KEY TAKEAWAYS
KEY TAKEAWAYS
Over four months after winning Taiwan’s presidential election, William Lai Ching-te from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) officially took office on May 20. Beijing fiercely criticized Lai’s inaugural address and conducted military drills and patrols around Taiwan in a bid to “punish” Lai for failing to heed China’s preferred positions. In the days following the speech, Lai also faced challenges at home, as opposition parties in Taiwan’s legislature passed a set of reform bills that critics warn could increase China’s ability to interfere in Taiwan’s domestic affairs.
All signs point to increasing cross-Strait tensions over the next four years as Taipei and Beijing test each other’s limits and seek to advance their political objectives.
Lai, who was vice president under previous president Tsai Ing-wen, aimed to reassure Taiwan voters that his administration would have continuity with his predecessor’s approach to domestic issues such as economic development and energy policy, as well as foreign policy. On cross-Strait relations, however, Lai made three key points that demonstrated a relatively tougher stance on China, surprising some in Beijing.
First, Lai pledged to stand firm on Taiwan's sovereignty. Lai used the word “sovereignty” seven times during his speech, a significant increase over Tsai's single mention of the word in her 2016 inaugural address and its total absence from her 2020 speech. Lai also referenced “Taiwan” 82 times, far exceeding Tsai's 41 mentions in her 2016 speech and 47 uses in 2020. While many use the terms Taiwan and Republic of China interchangeably, calling the island “Taiwan” suggests that it is a separate entity from China. The Republic of China, or ROC, is the official name and more palatable to Beijing. And while Tsai used diplomatic terms like “the other side of the Strait” or “Beijing authorities” in her inaugural speech, Lai directly mentioned “China” seven times, clearly distinguishing Taiwan from China.
Second, Lai’s speech adopted a stronger and more assertive position toward Beijing. Although Lai’s cross-Strait approach seems largely aligned with Tsai’s broad direction on the surface, subtle differences lie in the finer details. He endorsed Tsai’s “Four Commitments” but specifically only elaborated on the one that Taiwan and China are not subordinate to each other. Lai also condemned China’s military threat in a more straightforward and assertive way than Tsia ever did. He called China’s military actions and gray-zone coercion “the greatest strategic challenges to global peace and stability,” and emphasized that “China’s ambition to annex Taiwan will not simply disappear.”
Third, “democracy” was a prominent theme throughout Lai's speech. Lai positioned democratic Taiwan as a beacon of global peace and a driver of global prosperity. By placing Taiwan in the pantheon of the world's democratic nations, Lai was likely hoping to build international support for Taiwan’s political system, boost Taiwan’s status on the global stage, and further distance Taiwan from Beijing.
Lai sent a clear signal to Beijing that he would not back down in the face of pressure. Still, his speech reflected a degree of restraint. The new president’s team knew that China would object to any speech that did not explicitly accept the 1992 Consensus — a vague agreement reached in the early 1990s that stipulates that both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to “one China” — which Lai would not do. Instead, he mixed tough words with subtle olive branches to Beijing, such as mentioning the historical figure Chiang Wei-shui, who is deemed acceptable on both sides of the Strait. He also used the term ROC 15 times, which was more than Tsai did in 2016 or 2020. In Beijing’s eyes, however, the limited conciliatory language in the speech was not enough to counterbalance Lai’s harsher rhetoric.
Lai sent a clear signal to Beijing that he would not back down in the face of pressure. Still, his speech reflected a degree of restraint.
No matter what Lai might have said in his speech, Beijing’s opposition to the address was a foregone conclusion. But Lai’s stance on cross-Strait relations and Taiwan’s sovereignty further intensified Beijing's displeasure. Since Lai was nominated as the DPP’s presidential candidate in April 2023, Beijing has consistently accused him of being a “stubborn Taiwan independence worker” and “destroyer of cross-Strait peace.”
Indeed, Beijing’s rhetorical response was swift and harsh. Just hours after the speech, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) issued a short statement accusing Lai of “vigorously promoting the separatism fallacies” and “inciting cross-Strait confrontation,” echoing previous criticisms. The following day, the TAO gave a comprehensive response to Lai’s speech, characterizing it as a complete “confession of Taiwan independence.” The statement accused Taiwan’s leader of promptly “revealing the true face of ‘Taiwan independence’ upon taking office.” China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, said that “all Taiwan independence separatists will be nailed to the pillar of shame in history.” On May 29, during the TAO’s first press conference after the speech, a spokesperson further criticized the speech for filling with lies and deceit, distorting history, and promoting Taiwan independence under the guise of “democracy.”
On May 21, the Chinese Communist Party’s official People's Daily newspaper dedicated its entire fourth page to strongly refuting Lai's approach to cross-Strait affairs. A commentary titled “Taiwan independence worker’s empty rhetoric harms Taiwan” accused Lai of deceitfully promoting a “two-state theory” and exacerbating cross-Strait tensions. Mainland academics described the speech as sending a “very intense” signal to Beijing with its “pro-independence” language. Zhou Zhihuai, former director of the Institute of Taiwan at the Chinese Academy of Social Science, said Lai’s was the “most pro-independence speech” ever given by a Taiwanese leader.
China also used its military to intimidate Taiwan after the speech. On May 23, China conducted two days of military exercises that encircled Taiwan. A spokesperson for the Chinese military’s Eastern Theater Command, which is responsible for the drills and a potential Taiwan contingency, called the exercise “a strong punishment for the separatist acts of Taiwan independence forces and a serious warning against interference and provocation by external forces.”
The duration and scale of China’s military drills were smaller than those conducted in August 2022 after then-House Speaker Pelosi visited Taipei and in April 2023 after Tsai transited through California. Yet a Taiwanese military expert noted that unlike previous exercises, these drills simulated a “full-scale armed invasion of Taiwan,” encompassed Taiwan's outlying islands for the first time, and were conducted at the edge of the 24 nautical miles of Taiwan's contiguous zone. Beijing continued its military pressure and intimidation campaign on May 28, by conducting “joint combat readiness patrols” in the air and waters around Taiwan.
China has also used economic tools to express its displeasure. On May 20, the Ministry of Commerce added three U.S. companies to its “unreliable entities” list for their involvement in arms sales to Taiwan. The next day China sent a clear signal that it was also not satisfied with Washington’s posture on Taiwan, issuing sanctions on former U.S. congressman Mike Gallagher, who chaired the U.S. House of Representatives’ Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, for his “interference in China's internal affairs, undermining China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and infringing on China's interests.” And last week, China’s State Council announced the suspension of preferential tariff arrangements on 134 items under the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, a cross-Strait trade agreement signed in 2010.
Although China’s response to Lai’s speech has been strong, it has also been carefully calibrated not to provoke the United States, as Beijing does not want to make the cross-Strait issue a major area of focus in the U.S. presidential campaign.
The continued harassment is all part of Beijing’s broader effort to redefine a “new normal” of heightened military pressure on Taiwan.
The continued harassment is all part of Beijing’s broader effort to redefine a “new normal” of heightened military pressure on Taiwan. These actions, coupled with additional diplomatic, economic and military gray-zone coercion, are intended to undermine the Lai administration’s legitimacy and ability to govern.
Indeed, Lai is already experiencing challenges from Taiwan’s legislature, where opposition parties rapidly approved several bills that will greatly expand the legislature’s power, citing the goal of improving institutional checks and balances. Critics are primarily concerned about the swift and forceful push to pass the bills without considering public feedback on the details. Some also called the measures “pro-China” and warned that they would make it easier for Beijing to interfere in Taiwan’s domestic affairs and weaken civil society. Tens of thousands of people are protesting the bills outside the legislature building, and this new “Bluebird Movement,” now a highly partisan issue in Taiwan, could signal the potential for discord in the divided government ahead.
Over the next four years, Taipei and Beijing will likely continue to probe each other's implicit boundaries, seeking opportunities to advance their political agendas and shift political narratives and conventional wisdom in the region and around the world. Taiwan’s leaders will work to further strengthen the island democracy’s distinct political identity, while Beijing will use a combination of carrots and sticks to encourage Taiwan voters to seek peaceful unification on Beijing’s terms. While this tension may remain restrained until the U.S. presidential election, it will likely escalate in 2025.
As tensions rise, so does the risk of unwanted conflict. Improved communication between Washington and Beijing, and between Beijing and Taipei, will be critical for ensuring that all parties are sending clear signals and correctly interpreting the messages sent by others.
Improved communication between Washington and Beijing, and between Beijing and Taipei, will be critical for ensuring that all parties are sending clear signals and correctly interpreting the messages sent by others.
The U.S. Congress will continue to play a key role in U.S. policy toward Taiwan and cross-Strait relations more broadly. Lai’s speech made only one direct mention of the United States, and that was a reference to the Indo-Pacific Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, which provided support to Taiwan. A week after Lai’s inauguration, two bipartisan House and Senate delegations traveled to Taipei to demonstrate U.S. support for the new government.
Given Lai’s tougher line on China and Beijing’s unyielding position on Taiwan, it’s unlikely that cross-Strait relations will improve or that tensions will lower anytime soon. Even as Washington is occupied with the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, it should remain laser-focused on helping Taiwan defend itself and deter military conflict. Conflict in the Taiwan Strait is neither imminent nor inevitable, but all sides — Taipei, Beijing and Washington — must work to keep the peace in what is one of the world’s most dangerous flashpoints for great power conflict.