KEY TAKEAWAYS
KEY TAKEAWAYS
South Korea’s only official policy regarding unification with North Korea is the "Three-Stage National Community Unification Formula" (hereafter “Unification Formula”), first declared by the Roh Tae-woo administration in 1989 and partially revised by the Kim Young-sam administration in 1994. However, the Korean Peninsula has changed drastically for the worse in recent years, and achieving “reconciliation and cooperation,” the first part of the three-stage formula, has become unrealistic. North Korea continues to arm itself with nuclear weapons and, at the beginning of 2024, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un suddenly declared the inter-Korean relationship as a hostile one between two separate states and renounced Pyongyang’s long-standing peaceful unification policy, making the prospect of unification even more distant.
Against this backdrop, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol announced a new unification policy called the "8.15 Unification Doctrine" (hereafter “Unification Doctrine”) during his August 15, 2024 Liberation Day address. This new doctrine’s unilateral approach is unlikely to advance either unification or peace on the Korean Peninsula.
Yoon previewed the purpose and intent of his Unification Doctrine in a March 1 Independence Movement Day speech in 2024. He criticized the North Korean regime’s "tyranny and human rights abuses" and declared that unification should be pursued by expanding “the universal values of freedom and human rights” into North Korea. His Unification Doctrine, intending to end North Korean tyranny and expand freedom to the whole Korean Peninsula, consists of three unification visions, three implementation strategies and seven action plans.
The three visions of “a Unified Republic of Korea" are: “(1) a country full of happiness where people’s freedom and safety are guaranteed; (2) a strong and prosperous country soaring through creativity and innovation; (3) and a country that contributes to global peace and prosperity.” The expression "Unified Republic of Korea" stands out in contrast to the previous Unification Formula, which called the final state a "unified state" or “Korean Peninsula state.” However, the Unification Doctrine intentionally uses the term "Unified Republic of Korea" to emphasize unification led by the Republic of Korea, South Korea’s official name, achieved by expanding freedom into North Korea.
The three implementation strategies for achieving the vision of "a Unified Republic of Korea" include: (1) fostering the values and capacity of freedom domestically in South Korea to promote unification; (2) “changing the minds of the North Korean people to make them ardently desire a freedom-based unification”; and (3) building international solidarity for a South Korea-led unification. Yoon emphasized the second implementation strategy, calling for the propagation of the value of freedom among North Korean residents to induce changes in the North.
Finally, the doctrine proposed seven action plans to achieve the vision of a Unified Republic of Korea and fulfill the three implementation strategies:
The most notable feature of the Unification Doctrine is that it places unification at the forefront of South Korea’s North Korea policy. Following Kim Jong Un’s decision to ditch North Korea’s traditional national unification policy, the Unification Doctrine declared South Korea's strong will for unification both domestically and internationally. The doctrine also aimed to reaffirm South Korea’s territorial claim over the entire Korean Peninsula, in line with Article 3 of its Constitution, in the event of a contingency in North Korea.
Both conservative and progressive governments in South Korea used to take a low-key approach to the unification issue. The unification policies of conservative governments under Kim Young-sam, Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye passively waited for North Korean regime change and prepared for unification internally. Progressive governments under Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun, and Moon Jae-in renounced unification-by-absorption, pursuing inter-Korean dialogue, peaceful coexistence and economic cooperation to facilitate a gradual, peaceful unification. The new Unification Doctrine not only promotes unification as the foremost North Korea policy goal but also pursues it actively and assertively.
Next, whereas the Unification Formula recognized the North Korean authorities as negotiation counterparts and pursued unification through negotiations and agreements, the Unification Doctrine is a unilateral unification strategy. Kim Tae-hyo, the first deputy director of the National Security Office who led the drafting of the Unification Doctrine, has insisted that “unilateral, proactive unification actions are inevitable since the first step of reconciliation and cooperation under the Unification Formula had not been properly implemented in the past 30 years.” The use of the term "doctrine" here also reflects the Yoon administration’s intent to unilaterally declare unification visions and strategies toward North Korea.
Against this backdrop, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol announced a new unification policy called the "8.15 Unification Doctrine" (hereafter “Unification Doctrine”) during his August 15, 2024 Liberation Day address. This new doctrine’s unilateral approach is unlikely to advance either unification or peace on the Korean Peninsula.
Though the Yoon administration claims that the Unification Doctrine "inherits and supplements" the Unification Formula, the doctrine appears to replace the formula.
Also, while previous unification policies emphasized reconciliation, cooperation and national homogeneity to create an environment conducive to consensual unification between the two Koreas, the Unification Doctrine supports the inducement of freedom among North Korean residents to accelerate national unification. It largely excludes negotiations with North Korea and proposes a unilateral approach aimed at "changing the North Korean residents to eagerly desire free unification." Kim Tae-hyo said in an August press briefing that “unification is not to be made by negotiation artificially between authorities but by South and North Korean people as the main actors and drivers of freedom, peace, and unification.”
Though the Yoon administration claims that the Unification Doctrine "inherits and supplements" the Unification Formula, the doctrine appears to replace the formula. The Yoon administration argues that the Unification Formula lacks a final vision of a unified state and a strategy to achieve it, which the Unification Doctrine aims to address. Despite the Yoon administration’s claim of inheritance, its Unification Doctrine differs significantly from the formula in the sense that the doctrine negates inter-Korean negotiations as the foremost policy means; ignores the gradual, functional three-stage approach to unification; and skips the critical first stage of reconciliation and cooperation.
The new doctrine will likely be no more effective than the Unification Formula for several reasons.
First, for any North Korean policy to bear fruit, it must be based on national consensus, ensuring the support and sustainability of the policy. However, given the intense divisions in South Korea surrounding North Korean policies, the doctrine’s polarizing approach is not sustainable. Almost all new unification initiatives by previous administrations failed to survive beyond their terms. But the Unification Formula, though ineffective, has survived changes in administrations for 30 years, either due to the national consensus already formed around it or the lack of better options.
Given the intense divisions in South Korea surrounding North Korean policies, the doctrine’s polarizing approach is not sustainable.
Second, the Unification Doctrine essentially advocates for the North Korean people to pursue regime change, which the Kim regime will find hostile and may counter aggressively. It is likely this long-standing fear of internal instability motivated North Korea to treat South Korea as a “hostile foreign state” and ignore South Korea’s engagement and unification overtures. North Korea also strengthens its nuclear deterrence capabilities partially to help fend off South Korea’s information and change offensives under the Unification Doctrine. In addition, North Korea has utilized the U.S. competition with both China and Russia to build a North Korea-China-Russia trilateral security and economic bloc that might render the doctrine’s pressure and sanctions tactics ineffective for inducing changes in the North.
Third, for the Unification Doctrine to be sustainable and effective, it must secure international support, particularly from key regional actors. However, given the current geopolitical competition in the region, meeting this condition seems challenging. China and Russia will likely reject the Unification Doctrine and may even obstruct it. These authoritarian and communist states uphold "non-interference in internal affairs" as a core diplomatic principle, and they share common interests in resisting democratization efforts from outside forces.
Since China and Russia also want North Korea to remain a strategic buffer against U.S. advances in Northeast Asia, they will not support doctrines that undermine this outcome. Meanwhile, although the United States and Japan support South Korea’s Unification Doctrine in general, they are likely to be cautious about its full implementation. Their immediate security challenges are to contain the expansion of China and Russia, maintain peace and stability, and prevent war and nuclear use on the Korean Peninsula, rather than pursue South Korea-led, freedom-based unification or alter the current status quo on the Peninsula.
The Yoon administration claimed that its Unification Doctrine updated the 30-year-old National Community Unification Formula and filled in a few blanks. However, the doctrine is presenting an “alternative unification plan” quite different from the existing formula in its vision and implementation strategies. Now South Korea seems to have two unification formulas. The previous Unification Formula was indeed outdated, ineffective and hollow. But the new doctrine seems detached from geopolitical reality, overly optimistic and potentially risky. The Dong-A Ilbo, a major conservative newspaper in Seoul, rightly pointed out in an August 16 editorial that “if the Yoon government lacks effective strategies to change the stance of the North Korean regime, which should be South Korea’s dialogue counterpart, while focusing solely on the ideological clarity of freedom-based unification, then the Doctrine might become a one-off event."