While there are similarities between Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s aggression toward Taiwan, USIP’s Andrew Scobell says the two situations are markedly different upon closer inspection: “Russia also likes to flout international norms [while] China largely pretends to be playing by them.”

U.S. Institute of Peace experts discuss the latest foreign policy issues from around the world in On Peace, a brief weekly collaboration with SiriusXM's POTUS Channel 124.

Transcript

Julie Mason
Well, there's lots of speculation about what kind of lesson China might be taking from Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Dr. Andrew Scobell is distinguished fellow with the China Program at the U.S. Institute of Peace. He's here to tell us that China is not Russia and Taiwan is not Ukraine. Dr. Scobell, good morning.

Andrew Scobell
Good morning.

Julie Mason
There have been a lot of comparisons and you say broad brush: Yeah, sure, Ukraine and Taiwan have some things in common. But you say Xi isn't Putin, and in fact, Taiwan and Ukraine, their situations are quite different. Tell us about it.

Andrew Scobell
Sure. Well, China is quite different from Russia, because it's much more integrated into the global economy. And because Russia is not. Russia also likes to flout international norms. China largely pretends to be playing by them. In terms of leaders, Xi Jinping, the leader of China likes to project the image of a global statesman who is part of the world, abides by world norms and largely plays by the rules. Putin, by contrast likes his bad boy image. Those are some key differences, I think, between Russia and China. As far as Ukraine and Taiwan, both are really the object of irredentist claims by Russia and China, respectively. And yet, Ukraine is outside of NATO. It doesn't have any de jure or de facto allies. Taiwan, yes, it doesn't officially have any allies but it has close security ties with a number of countries, including and most notably the United States. I think from China's perspective, any military operation against Taiwan, they assume that the U.S. will come to Taiwan's aid. But clearly, in Ukraine Putin understood that no country, including the United States would come to its aid.

Julie Mason
Well, aren't there some questions about how much the U.S. would actually do for Taiwan?

Andrew Scobell
Sure. But, I think the key here is, what does Beijing think? And the assumption has long been that a military attack on Taiwan? The U.S. armed forces would come to the rescue.

Julie Mason
And Dr. Scobell, what do you make of the role China's playing vis-a-vis Russia and Ukraine, and I mentioned earlier on the show that Jake Sullivan will be meeting with a Chinese counterpart in Rome, to talk about it.

Andrew Scobell
China is in a difficult position, because they have a close relationship with Russia, they call it a strategic partnership. Putin and Xi have met almost 40 times over the years, most recently in February, in Beijing. So they have this close relationship. But both Russia and China insist it's not an alliance. So China doesn't feel like it has to come militarily to Russia's assistance. And yet, it also wants to maintain cordial relations with the rest of the world including Europe, including the United States. So it's walking this fine line to appear reasonable and neutral. And not be tarred with the same brush as the Russians, and then at the same time not be forced to openly criticize Russia.

Julie Mason
Dr. Scobell how much of Xi's power, in his own estimation, do you believe is derived from Chinese economic prosperity? I mean, does he do well because of the rise of the middle class and people have consumer goods there and the idea of a prosperous nation? Or Is he strong because their military is so powerful? Or is it both?

Andrew Scobell
I think it's both. But it leans more towards the economics. And so that really casts in stark terms: wars are bad for China's economy. And especially a war that drags on, wherever it is in Ukraine or elsewhere. But China has significant economic interests in Ukraine and so this war dragging on is just bad news for China.

Julie Mason
And I think we have some understanding of why Putin went into Ukraine and what his you know, delusions are there. Does China need Taiwan, other than just wanting Taiwan?

Andrew Scobell
Well, China has – speaking of economic interest – has substantial economic interests in Taiwan. There's a lot of commercial ties across the Taiwan Strait. And so economically, Taiwan is very valuable to China, but politically China needs Taiwan, too, because it's painted itself into or backed itself into a corner. The ruling Communist Party has insisted that there's one thing that the Communist Party refuses to negotiate, or it stands firm on, is unification with Taiwan. But, so it's part of the political legitimacy of the Communist Party rule is linked into maintaining this claim. Now, that doesn't mean that they feel huge pressure to take Taiwan, to unify with Taiwan tomorrow or next week. But certainly, the ongoing situation in Ukraine, in the minds of Chinese leaders creates – they can't help but think, well, what about Taiwan?

Julie Mason
Really, really interesting. Dr. Andrew Scobell is distinguished fellow at the China Program at the U.S. Institute of Peace. His piece "China's not Russia, Taiwan is not Ukraine." Thank you so much for joining me this morning.

Andrew Scobell
You're welcome. Thank you.

Julie Mason
Really good to talk.


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