KEY TAKEAWAYS
KEY TAKEAWAYS
Tensions between Israel and the Lebanese Shia militia Hezbollah are at their highest point since their 2006 war. They have exchanged tit-for-tat attacks since October, displacing tens of thousands from northern Israel and southern Lebanon. But in recent weeks, both sides have escalated the violence and rhetoric. USIP’s Mona Yacoubian looks at what’s driving this escalation, what each side is trying to tell the other and the diplomatic efforts underway to lower the temperature.
The current cross-border hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel date back to October 8 when Hezbollah launched rocket strikes against Israel following Hamas’s October 7 terror attack against Israel and the ensuing war in Gaza. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has vowed to continue the fight until there is a cease-fire in Gaza.
Since October, fighting between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Hezbollah has occurred almost daily, with the severity of fighting escalating as both sides probe more deeply into the other’s territory and unleash even deadlier firepower. The impacts have been severe for both Israel and Lebanon: more than 60,000 Israelis have been displaced from northern Israel and an estimated 94,000 Lebanese have been forced out of southern Lebanon. Meanwhile, nearly 100 Lebanese civilians and more than 300 Hezbollah fighters have been killed, while in Israel, 18 soldiers and 10 civilians have been killed, according to Israeli military sources.
The most recent ratcheting up of violence has been notable in many respects. Starting in May, Hezbollah began using more advanced weaponry including more sophisticated drones and guided missiles. The violence continued its upswing with the June 12 Israeli strike that killed the most senior Hezbollah commander to date. Hezbollah retaliated with an “unprecedented” rocket and missile barrage, sparking fires across various parts of northern Israel. The IDF then responded with a heavy assault on Hezbollah. This escalation round between Israel and Hezbollah marks a greater pace and breadth of attacks, expanding well beyond the largely calibrated approach previously taken.
Adding to the military escalation, both sides have engaged in a deepening war of words with increasingly bellicose statements and threats.
Adding to the military escalation, both sides have engaged in a deepening war of words with increasingly bellicose statements and threats. In a June 19 speech, Nasrallah vowed that all of Israel would be vulnerable to attack and for the first time, threatened a reprisal against European Union member Cyprus — if it helps Israel attack Lebanon — and potential targets in the Mediterranean sea. For its part, the Israeli military has noted that its war plans against Hezbollah are complete, warning of the potential for “all-out” conflict.
Increasingly sophisticated signaling operations have accompanied the war footing rhetoric. In a recent example, on June 18, Hezbollah released on social media drone footage of Israel’s Haifa port and other critical infrastructure, purporting to demonstrate Hezbollah’s ability to evade Israeli surveillance and air defense systems and threaten Israeli sites. Following the Hezbollah drone episode, a British newspaper citing unnamed sources alleged Hezbollah was storing Iranian weapons at the Beirut International Airport, interpreted as a thinly veiled threat against Hezbollah. The charge was immediately refuted by Lebanese authorities.
The escalating tensions between Israel and Hezbollah reflect a moment of unprecedented danger in the region. Prospects for an all-out confrontation that would embroil Israel, Lebanon and potentially beyond are growing. Three factors are feeding this increased risk of major conflict: First, the upending of previous rules of engagement and established redlines in the wake of October 7; second, a confluence of events driving toward conflict with no easy off-ramp; and third, a heightened risk of miscalculation.
Factor 1: No clear rules of the game. Hamas’ October 7 attack and the ensuing conflict in Gaza — with its reverberations across multiple regional flashpoints — has launched the region into uncharted waters. In April, these tensions erupted into the first serious instance of direct confrontation between Israel and Iran, marking the crossing of a Rubicon. In essence, the old “rules of engagement” have been upended, overtaken by a new reality.
In this new, uncertain environment, Israel and Hezbollah are testing and probing to understand these new parameters and seeking to establish new “redlines.” Hezbollah’s escalation seemingly contradicts conventional wisdom that the militant group does not want to bear the cost of dragging Lebanon into a catastrophic war. However, new dynamics may now be at play in the aftermath of Iran’s April attack on Israel. An emboldened Iran — and by extension its proxy Hezbollah — sensing that Israel’s invincibility has been pierced may be testing where the new boundaries are for Israel. Hezbollah may also believe that Israel is in a weakened position, with its forces stretched in Gaza amid growing global criticism of its conduct of the war.
In this new, uncertain environment, Israel and Hezbollah are testing and probing to understand these new parameters and seeking to establish new redlines.
For its part, Israel may be reaching the limits of what it can tolerate in the north, which has become a de facto buffer zone. Nasrallah’s taunts coupled with the group’s advancing capabilities could impel Israel to take action. In responding to Hezbollah’s threats, Israel’s foreign minister noted that Israel was “getting very close to the moment of deciding on changing the rules of the game against Hezbollah and Lebanon.”
Factor 2: Unfortunate timing. Several dynamics are coming to a head at the same time. The Israeli government is under increasing pressure to address the situation in the north by making it safe for displaced Israelis to return, especially before the September start of the school year. A recent poll by the Hebrew language paper Maariv found that 62% of Israelis support a decisive war on Hezbollah. With major operations in Rafah winding down, Israeli forces will be freed to move to the north and confront Hezbollah. Hinting at this prospect, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently noted that the “intense phase” of fighting Hamas in Gaza is nearly over, and Israeli troops would then “face north.” He warned that if the challenge emanating from Lebanon is not resolved diplomatically, Israel will respond “in another way.” Meanwhile, with rapidly diminishing prospects for a Gaza hostage-cease-fire deal, Nasrallah continues to insist that his forces will not relent in their attacks on Israel barring a Gaza cease-fire.
Factor 3: Increased risk of miscalculation. Taken together, the lack of clear rules of engagement coupled with compounding deadlines pressuring toward conflict have dramatically increased the risk of miscalculation. While both sides profess the desire to avoid all-out war, the likelihood of error in this environment is quite high. With so much dizzying static and noise, signals can easily be lost or misunderstood. Indeed, the Israelis reportedly miscalculated in April when deciding to strike the Iranian facility in Damascus, underestimating how Iran would respond. As such, this is perhaps the most dangerous time — where efforts to establish redlines in order to avoid a bigger war, lead to miscalculations, misunderstandings and unintended escalation that trigger the worst outcome.
Multiple efforts are underway to de-escalate tensions and avert a widescale conflict. French, German and European Union diplomats have traveled to the region seeking a diplomatic solution. More significantly, U.S. Special Envoy Amos Hochstein has engaged in intensive diplomacy over the past week, shuttling between Israel and Lebanon and meeting with key government officials on both sides in search of an off-ramp.
In one scenario, the United States could seek to leverage an Israeli announcement that major combat operations in Gaza have concluded toward broader efforts to de-escalate that fall short of a formal Gaza cease-fire. This effort would likely entail a deal where Hezbollah forces withdraw several kilometers from the Israeli border and the Lebanese Armed Forces would expand and dramatically increase their footprint in southern Lebanon.
In the event diplomacy fails to achieve a deal, the United States has also engaged in its own messaging campaign in an effort to get both sides to step back from the brink of war. In a series of stark warnings to both sides, U.S. officials have raised the specter of war spiraling out of control. Hochstein reportedly sent Hezbollah a message that the United States would not be able to restrain Israel if the escalation continues. Meanwhile, the U.S. chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said that the United States would not have the same ability to defend Israel in a war with Hezbollah as it did with Iran given Lebanon’s proximity to Israel and shorter warning times. He also warned that an Israeli military offensive could prompt Iran to get involved, potentially triggering a wider war that would endanger U.S. troops in the region. A separate report by U.S. officials noted that the Israel’s Iron Dome anti-missile defenses could be overwhelmed by a massive Hezbollah strike.
Indeed, for Israel, a full-scale war with Hezbollah would be a fundamentally different and more significant challenge than it has faced with Hamas, particularly with Israeli forces stretched thin by nearly nine months of fighting in Gaza. Backed by Iran, Hezbollah is a much more effective and capable fighting force than Hamas — with critical strategic depth. Its forces have been hardened by a decade of fighting in Syria to prop the Assad regime. Hezbollah has also gained valuable experience training Iraqi Shia militias and the Houthis. This underscores the dire need for diplomacy and de-escalation. Given the dynamics discussed above, an Israel-Hezbollah war has the dangerous potential of sliding into a regional conflagration that could alter the trajectory of peace and conflict in the region for years to come.