KEY TAKEAWAYS
KEY TAKEAWAYS
Since early 2024, fighting in northern Rakhine state has led to the worst attacks on the Rohingya population since 2017, when Myanmar’s military drove more than 750,000 across the border into Bangladesh. The new attacks are a stark reminder of the Rohingyas’ vulnerability. The world has known about their plight for decades, and in 2024, only 636,000 Rohingya — or 23 percent of the 2.8 million Rohingya around the world — still live in their homeland, Myanmar.
These figures are from a new report by Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières, or MSF) on the global Rohingya community. Behind the Wire offers an alarming illustration of the devastating impact of prolonged discrimination and persecution on the entire group. This persecution intensified in the 1980s when Myanmar’s military regime deliberately rendered the Rohingya stateless. Since then, their statelessness has been passed down from one generation to the next. The majority of Rohingya children are now born outside Myanmar and have never known their homeland. By the end of this decade, only one in five will be born in Myanmar.
The four countries where most exiled Rohingya now live are Bangladesh, with 1.1 million; Pakistan, with 400,000; Saudi Arabia, with 340,000; and Malaysia, with 210,000.
MSF estimates that only one percent of the total Rohingya population has managed to obtain a passport, citizenship or resettlement in a country where they have no fear of arrest and abuse. Most others are contained or marginalized by harmful policies that deny them basic human rights and self-determination, both in Myanmar and elsewhere. Fifty-seven percent live in barbed-wire-fenced camps in Bangladesh and Myanmar, or in closed villages in Myanmar where apartheid-like conditions are the norm.
While most international attention focuses on the Rohingya in Myanmar and Bangladesh, the overall situation of the 2.8 million Rohingya has been deteriorating, says MSF, negatively impacting the community’s ability to cope with the consequences of exclusion from citizenship and a place in the world. There is no credible international dialogue underway that addresses the Rohingya as a people scattered around the world. International attention tends to focus on immediate humanitarian and conflict-related crises and, as MSF points out, broader perspectives are largely ignored.
Of course, the current crises in Arakan and Bangladesh do deserve full attention, but they should be considered part of the search for comprehensive solutions for the entire group.
Military forces of the State Administration Council (SAC) — Myanmar’s illegitimate regime — are gradually retreating from Rakhine (or Arakan as it is increasingly called). With most of Arakan under control of the Arakan Army (AA), the key question is how to achieve the kind of stability needed to ensure that all Arakan’s people can live in peace and harmony and lead safe and productive lives. Shifting from military control to civilian governance is always a tall order, but in the case of Arakan, trust between its two main communities, the Rakhine and the Rohingya, has suffered serious setbacks since the start of the AA’s current campaign in November 2023, making this transition even more difficult.
Although the SAC is losing the war in Arakan, it has won an important battle. It has successfully employed its tried-and-tested divide-and-rule strategy, not only deepening the divide between the Arakan and Rohingya communities, but also creating a split that has brought some Rohingya armed groups to the SAC’s side. Both the AA and SAC have increased their recruitment of Rohingya fighters. In both cases, reports indicate that many have been forcibly recruited, particularly by Rohingya militias aligned with the SAC.
Although the SAC is losing the war in Arakan, it has won an important battle.
These militias — Arakan Rohingya Army (ARA), Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) and Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) — have long been unpopular with most Rohingya. Earlier this year, as the war in northern Arakan escalated, it became abundantly clear that the militias worked closely with the SAC to forcibly recruit young Rohingya from the camps in Bangladesh and traffic them into the hands of the military regime. Some sources say that as many as 2,000 crossed the border into Myanmar. It is highly unlikely that this could have been done without the knowledge of senior officials in Bangladesh.
Tragically, Rohingya have been forced to fight on both sides of the conflict. This complicated and brutal warfare has contributed significantly to the thick fog of war in northern Arakan. Many individuals have provided information and evidence to help piece together a complex conflict puzzle, sometimes at great personal risk. Their efforts must be acknowledged. However, as of mid-September, none of the conflict parties (SAC, AA, RSO, ARA and ARSA) has released information about the number of fatalities or wounded.
At the same time, civilian casualties are said to be high, which would be consistent with reports from other parts of Myanmar, showing shocking disregard for the laws of war and humanitarian law. The willful destruction of entire villages and towns, critical infrastructure and the targeting of schools, clinics and houses of worship demonstrate a total lack of respect for human life.
Serious allegations have been lodged against all parties, but verification has been problematic mostly due to the lack of independent access to conflict areas. A truth deficit remains, and an independent assessment mission will be necessary to obtain a more complete picture of what happened since early 2024, particularly in Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships.
To establish a credible record, the cooperation of all conflict parties will be needed. Moreover, an independent mission should examine the impact of violent conflict on all ethnic communities in Arakan. While the Rohingya are the largest population group in northern Arakan, there are many others, such as the Rakhine, Hindus, Maramagyi, Mro, Thet and Kaman. Amid the flood of information coming out of northern Arakan, details about the impact of conflict on some of these groups have been scant.
With most of Arakan now under AA’s military control, its civilian branch, the United League of Arakan (ULA), may soon have an opportunity to share proposals to operationalize what the group calls “The Way of Rakhita,” its, until now, fairly vague vision for a future Arakan. In an interview with The Diplomat in early September, AA commander Twan Mrat Naing said, “We are always in favor of repatriation [of Rohingya Muslims] in principle, and there should be voluntary, dignified and safe repatriation under conducive conditions.” That is a welcome statement, but it remains to be seen what specific proposals the ULA will present. Will they envisage an inclusive Arakan, one where all ethnic communities can find a place they can call home, based on equality and respect? One thing is clear: without dismantling the apartheid system — put in place by successive regimes — genuine progress will remain out of reach.
It is important to acknowledge that for decades, the Rohingya have borne the brunt of violence and oppression in Arakan. However, the justifiable fears and grievances of all other communities must also be recognized and addressed. Without dialogue and understanding among all groups, progress will be limited.
Equally, it must be clear that there are no quick fixes. Arakan has multiple crises: a security crisis, an economic and development crisis, and a human rights crisis. Much of the state’s critical infrastructure has been destroyed, while outward flight has depleted essential human resources in critical sectors, including agriculture. Food security is no longer guaranteed, the toll on all ethnic communities is significant and the destruction of entire villages and livelihoods has led to incalculable economic damage. The United Nations reports that 533,000 people in Arakan are now displaced, while many others have fled.
Given the enormous destruction of human and economic capital, a long-term recovery plan will be needed—one that addresses not only the economy but also the restoration of inter-communal relations, including a transitional justice plan. Discussions about transitional justice are always difficult, particularly when suffering continues. Reconciliation cannot succeed unless all are prepared to listen to others’ fears and grievances. Postponing dialogue risks making matters worse.
In the case of the Rohingya, the all-important issue of citizenship will be high on the agenda, and in addition, freedom of movement will also be critically important. The lack of freedom of movement infringes on many other rights, including access to livelihoods, education, health care and religious worship. In other words, addressing lack of freedom of movement paves the way for the enjoyment of many other rights.
For Rohingya in refugee camps in Bangladesh, 2024 has been an exceedingly difficult year. With the violence and insecurity in camps increasing and enforced abductions leaving behind terrified families of hundreds of young men, trauma is widespread, and hope has dimmed.
Given the major destruction and displacement in Arakan, the immediate returns of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh will not be possible. However, Bangladesh, Arakan’s leadership and the Rohingya should start discussions about how returns might ultimately take place. Fostering hope is critical, as is ensuring that Rohingya repatriation becomes part of Arakan’s longer-term recovery plan. In this context, the recent statement by Bangladesh’s head of government, Mohammed Yunus, is encouraging. He pledged continued support for the Rohingya and their “eventual repatriation to their homeland, Myanmar, with safety, dignity and full rights.”
To improve the situation in the camps near Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh and its international partners should consider enabling greater freedom of movement, improving access to livelihoods, allowing the use of sturdier building materials and providing education to all Rohingya children and young people in the camps. There could hardly be a greater gift from Bangladesh to Arakan than the education of young Rohingya.
Additionally, there is one immediate recommendation for Bangladesh. It would be an act of great humanity and neighborliness to facilitate the establishment of a humanitarian corridor into Maungdaw district. Reducing the severe shortages of humanitarian supplies in Arakan would not only directly aid all communities but also significantly contribute to stabilizing the current situation.
Even though bilateral relations are important for addressing issues between immediate neighbors like Bangladesh and Myanmar, the insistence on a state-centric approach — one that dictates that faraway Naypyidaw should be the entry point for all contacts between states — has increasingly lost relevance.
The AA’s de facto territorial control demands greater pragmatism in the conduct of interstate relations. Myanmar’s western neighbors should begin to accept this reality and reach out to Arakan’s leadership, particularly to the United League of Arakan (ULA), the civilian arm of the Arakan Army. The SAC regime in Myanmar’s capital, Naypyidaw, is not only far from Arakan but has also lost control over much of Myanmar. Pragmatism is particularly urgent to ensure immediate humanitarian access and assistance.
At the same time, important questions about atrocities committed in Arakan remain, particularly in Buthidaung and Maungdaw. ULA/AA’s willingness to cooperate with an independent investigation might help to overcome the understandable reluctance of key players.
Another major issue is the future of the Rohingya as a people. As the new MSF report shows, the situation of most Rohingya around the world is deeply troubling. Limiting responses to mostly short-term humanitarian issues while ignoring the longer-term plight of a community of 2.8 million has been a failure of the international community. A new initiative is needed — one that addresses the Rohingya community as a whole, focusing on improving their immediate needs as well as their future. Obviously, highly sensitive issues will have to be addressed. One of these, mentioned by MSF, could be the acceptance that not all Rohingya will return to Arakan, particularly descendants of older generations who left 20 to 40 years ago and have never seen their homeland. But such questions can only be addressed as part of a comprehensive effort to do justice to the Rohingya people and their plight.
A new comprehensive effort could be based on the Global Compact on Refugees, which represents the political will and ambition of the international community for strengthened cooperation and solidarity with refugees and affected home countries. It is based on four principles: (i) enhancing refugee self-reliance, (ii) easing pressure on host countries, (iii) supporting conditions in countries of origin and (iv) expanding access to refugees’ countries of origin.
Laetitia van den Assum is an independent diplomatic expert. She is a former ambassador of the Netherlands and was a member of the Rakhine Advisory Commission headed by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (2016/17).