KEY TAKEAWAYS
KEY TAKEAWAYS
Jordan sits at the heart of the ever-shifting sands of the Middle East, walking a tightrope between maintaining neighborly relations, advancing national interests and containing threats to ensure its own security and stability.
In the aftermath of Hamas’ October 7 attack, and the ongoing set of chain reactions shaking the Middle East, Jordan faces significant political and security challenges in balancing these relationships. The devastation in Gaza and deteriorating situation in the West Bank — coupled with Hamas’ October 7 attack and Iran’s regional adventurism — will continue to shape its strategic decisions. The September 8 attack by a Jordanian truck driver on Israeli security at the Allenby Bridge, on the border between Jordan and the West Bank, highlights public frustrations toward Israel, even while Jordan’s security and political relationships necessitate working relationships with regional neighbors.
To overcome these challenges, Jordan is pursuing proactive diplomacy, strengthening its security apparatus, and working closely with international allies to seek a sustainable resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Maintaining this balance of political and security necessities is crucial for Jordan’s stability in an increasingly complex geopolitical environment. Three principal tightrope acts characterize the Hashemite Kingdom’s posture in the current challenging context.
Jordan’s relationship with Hamas is largely shaped by public sentiment toward the Palestinian cause, as well as its domestic security calculations. Home to over 2 million Palestinian refugees — the largest number of any country in the Middle East — Jordan has historically taken a more nuanced stance toward Hamas than Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, mindful of the Jordanian people’s historical, political and demographic relationship to Palestine and the movement’s perceived standing as a defender of the Palestinian cause. As such, the Jordanian government has sought to maintain some contact with the group while also seeking to contain its radical influence.
Jordan’s relationship with Hamas is largely shaped by public sentiment toward the Palestinian cause, as well as its domestic security calculations.
However, this balancing act is fraught with challenges, given Hamas’ history of meddling in Jordan’s internal affairs leading to the closure of its office in Amman in 1999, and significant distrust.
The months that followed Hamas’ October 7 terrorist attack highlight this dynamic. Devastating images of death and destruction from Gaza sparked massive protests across the kingdom, including calls for the annulment of the 1994 Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty. Hamas leaders were quick to exploit the Jordanian public’s outrage, framing the group’s actions on October 7 as a protective measure to defend Jordan against the Israeli far-right’s threats against the country and its efforts to undermine Hashemite custodianship over Muslim and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem.
Days after the October 7 attack, former Hamas chief and current head of Hamas’ diaspora office Khaled Mashaal urged the Jordanian public to mobilize, referring to October 7 as a “moment of truth” and a “moment for action.” Meshaal used slogans — such as “land of steadfastness and mobilization” — previously controversial for the implication that Jordan was merely a “platform” for Hamas’s operations. The catastrophe in Gaza shifted the focus, with a sense of solidarity subsuming previous concerns about the slogan’s interpretation.
Hamas was encouraged by Jordanian public support for Palestinians in the first weeks of the war, and in the months that followed. In April, Mousa Abu Marzouk, the deputy head of Hamas’ Political Bureau, reportedly suggested that, should the group be expelled from Qatar, it could relocate to Jordan, as many Hamas leaders hold Jordanian citizenship. The statement was a trial balloon, intended to gauge public sentiment and potentially pressure the Jordanian government to host Hamas. The Jordanian government reportedly vehemently rejected the idea, with former ambassador to the Palestinian Authority Ziad Majali saying, “Jordan has closed the book on Palestinian cells — and we do not intend to reopen it.”
To host Hamas in any way would introduce significant legal and diplomatic challenges for Jordan. Given the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor’s request for Hamas leaders to be indicted as tried as war criminals, and Jordan’s participation in the Rome Statute, the kingdom would be obligated to arrest and surrender indicted individuals, opening a web of processes and controversies the government would like to avoid.
To date, Jordan has managed to contain Hamas, as the Jordanian public has shown an ability to distinguish between sympathy for Gaza and support for the group. The Jordanian public has shown resentment of Hamas’ attempts to mobilize demonstrators to attack Jordanian police forces and security — widely viewed as pillars of national stability — undermining the group’s cause and support. How the group seeks to influence the Jordanian public in the future, and how the Jordanian government will balance support for Gaza with containment of Hamas, will be a critical part of Jordan’s balancing act.
For two decades, Iran has grown increasingly sophisticated in how it exerts regional influence and strengthens its negotiating power. Most visibly, Iran has leveraged proxy and allied groups to exert influence and reshape regional dynamics. By supporting groups like Hamas, the Houthis, Hezbollah and other militias in Iraq and Syria, Iran engages in conflicts to safeguard its interests while destabilizing neighboring countries.
Jordan is increasingly a target of Iran’s strategy. Since 2013, Jordan has contended with persistent drug and weapons smuggling on its borders, carried out by militants linked to Iran. As a result of these operations, Jordanian security forces regularly clash with militias on the Jordanian-Syrian border. An August 2023 survey by NAMA highlights how the war on drugs has led to a shift in public attitudes toward Iran, with the percentage of Jordanians viewing Iran as the region’s biggest threat rising from 12% in 2021 to 19.1% in 2023.
Beyond smuggling, Jordan has seen its territory attacked by Iranian weapons, notably in the January 2024 drone attack on Tower 22, a small U.S. military outpost in Jordan’s northeast. Months later, on April 12, Iran launched a significant air offensive against Israel in response to an Israeli attack on the Iranian consulate in Syria, which killed two generals. Iran’s response — which included over 120 ballistic missiles, 30 cruise missiles and approximately 170 drones — placed Jordan in the middle of a potentially major escalation. Jordan played a pivotal role in intercepting Iranian missiles aimed at Israel.
This defensive action — which Jordan framed as a measure to protect its own airspace, territory and citizens — underscores the kingdom’s primary concern for national security. Foreign Minister Ayman Al-Safadi publicly rejected characterizations of Jordan’s actions as defensive on behalf of Israel, reiterating that the kingdom’s foremost priority was safeguarding its own sovereignty and stability. This diplomatic framing helped to mitigate a potential backlash from Iran, while preserving a balanced relationship with Israel and Western allies.
As a function of geography alone, Jordan is certain to be caught in the middle of any major crisis if tensions between Iran and Israel escalate.
This framing also managed Jordanian public opinion, which stands in solidarity with Gaza and opposes official actions perceived as aligning too closely with Israel. However, the Jordanian public also seemed to have a nuanced understanding of the situation. With little interest in being caught in the crossfire, most conclude that the best way to support Gaza is through diplomacy and humanitarian aid rather than military actions. Consequently, Jordanians began to adopt a narrative that links domestic stability to effective support for Gaza — highlighting that stronger, more stable countries like Jordan are better positioned to aid the Palestinian cause and safeguard their own national interests, than failed and war-torn states like Yemen, Syria and Lebanon.
Iran will continue to attempt to destabilize Jordan. As a function of geography alone, the kingdom is certain to be caught in the middle of any major crisis if tensions between Iran and Israel escalate. Navigating this complex brinksmanship — and public opinion — will likely force Jordan to make difficult and potentially unpopular decisions in the future.
Jordan has a strategic interest in maintaining its peace treaty with Israel, as both countries cooperate on numerous regional security issues that extend beyond the Palestinian file. The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty includes essential security cooperation — border security, counterterrorism and intelligence sharing, among other things — which is vital for Jordanian national security, given the volatile regional environment. Disrupting these mechanisms could have severe implications for Jordan’s stability.
Over the past decade, under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s leadership, the relationship with Jordan has become increasingly strained, as Israel continues to oppose the possibility of a two-state solution and some extremists promote Jordan as a replacement for a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. With each outbreak of violence west of the Jordan River, Jordan faces a dual challenge of addressing the consequences that fundamentally weaken the two-state framework — potentially turning Jordan into a de facto homeland for Palestinians — while preserving the strategic alliance with Israel that is crucial for Jordan's national security and stability.
This balancing act also affects Jordan’s relationship with the U.S. Although the U.S.-Jordan partnership extends beyond ties with Israel, the fact that both countries are key U.S. allies and partners of CENTCOM that play a critical role in U.S. strategy in the Middle East. Jordan’s stability, strategic location, and security cooperation make it vital to U.S. interests, and maintaining strong ties with both Israel and Jordan is essential for Washington’s regional posture.
A nuanced approach has allowed Jordan to preserve essential security cooperation with Israel while voicing opposition to policies that threaten its national security.
As a result, Jordan’s relationship with Israel has evolved into two streams: the political and the security. In response to the Israeli government’s turn toward the hard-right, encapsulated by its current coalition, Jordan has maintained close cooperation with Israel’s security establishment (traditionally more attuned to Jordan’s stability), while simultaneously downgrading the conduct of relations with Israel’s political establishment to mid-level diplomats. Additionally, official communication, including interviews with the monarch, have cautiously differentiated between the Netanyahu government and those within Israeli society that do not support the extreme rhetoric of members from the current government. This nuanced approach has allowed Jordan to preserve essential security cooperation while voicing opposition to policies that threaten its national security.
The Gaza war tested this delicate balance. In the aftermath of October 7, Jordan collectively recoiled at Israeli operations which killed Gazan civilians, recalled Jordan’s ambassador to Tel Aviv, and conditioned the return of the Israeli ambassador to Amman on the cessation of hostilities. The Gaza crisis hit closer to home as — mirroring concerns in Egypt about displacement from Gaza to Sinai — fears rose that West Bank Palestinians may be pushed into Jordan. The kingdom is already host to millions of refugees from Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and Somalia, and is highly wary of a new influx of Palestinian refugees, whose predecessors have never been able to return to their original home.
Accordingly, Jordan was quick to denounce any forced transfer of Palestinians as a violation of international law, going so far as to declare such actions a “red line” and act of war. On October 17, King Abdullah and the crown prince — both wearing military fatigues — chaired an Armed Forces meeting in which the king reiterated Jordan’s firm rejection of any attempt to displace Palestinians in Gaza or the West Bank. The kingdom underlined this message on November 21 by sending reinforcement forces to the border with Israel.
When asked about this measure, Jordanian Prime Minister Bisher Khasawneh said that Jordan would resort to “all the means in its power” to prevent Israel from implementing any transfer policy to expel Palestinians from the West Bank. The premier also stated that “any displacements or creating the conditions that would lead to it, will be considered a declaration of war and constitutes a material breach of Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty.” Khasawneh added that “this would lead to the liquidation of the Palestinian cause and to harming the national security of Jordan.”
Diplomatically, Jordan has been clear in its rejection of any proposals that approach Gaza only militarily or isolate it from the West Bank, instead insisting that all policies regarding Gaza should be framed within a comprehensive political context. Jordan has worked with Arab and international allies to pressure Israel to shift from a conflict management approach to a more sustainable conflict resolution approach. This has included conditioning any post-war role of Arab countries in Gaza to the creation of a political horizon with irreversible steps toward a two-state solution.
In the immediate term, Jordan has taken a number of measures to stabilize an increasingly fragile West Bank. In November, Jordan sent a field hospital to Nablus and delivered significant humanitarian aid. In June, Jordan held an emergency international conference to mobilize global support and resources for Gaza. A key focus of the conference was to support the Palestinian Authority (PA) in strengthening governance and stability in the Palestinian Territories in the face of Israeli government efforts to weaken the PA.
Geography requires Jordan and Israel to continue to have a relationship. But the nature of that relationship will very much be shaped by the Palestinian issue. Failure to seriously address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will hamper the security and stability of both nations. Jordan will continue to advocate for a viable two-state solution and work with international allies toward this aim, including through pressure on Israel. For Jordan, more than ever there is an urgency for a comprehensive political strategy that prioritizes humanitarian aid, economic development, and the protection of Palestinian rights. Pursuing this path while securing its strategic interest in an ongoing relationship with Israel is a balancing act the country navigates every day.