Modi Walks a Diplomatic Tightrope in Ukraine

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • India’s diplomatic posture, geopolitical aims and domestic politics explain what Modi was looking to achieve.
  • For Ukraine, the visit advanced its outreach to the global community and multilateral peace efforts.
  • Ukraine will continue to court India, hoping it can serve as a neutral arbiter.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • India’s diplomatic posture, geopolitical aims and domestic politics explain what Modi was looking to achieve.
  • For Ukraine, the visit advanced its outreach to the global community and multilateral peace efforts.
  • Ukraine will continue to court India, hoping it can serve as a neutral arbiter.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Kyiv on Friday, marking the first time an Indian leader has gone to Ukraine since its 1991 independence. Ukrainian officials said the visit demonstrated diplomatic backing for the war-torn nation, as it looks to build support among non-Western nations ahead of any potential negotiations on a settlement to the conflict. Although India has long-standing close ties with Russia, it has sought to portray a neutral stance on the conflict. As part of Modi’s bid to boost India’s international clout, he wants to demonstrate that Delhi can play a constructive, “friendly” role in resolving the war.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy during the signing of a memorandum of understanding between their governments at the Maryinskyi Palace in Kyiv, Ukraine, Aug. 23, 2024. (Indian Ministry of External Affairs)
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy during the signing of a memorandum of understanding between their governments at the Maryinskyi Palace in Kyiv, Ukraine, Aug. 23, 2024. (Indian Ministry of External Affairs)

USIP’s Daniel Markey and Katie Ruppert look at what Modi was trying to achieve, how it could impact India’s relationship with Russia and what Ukraine wanted out of the visit.

Why did Modi decide to go to Ukraine now and what was he looking to achieve?

Markey: India’s diplomatic compulsions, geopolitical aspirations and domestic politics all help to explain the timing and aims of Modi’s first-ever trip to Kyiv last week.

In its diplomatic quest for “strategic autonomy,” India aims to build the widest possible web of constructive partnerships without binding itself by formal alliances. This balancing act enables New Delhi to reap the benefits of close ties to both Moscow and Washington, among others. However, it also compels India to show some degree of good faith to all sides, or at least to avoid humiliating diplomatic missteps.

One such misstep happened in July, when Modi literally embraced Vladimir Putin in Moscow immediately after Russian forces had attacked a Ukrainian children’s hospital and just as NATO leaders attended a summit in Washington, D.C. From a Western perspective, the optics were terrible, especially because the Biden administration has been forced to accept India’s rationale for continuing to buy Russian arms and ever more Russian oil — now over 44% of India’s total oil imports — over the past two years. Anguished groans from some of India’s staunchest champions in the Biden administration sent a loud and unmistakable message to New Delhi about the urgent need to recalibrate its diplomacy between Moscow and Kyiv.

But Modi’s trip was not merely a defensive move. It also reflected his geopolitical aspiration to position India as a leading global power with influence well beyond its South Asian neighborhood. Not only does Modi’s India aim to be a “voice of the Global South,” but it wants a seat at the global high table, including permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council. By showing that India is uniquely capable of playing trusted go-between and paving the way for a more substantive peace process between Moscow and Kyiv, Modi also makes the case that India cannot be sidelined from other matters of global consequence. Finally, India’s foray into European diplomacy represents a competitive rejoinder to China’s earlier attempt at advancing a political solution to the war in Ukraine.

Although it is far too early to suggest that India is willing or able to mediate a Russia-Ukraine dialogue, Modi’s calls to Putin and President Joe Biden immediately after his Ukraine trip were a constructive signal that the door is open for more, including in September at the United Nations Summit of the Future in New York and in October at the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia. That said, while India has many incentives to favor peace in Europe, it lacks decisive leverage over either warring party. Modi cannot bring either Putin or Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to peace if the terms and timelines do not suit their purposes.

Finally, Modi’s globetrotting diplomacy plays to his domestic political advantage in the difficult aftermath of the Indian national elections that weakened his party’s hold over parliament and a tumultuous turn in neighboring Bangladesh that sent India’s favored leader, Sheikh Hasina, into exile. By presenting himself as a successful international statesman, Modi distracts his public from these setbacks and reprises a role he played to great effect last fall when he hosted the G20 in India. In his appeals to the Indian public, Modi casts his India as a “Vishwaguru” or world leader/teacher, and a “Vishwabandhu,” or friend to the world, both images supported by his travels to Ukraine.

What does this mean for India’s traditionally close ties with Russia?

Markey: Throughout his trip to Poland and Ukraine, Modi took care not to alter India’s rhetoric or policy in ways that would directly undermine India’s relations with Russia. The negotiated bilateral statements with Poland and Ukraine reflected India’s always-hedged language on the Russia-Ukraine war. Both omitted any specific mention of Russia. Modi’s follow-up call with Putin reinforced the message that their bilateral ties are steadfast and important.

India is gingerly navigating its relationship with Russia in ways that simultaneously reflect three evolving and complicating realities. First, India is deepening its strategic partnership with Russia’s principal adversary, the United States, largely as a hedge against China. Second, despite New Delhi’s fruitful outreach to Washington, India will likely remain dependent on Russia for oil and critical weapons systems (like the S-400 air defense systems) for years to come. And third, India sees that Russia’s war in Ukraine has led Moscow to become increasingly dependent on dual-use military and economic support from Beijing. This emerging China-Russia axis, which appears to be tightening the longer the war drags on, threatens India because of its own unresolved tensions with China. To the extent that the war can be resolved quickly and on terms that enable continued India-Russia defense ties, it would serve India’s broader strategic purposes.

What was Ukraine looking to get out of the visit?

Ruppert: Kyiv had two objectives for Modi’s visit: to further Ukraine’s broader, diplomatic outreach to the global community and to attempt to mend ties after Modi’s July visit to Moscow.

Since the beginning of the war, the Ukrainian government has tried to reach out to key members of the global community, with the hopes of diplomatically pressuring Russia to end the war and involving affected parties to ensure a just and lasting peace. The Russia-Ukraine war has had global impacts, from disrupted food exports to fears of nuclear war.

By involving many voices in a peace process under his 10-point peace formula, Zelenskyy has tried to design a multilateral peace process. The first peace summit in Switzerland in June was attended by 101 countries and international institutions. While Modi did not attend, Indian officials attended at the ministerial level, although they did not sign the final communique that endorsed “principles of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all states, including Ukraine.”   

Instead, Modi’s literal embrace of Putin came only weeks after snubbing Zelenskyy’s peace summit and sending a relatively small delegation. Zelenskyy likely appreciated Modi’s visit to Kyiv to rebalance ties and the possibility of India playing a mediation role at future talks. Still Zelenskyy remains a bit wary, however, of India’s ability to serve as a neutral arbiter. This is seen in his call for India to sign the communique before Kyiv considers Delhi for a formal mediation role. Signing the communique and attending upcoming national security advisor-level talks at the appropriate level might help ease concerns over India’s capacity to play a needed, and likely Ukrainian desired, role in resolving the conflict. 


PHOTO: Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy during the signing of a memorandum of understanding between their governments at the Maryinskyi Palace in Kyiv, Ukraine, Aug. 23, 2024. (Indian Ministry of External Affairs)

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s).

PUBLICATION TYPE: Question and Answer