KEY TAKEAWAYS
KEY TAKEAWAYS
Last September, Vietnam and the United States upgraded their relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership — a historic development that has analysts, academics and high-level officials from both sides now pondering the question of “What’s next?” Part of the answer might be an expansion of Vietnam-U.S. postwar reconciliation.
To date, the post-war reconciliation process has often been thought of as bilateral and security focused. But reconciliation involves all conflict parties and is therefore not only a matter of bilateral scope between Vietnam and the U.S. — other countries that were deeply involved in the war should also be engaged.
Today, there are a number of signs that there is a possibility to expand wartime reconciliation to include other U.S. allies and partners that were involved in the conflict, particularly South Korea. And the U.S. can jumpstart this process by providing aid to Vietnamese victims when they are seeking justice.
The first sign in favor of expanding reconciliation can be found within the upgraded U.S.-Vietnam framework itself. In their joint statement announcing the comprehensive strategic partnership last fall, U.S. and Vietnamese leaders listed overcoming the consequences of war among the 10 main areas for enriching relations. This new diplomatic framework can create space for fresh cooperation, including in reconciliation.
Expanding the scope of current reconciliation, or putting forward a “Reconciliation 2.0” concept that goes beyond traditional topics (such as remains recovery, unexploded ordnance clearance, Agent Orange remediation and artifact exchanges), is a potential way to do just that. This would not only reinforce the foundation of mutual trust on which bilateral relations are built, but also bring new substance to overall bilateral cooperation.
A Reconciliation 2.0 concept, if implemented, could also hold symbolic value ahead of the 50th anniversary of the end of the Vietnam War and the 30th anniversary of the normalization of U.S.-Vietnam ties, both of which are slated for 2025.
Beyond deepening wartime reconciliation within the bilateral context, it may be productive to consider expanding reconciliation to include U.S. partners involved in the Vietnam War. On that front, South Korea, with its massacres of Vietnamese civilians, can be seen as a suitable candidate for a number of reasons.
First, while it is true that wartime consequences are not the focus of South Korea and Vietnam, there is still political space for both sides to talk about this issue, especially when they are looking for ways to bring more substance to their bilateral cooperation and to operationalize their own comprehensive strategic partnership adopted in 2022. To be more specific, from the South Korean side, its government has never officially acknowledged civilian massacres by its troops in Vietnam or conducted investigations, but certain (liberal) presidents have offered oblique references in the past. From the Vietnamese side, the government has not sought an official apology but has not shied away from addressing Korean leaders’ contrasting remarks about the massacres and wartime issues either.
Second, South Korea’s current domestic landscape might generate conditions to promote greater reconciliation with Vietnam’s citizens. According to several open sources, a portion of South Korean society is starting to come to terms with Korea’s wartime atrocities in Vietnam. South Korean organizations such as the Committee for Finding the Truth about Vietnam and the Korea-Vietnam Peace Foundation have pursued settlements on behalf of the Vietnamese victims for years.
Some individual Koreans have sought to make amends with the past by urging for accurate investigations. The Korean public in recent years has also been exposed to reconciliation issues via a series of cultural products and creative acts of contrition, such as the Hankyoreh newspaper’s consistent coverage of the issue, grassroots documentaries such as “Road to Peace” and “The Confession,” and the exhibition at the War and Women’s Human Rights Museum in Seoul linking Vietnamese victims’ struggle with Koreans. There have also been signs that some Korean veteran groups — who are often vocal about denying atrocities — have made efforts in atonement and acknowledgement.
But perhaps one of the biggest indicators that South Korea may be willing to engage further on wartime reconciliation came last year, when a South Korean court ruled in favor of a Vietnamese victim of a wartime atrocity for the first time in history. This landmark court ruling could help set a precedent for other victims to have their grievances addressed. However, it should also be noted that South Korea’s government has appealed the court’s ruling, potentially lengthening the victim’s journey for justice.
On a side note, starting with South Korea in Reconciliation 2.0 may help open opportunities to look at other unsolved wartime grievances. This may include those related to Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War, as Australian troops have been accused of being involved in civilian killings and cover-ups, as well as chemical toxin spraying in Vietnam.
There are a number of different reconciliation measures available, including technical and diplomatic ones, that the United States could use in a Reconciliation 2.0 process that includes South Korea.
First, in the technical domain, the U.S. military has a role to play in terms of record collection and investigation.
Civic groups are the main mobilizers in South Korea, but they have been relying on word of mouth, eyewitness accounts or scattered materials to build up their cases rather than systematic and far-reaching investigations. The Korea-Vietnam Peace Foundation stresses that, apart from the records of mass killings accumulated in the past two decades, there are likely more victims who have yet to be identified. The existing data on casualties also varies across a wide range: some sources claim there were 45 incidences of mass killings by South Korean troops, while others cite 80 or 130.
The United States can use its influence as South Korea’s ally to encourage Seoul to make amends.
The United States can help fill this gap with more concrete data. Existing records often cite U.S. sources, including a report prepared by U.S. military inspectors in Vietnam and a study done by two American Quaker aid workers in the 1970s. Additionally, the United States was allegedly aware of some massacres and conducted investigations at the time (with some being stopped at the preliminary stage). In one case, a nearby U.S. Marine brigade quickly pointed out that a war crime had been committed. All of the above hint that the U.S. government and military possibly possess more records that have not come to light.
Other actors, such as U.S. lawyers, academics and journalists, should also join hands with counterparts from organizations such as the Vietnam Lawyers Association and Seoul Bar Association who have been vocal in calling for systemic investigations of the atrocities.
Additionally, the United States and South Korea can pool further resources for humanitarian assistance to support survivors’ needs, similar to what USAID has undertaken for Vietnamese people affected by Agent Orange, or what the Korea International Cooperation Agency has done with development projects in Vietnamese provinces that Korean troops occupied during the war.
Second, in the political domain, the United States should facilitate an environment conducive to truth promotion regarding wartime atrocities. This can be a symbolic act, but truth promotion can lead to acknowledgment of past misdeeds, which essentially enhances reconciliation.
The United States can use its influence as South Korea’s ally to encourage Seoul to make amends. Washington should support the establishment of joint research operations or a truth and reconciliation commission with related parties so that survivors would have a platform to come forward with their grievances and so that the data-gathering process could be done more thoroughly amid the little time victims have left.
It is true that such a U.S. stance might face complications due to its own involvement in atrocities, both in Vietnam and in South Korea, among others. But the abovementioned proposals do not require a clear-cut legal judgment or apology right away and can be conducted by a range of governmental and nongovernmental actors.
In conclusion, despite being regarded as the longest reconciliation in history, U.S.-Vietnam reconciliation still has room to grow into a Reconciliation 2.0, especially under the upgraded bilateral framework. With the current social developments in South Korea, the upcoming ceremonial benchmarks in Vietnamese and U.S. history, and the political discourse around reconciliation, the technical and political contributions suggested above could enable an expansion in how we approach Vietnam War reconciliation.
Thu Ngan is a freelance writer interested in U.S.-Vietnam relations and regional security issues.