Negotiating with the Taliban: Reconciliation in Afghanistan and Pakistan?
What is the potential for political negotiations and reconciliation to resolve the armed conflict raging on both sides of the Durand Line that separates Afghanistan and Pakistan?
Of Related Interest
- Watch video of the panelists speaking at this event
- Learn more about Michael Semple’s new book
- See a full list of speakers and their biographies
Event Summary
June 2009 was the most violent month in Afghanistan since 2001, and in July coalition forces launched a large-scale counter-insurgency campaign in the volatile Helmand Province. While kinetic operations continue to expand, U.S. and coalition commanders have repeatedly made clear that military means alone will not create the conditions for long-term peace and stability. Economic development and political reconciliation with disenfranchised actors must take place. Thus, it is increasingly necessary to explore the potential for negotiations to resolve the on-going armed conflict on both sides of the Durand Line—the 1,610 mile border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
To examine this issue, on July 10, 2009 the United States Institute of Peace launched its new book, "Reconciliation in Afghanistan,” with author Michael Semple and two panels of top experts. Discussions explored both the overlapping and distinct challenges of negotiating with insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Panelists detailed past negotiating failures, divergent aspirations, diverse insurgent groups with varied willingness to negotiate, and explored how far we can compromise on substantive issues such as women’s rights.
In the first panel, Semple detailed the initial 2001 Bonn Process in Afghanistan and its explicit provisions for reconciliation and political inclusivity. Over the last eight years of conflict however, Semple argues that the international community and government of Afghanistan have failed to create or manage a meaningful reconciliation process. The failure to do so has resulted in alienation and renewed resistance from insurgent groups that were initially willing to participate in a political process. While this failure has resulted in ongoing conflict, Semple suggests that major convergence in the aspirations of coalition partners, the Afghan government and most insurgent groups still remains—the desire for an end to conflict, an inclusive political process and an Afghan state which is free from foreign forces are all shared objectives. A political process which can facilitate dialogue towards these common aspirations is needed.
While political means are necessary for a negotiated settlement, human rights expert Patti Gossman discussed the lack of institutional frameworks and accountability as a severe impediment to enforceable and therefore meaningful agreements. She argued that efforts to negotiate must focus on the 'terms of the bargain', where the Afghan government and international partners are able to compromise, and what mechanisms can be established to ensure all parties are held accountable to their commitments. Former Afghan Interior Minister Ali Jalali added that the insurgency is not monolithic and the goals and grievances of each group will affect the degree to which they may be reconcilable. He highlighted the varying degrees of pragmatism in groups that are fighting primarily out of local or historical frustrations, fighting to support Taliban ideals embedded in adherence to Islam, Pashtun pride and power, and those who are simply using Afghan soil to pursue an international jihad. The former will be much easier to address than the latter.
USIP’s Imtiaz Ali and Shuja Nawaz, director of the South Asia Center of the Atlantic Council, opened the second panel with a discussion on past reconciliation efforts in Pakistan and the ways in which the current situation is linked to, but separate from, insurgent problems in Afghanistan. The Pakistani state has repeatedly failed to create and enforce meaningful agreements with insurgent groups in the disenfranchised tribal areas. In the last five years alone, the Pakistani government and militants in the NWFP and FATA areas have repeatedly entered, violated and then withdrawn from negotiated settlements. Both panelists agreed that a lack of economic opportunity and access to justice creates a willing base of insurgent support; until these problems are addressed, the current military operations cannot create a durable peace.
Nearly 150 participants attended the July 10 event, making it one of the largest in-house events in USIP history. Experts from both panels also addressed a host of questions from the audience including: the role for international actors, who should participate in negotiations, what objectives should be established, how a negotiated settlement could be enforced, what message the willingness to negotiate sends to insurgents, how negotiations may compromise U.S. objectives, how negotiations would affect women, and whether negotiations could be successful without adequate state structures.
Panel 1: Reconciliation in Afghanistan
Michael Semple
Former Deputy Special Representative of the EU to Afghanistan and author of Reconciliation in Afghanistan (USIP, 2009)
Ali Jalali
Former Minister of Interior for Afghanistan
Patricia Gossman
Founder, Afghanistan Justice Project
Alex Thier, Moderator
Senior Adviser, Rule of Law Center of Innovation, U.S. Institute of Peace
Panel 2: Negotiating with the Taliban in Pakistan
Shuja Nawaz
Director, South Asia Center, The Atlantic Council
Imtiaz Ali
Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow, U.S. Institute of Peace
Rodney Jones, Moderator
Program Officer for Pakistan and South Asia, U.S. Institute of Peace