News coverage of President Trump’s meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has focused significantly on the optics of their televised encounter at the demarcation line separating North and South Korea. But according to two senior U.S. experts—Ambassador Joseph Yun, the former U.S. special representative for North Korea policy, and Frank Aum, who served as advisor for North Korea to four U.S. defense secretaries—the announced plan for a resumption of working-level talks is potentially significant.

President Donald Trump and North Korea’s Kim Jong Un meet for the third time, Sunday, following their initial summit in Singapore in 2018, and a meeting they cut short in disagreement in February in Hanoi. (Erin Schaff/The New York Times)
President Donald Trump and North Korea’s Kim Jong Un meet for the third time, Sunday, following their initial summit in Singapore in 2018, and a meeting they cut short in disagreement in February in Hanoi. (Erin Schaff/The New York Times)

First, what is the big-picture significance of this widely broadcast encounter?

Frank Aum: There are legitimate criticisms about this meeting being a superficial photo opportunity and a legitimate argument that the state of U.S.-DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] negotiations is really no different than where we were nine months ago, when working level negotiations were supposed to start. But there were some important benefits.

For one, this was a historic meeting, the first time that a sitting U.S. president visited North Korea. Trump can point to this meeting to upend the narrative that U.S.-DPRK negotiations are stalled. Also, by signaling that the two sides will begin working level negotiations in a few weeks, Trump can respond to critics who argue that no progress is being made on denuclearization.

Kim Jong Un can claim a similar public relations and propaganda victory. Each meeting he has with the U.S. president legitimizes the North Korean leader. Kim can also claim that the U.S. president reached out to him for a meeting and was deferential by going to Kim's home court. In addition, Kim saves some face after the Hanoi debacle, their meeting cut short in February. And Kim can exert pressure on the skeptics within North Korea who believe that diplomacy is pointless and that North Korea should keep its nuclear weapons. Kim was clearly beaming when Trump was waiting for him at the military demarcation line in Panmunjom.

Beyond the optics, you both are saying that an opportunity exists for real progress. Sketch that for us.

Frank Aum: The biggest takeaway with regard to actual progress is that the two sides agreed to begin working-level negotiations in a few weeks. If they come to fruition, if they address the core issues of denuclearization and sanctions relief rather than just summit logistics or other lower-hanging fruit, and if the two sides demonstrate greater flexibility, then we have the real chance of reaching a breakthrough agreement. A lot of work remains.

Joseph Yun: The most significant result of the Trump-Kim Jong Un meeting Sunday was getting back to negotiations through a working-level group. Trump made it clear that the U.S. team would be led by the State Department, with Stephen Biegun, the special representative, under Secretary of State Pompeo’s auspices. The North Korean team is not clear. The team from the ruling party’s United Front Department that led negotiations in Hanoi and Singapore was dismissed, possibly severely punished, after the failure to reach a deal in Hanoi.

The challenge for the working-level negotiators is to come up with a deal better than the one on the table in Hanoi. For Pyongyang, this must mean significant sanctions relief. For Washington, the denuclearization side of the deal must include more than Kim’s offer in February to close the Yongbyon nuclear complex.

It is hard to imagine anyone other than President Trump taking this step. He is proud of his achievements on North Korea, especially in lowering tensions on the Korean Peninsula, and wants to make further progress. The big question is whether Kim Jong Un is using President Trump to advance his own agenda to become an accepted nuclear weapons state, or does he mean it when he says he is looking to fundamentally change North Korea? The working-level opportunity announced at the Trump-Kim meeting yesterday will likely provide the answers.


Related Publications

How Congress Can Help Improve Relations with North Korea

How Congress Can Help Improve Relations with North Korea

Thursday, May 9, 2024

Although the Constitution authorizes the president and the executive branch to lead foreign affairs, it also vests the legislative branch with responsibilities that impact the conduct of diplomacy and statecraft. These include the ability to “declare war,” “raise and support armies,” “regulate commerce with foreign nations” and approve treaties and diplomat appointments, as well as general oversight functions and power to appropriate money from the Treasury.

Type: Analysis

Global PolicyPeace Processes

Increasing Information Access for the North Korean People

Increasing Information Access for the North Korean People

Monday, April 15, 2024

In recent years, North Korea has become more repressive, more impoverished and more allergic to the outside world. Already turning inward after the failure of diplomatic efforts in 2019, the North Korean government isolated itself further amid the global COVID-19 pandemic. North Korea has learned to operate, and Kim Jong Un has learned to rule, with greater levels of self-isolation than aggressive international sanctions regimes could ever hope to impose. Given North Korea’s current mode of rejecting even humanitarian assistance and its recent turn toward Russia, the chances for diplomatic breakthroughs with Pyongyang look like a wishful long-term hope at best.

Type: Analysis

Global Policy

It’s Time to Resolve the Korean War

It’s Time to Resolve the Korean War

Monday, April 1, 2024

The greatest challenge to peaceful coexistence between North Korea and the United States is the technical state of war between the two countries. The United States and the Soviet Union may have been at ideological loggerheads, used proxies in regional conflicts and come close to direct superpower blows — but they were not in a state of war. Resolution of the Korean War should be set as a stated U.S. policy objective. This is a necessary Step Zero on the road to peaceful coexistence with North Korea today and could reduce the risk of deliberate or accidental conflict, nuclear or otherwise.

Type: Analysis

Global Policy

Three Conditions for Successful Engagement with North Korea

Three Conditions for Successful Engagement with North Korea

Monday, March 25, 2024

The September 13, 2023, meeting between Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un in Russia’s Amur Oblast marked a significant crippling of the decades-long U.S. pressure-based approach toward North Korea. The strategy of isolating and pressuring North Korea through United Nations Security Council resolutions to compel its nuclear disarmament in exchange for providing normalized relations, economic aid and sanctions relief may or may not ever have been a winning strategy, but now is no longer viable. The strategy required cooperation among the United States, South Korea, China and Russia, but this now seems a distant prospect.

Type: Analysis

Global Policy

View All Publications