KEY TAKEAWAYS
KEY TAKEAWAYS
Over five decades into the “Asian peace,” there are reasons to be pessimistic about the future security of the Indo-Pacific. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has ignited concerns of conflict in Asia and Moscow’s nuclear threats have unearthed the specter of nuclear war as China rapidly augments its nuclear capabilities. An escalating arms race between the U.S. and China will inevitably leave non-nuclear weapon states caught in the middle. But all is not lost. In Asia, there are existing security mechanisms that could be revitalized to reinforce strategic stability. One of those mechanisms is the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ).
SEANWFZ, otherwise known as the Bangkok Treaty, was a product of the early post-Cold War era when arms control and disarmament were on a positive trajectory. Entering into force in 1997, the 10 member-states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) vowed to not develop, manufacture, acquire, possess or control nuclear weapons within the zone. It also includes protocols, still awaiting the signatures of the five permanent (P5) members of the U.N. Security Council, that would obligate them to forgo the threat or use of nuclear weapons against members of the treaty. Only after the 2021 founding of AUKUS — a U.S.-UK-Australian security partnership — did China express its interest in signing the protocols provided the other P5 states did the same.
The most recent nuclear weapon-free zone, the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (CANWFZ), which entered into force in March 2009, has been ratified by all of the P5 except the United States (the United States has signed the Protocol but has yet to ratify it). This shows that interest remains in realizing the aspirations of non-nuclear weapon states and their desire to secure regional neighborhoods free of nuclear weapons.
After the nuclear detonations over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we have all lived under the nuclear shadow. In different ways, the world has come to terms with it. U.S. allies have sought reassurance through Washington’s extended deterrence in hopes of making Moscow, Beijing or Pyongyang think twice. But the flaw in deterrence is that it only works until it fails.
Neither Beijing nor Washington can lead alone in Asia and the looming, if not already existing, nuclear arms race complicates great power competition in the region even more. China’s nuclear build-up is partially a response to the failures in resolving the security issues of the region, whether it may emerge from the South China Sea, Taiwan or the threat of escalating trade wars. As Tong Zhao, a nuclear policy expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, recently wrote, “Washington and Beijing should address their bilateral rivalry that stokes nuclear competition, starting by acknowledging the presence of information and perception gaps.”
While China proposed a no-first-use treaty between the P5 states at the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, it also recently suspended nuclear talks with Washington over the latter’s arms sales to Taiwan. Chinese behavior in the South China Sea and support for Russia has not helped in presenting Beijing as a genuine partner for peace and security. In Washington, both parties are united on a tough on China approach. In the current climate, substantive progress on U.S.-China arms control remains unlikely.
It is incumbent on ASEAN to call upon the Security Council’s permanent members to recognize that a nuclear war must not be fought and cannot be won in Asia.
But there is still an opportunity for the states caught in between to resolve these challenges before the nuclear card is played. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has long prided itself on the concept of “ASEAN centrality,” where the organization should be the driving force behind peace and security in Southeast Asia. As caretakers of the SEANWFZ, it is incumbent on ASEAN to call upon the P5 to recognize that a nuclear war must not be fought and cannot be won in Asia. The longer the protocols of the Bangkok Treaty remain unsigned by the P5, the weaker the norms of the nuclear weapon-free zone become, and the treaty will become no better than the paper it was written on.
ASEAN member states should continue to raise SEANFWZ when engaging with the P5, especially with the U.S. and China. A potential pathway is to consider “linking” SEANWFZ with other issues pertinent to the region. For instance, by recognizing that nuclearized great power competition has detrimental effects to economic cooperation and prosperity, agreement on SEANWFZ could help reassure the region that more restrained great power competition would be the prudent path forward. Additionally, with the principle of non-testing of nuclear weapons increasingly challenged, ASEAN members can stress the humanitarian and ecological effects of nuclear testing.
A new Asian security architecture resting on the foundation of SEANWFZ would recognize that the threat or use of force with or without nuclear weapons is contrary to the norms of the region. War, especially nuclear war, is bad for business. The traditional definition of “strategic stability” where a nuclear power has no incentive to initiate a first strike against another does not fit into the Chinese leadership’s worldview. Beijing sees strategic stability more broadly, including the absence of adversarial economic behavior. ASEAN member states are economically dependent on China and the United States; it is by highlighting the tenuous nature of these links that the quest for newfound stability may begin.
ASEAN needs to engage with the P5 to better understand those states' reservations over the Bangkok treaty. Unlike other nuclear weapons-free zones, SEANWFZ covers the maritime Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of ASEAN member states. The United States, alongside the P5, expressed reservations that this would limit its ability to deploy its forces in Southeast Asia. Until ASEAN and the P5 find a way to reconcile reservations over provisions that extend its coverage into EEZs of treaty members, it is unlikely that the SEANWFZ will be ratified by the permanent members of the Security Council.
ASEAN needs to engage with the P5 to better understand those states' reservations over the Bangkok treaty.
Washington’s policy is to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons on any particular vessel, but the provisions of the Bangkok Treaty would require a reversal of this practice. While China has become more amenable to signing the protocols, the possibility of Russia acting as a spoiler by tying the treaty with its war in Ukraine cannot be ruled out. Additional consultations between ASEAN and the P5 could help in informing each other on the current positions of the parties.
There is certain to be disagreement within ASEAN, too. For instance, the Philippines is a treaty ally of the United States, and Manila would seek to maximize the utility of American security guarantees. The recent agreement between China and the Philippines to stabilize the situation in the Second Thomas Shoal is a positive development for regional security, but it also begs the question of whether reassurances from the United States granted the Philippines additional leverage in dealing with China. A reinforced SEANWFZ might frustrate Manila’s security guarantor, an outcome neither it nor Washington would desire.
The scope of the Bangkok Treaty also covers the peaceful use of nuclear technology. In its provisions, parties to the treaty are mandated to sign agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency to implement proper safeguards and best practices. Under the pressure of matching the expectation of reaching environmental goals and ensuring energy security, Southeast Asian states are heavily considering nuclear energy as an option. Singapore is developing its pool of nuclear scientists and has recently signed a civilian nuclear cooperation deal with the U.S., while Indonesia plans to construct a Russian-designed experimental nuclear reactor near Jakarta. ASEAN states are at different stages in development, which means difficulties in ensuring uniform implementation of safeguards and means of verification. Failure to take action would create possibilities of proliferation risks or the illicit trafficking of fissile material.
Historically, progress in arms control tends to be personality-driven and leader-dependent. The nuclear shadow will not disappear unless leaders on both sides of the Pacific make choices that limit or eliminate the potential for nuclear conflict. With a set of new leaders emerging in Asia such as Singaporean Prime Minister Lawrence Wong and President-elect Prabowo Subianto in Indonesia, there will be opportunities for the P5 and ASEAN to realize a nuclear-weapon free Southeast Asia.
Nigel Li is a Singaporean who specializes in Russian foreign policy, developments in Central Asia and nuclear arms control issues. He is a graduate student at Georgetown University and an incoming Bunker Fellow at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy.