KEY TAKEAWAYS
KEY TAKEAWAYS
Chinese leader Xi Jinping last week made his first trip to the European continent in five years, visiting France, Hungary and Serbia. In Paris, Xi faced tough questions over trade and China’s support for Russia and its war in Ukraine, but met a much friendlier reception in Budapest and Belgrade, both of which view China as a key economic and political partner. Still, the visit demonstrated the obstacles Beijing faces in fostering deeper ties across Europe, where resentment is simmering over China’s moral and materiel aid to Russia and what Europe views as unfair trade practices.
USIP’s Andrew Scobell, Mirna Galic, Katie Ruppert and Mary Glantz look at what Xi was trying to accomplish with this trip, what it shows about European divisions on China and the implications for Russia’s war on Ukraine.
Scobell: Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s recent visit to France, Hungary and Serbia was his first post-COVID trip in Europe. His last sojourns to Europe were in 2019 when Xi took a three-country swing through Italy, France and Monaco in March, and then paid a state visit to Greece in November of that year. Xi’s 2024 European excursion was purposefully planned. Of course, all Xi’s overseas travel is carefully scripted, heavily stage-managed and minutely organized. While Xi’s May 2024 European jaunt was no exception to Beijing’s thorough preparation, this trip was even more scrupulously conceived. Why? Because Beijing is painfully aware that China is not particularly popular in most European capitals either among the political class or ordinary people.
So, when looking for countries to visit where Xi could expect red carpet treatment and a warm welcome, the list Chinese officials compiled was very short indeed. Xi did not want to greet grim-faced leaders, engage in barbed exchanges or see hostile street protests through the tinted windows of his limousine. All three countries were chosen with the knowledge that Beijing would control the agenda, manage the optics and be extremely confident that controversy would be avoided.
Beyond the desire for positive pleasantries and good optics, Xi had other goals. Europe is considered a pivotal region albeit not a particularly welcoming one to China. Beijing looks to weaken the unity of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and strengthen China’s economic access to the European Union (EU).
In France, Xi sought to nurture the relationship he has developed over the years with President Emmanuel Macron and leverage the French leader’s desire to play a mediator between the United States and China. In Hungary, Xi aimed to solidify his good ties with Prime Minister Viktor Orban who has shown himself to be the most pro-China of any NATO member or EU member head of government. Orban has aligned himself and his country as highly sympathetic to China and has embraced sizeable Chinese investment. Serbia, meanwhile, has demonstrated itself to be one of China’s most enthusiastic partner states in the Balkans and welcomed multiple Chinese Belt and Road infrastructure projects.
Galic: On paper, Europe is fairly united in its perceptions of China, both internally, and with the United States. The EU and NATO have complementary agreed language on China, with the former categorizing China as a “an economic competitor” and a “systemic rival” and the latter warning of the “systemic challenges posed by [China] to Euro-Atlantic security.” Still, both emphasize the importance of cooperation with China. Much of this stems from an internal reckoning within Europe on China, based on various economic, political and geostrategic factors. Neither the EU nor NATO are very prescriptive on China, with the exception of the EU’s stance on trade. What does differ, both within Europe and between European allies and the United States, is how to interpret or implement agreed language provided by the EU and NATO, as well as how China fits into various national economies.
As alluded to above, France has appointed itself to a sort of leadership role within the EU on China and the French approach reflects Macron’s view of a unique French diplomatic role, desire for European strategic autonomy from the United States and concerns about economic disadvantages for French and EU trade. This prominence and Macron’s state visit to Beijing in 2023 — which pleased Xi but brought consternation from many French allies — along with Beijing’s view of European autonomy as a useful fulcrum for separating the United States and Europe, made Paris a priority for Xi’s visit. Much to his credit, Macron ensured that Xi’s meetings in Paris included European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, an effort he also made during his visit to Beijing.
From the seat of one of the leading nations of the European project, Xi next flew to one of its remaining outsiders, Serbia. Belgrade has been in discussions to join the EU since 2014 and seems further rather than closer to that goal given the illiberal tendencies of its government. Belgrade and Beijing share a host of other affinities, including close relations with Russian President Vladimir Putin, a distrust of NATO (Xi’s visit fells on the 25th anniversary of NATO’s accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the alliance’s air campaign over Kosovo in 1999) and support for one another’s respective claims to Taiwan and Kosovo. More broadly, the Beijing-Belgrade relationship reflects a manifestation in Europe of a problem China has posed around the world by providing alternative sources of investment and legitimacy to governments whose other potential partners demand improvements in governance, corruption or human rights.
As far as Hungary goes, Orban has long been seen as a bit of a spoiler for Beijing within the EU, as he demonstrated notably by thwarting EU statements related to China in 2016 and 2021. Hungary was also the first European country to sign a belt and road agreement with China back in 2015 and China is the country’s single biggest investor as of 2023. Xi’s visit to Hungary is, therefore, no surprise and simply a recognition and continuation of the special relationship between Budapest and Beijing. Like in the case of Serbia, China’s relationship with Hungary reflects a broader problem for an EU struggling to reign in a member state whose government shows authoritarian leanings and for whom China provides a ready external backer.
We hear a lot about how China is working to divide Europe from the United States. The perception Xi's visit gives based on what we saw with one stop in an EU stalwart, one in an EU spoiler and one in a non-EU member is that China also has interests in dividing Europe itself, perhaps into different blocs. This is quite ironic given all of China’s talk against blocs.
Ruppert: If European nations had hoped that the trip signaled a change in China’s approach to Ukraine, they are almost certainly disappointed. Macron had placed the Ukraine war, in addition to trade disputes, at the top of his agenda with the Chinese president and both he and von der Leyen pressed Xi to do more to stop the conflict.
Xi’s prickly response made it clear that Beijing was not considering a shift in policy; “We oppose using the Ukraine crisis to cast blame, smear a third country and incite a new Cold War,” Xi said. Xi further defended his role both in public statements and in an op-ed in Le Figaro before he arrived, saying that Beijing was “not at the origin of this crisis, nor a party to it, nor a participant.”
Macron can only hang his hat on Xi’s willingness to jointly call for an “Olympics truce” — a pause in all fighting in all conflicts across the world for the duration of the Paris Olympics from July 26 to Aug. 11.
Glantz: Instead, Putin’s imminent visit to Beijing suggests that the “partnership without limits” remains as strong as ever. From May 16-17, Putin will lead a delegation including now-former defense minister Sergei Shoigu and current Defense Minister Andrei Belousov to Beijing and Harbin. There Putin and Xi will reportedly “have an extensive discussion of the entire scope of issues pertaining to the Russia-China overarching partnership and strategic cooperation. They will outline priorities for further practical cooperation between the two states and have an in-depth exchange of opinions on the most pressing international and regional issues.”
In other words, Russia is signaling that its relationship with China remains strong and that any hopes that China would pressure Russia to end its war against Ukraine are in vain.