KEY TAKEAWAYS
KEY TAKEAWAYS
The Taliban’s new vice and virtue law, which places sweeping restrictions on women’s dress, mobility and public presence, is facing pushback from Afghan religious scholars, civil society, the wider Muslim community and even the Taliban themselves.
The law weaponizes religion to justify the Taliban’s oppressive rule, leaving millions of Afghan women and girls in a state of fear and uncertainty.
The Taliban’s law, ratified on July 31, 2024, erases the hard-won rights of Afghan women over the past two decades. Women are now required to cover their entire bodies, including their faces, and their voices must be concealed in public spaces. The law goes further, barring women from traveling without a male guardian, and imposing restrictive dress codes and behavior rules. These limitations go beyond women’s rights, affecting public celebrations and banning music, all framed under an extremist interpretation of Islam. The law, if fully enforced, would undermine fundamental human rights while reinforcing the Taliban’s authoritarian rule.
Noting that the law grossly misinterprets Islamic teachings, scholars have publicly challenged the regime, arguing that the Taliban’s claims about women’s voices being awrah (nakedness) and the necessity for strict covering are not supported by the Quran or Sunnah. They point to numerous religious texts that affirm women’s voices were heard and respected during the Prophet Muhammad’s time, directly contradicting the Taliban’s position. For instance, Quranic verses such as 60:12 and 58:1 show women engaging in verbal communication with the Prophet, while the hadiths narrated by Aisha, the Prophet’s wife, further prove that women’s voices were never meant to be silenced in Islamic tradition. These scholars have highlighted that morality enforcement, according to Islam, is the responsibility of the Muslim community as a whole, not the state, debunking the Taliban’s justifications.
There are increasing signs of internal division within the Taliban regarding the implementation of the vice and virtue law. Taliban leader Haibatullah Akhundzada’s unusual visit to northern and western Afghanistan earlier in September, covering eight provinces, including Takhar, Badghis, Balkh and Kunduz, highlights efforts to address growing dissent among local officials and tribal leaders. According to reports, multiple governors have refused to enforce the vice and virtue law, while one of the Taliban’s chief negotiators of the 2020 Doha agreement and deputy minister of foreign affairs, Abbas Stanikzai, has publicly spoken against its restrictions on women.
The Taliban’s efforts to enforce this law will not only exacerbate public resistance but reveal the internal conflicts that may threaten their grip on power.
These divisions have led to internal fractures, with local leaders questioning the law’s implementation. As one leader of the Ahmadzai tribe told one of the authors, “It feels like there has been a death in everyone's family ... because their daughters can’t go to school.” This discontent highlights the law’s psychological and economic toll, affecting families and the country’s well-being by limiting women’s participation in society and weakening the economy. The Taliban’s efforts to enforce this law will not only exacerbate public resistance but reveal the internal conflicts that may threaten their grip on power.
The growing resistance to the Taliban’s law is not limited to Afghan scholars. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and its scholars have also expressed their disapproval, with some delegations snubbing Taliban officials at recent meetings. Even traditionally conservative members like Saudi Arabia have criticized the Taliban’s harsh interpretation of Shariah. This global Muslim opposition to the law underlines that the Taliban’s position is not only out of step with Islamic jurisprudence but also threatens to isolate Afghanistan diplomatically.
Fearing potential unrest from both scholars and the general populace, the Taliban issued a statement on September 20 prohibiting religious scholars from engaging in controversial topics. This move suggests that the regime is acutely aware of growing dissatisfaction with its policies and is increasingly concerned about the possibility of dissent. By stifling debate on sensitive religious issues, the Taliban seeks to maintain control and prevent any challenges to their authority. This reflects a broader anxiety within the regime about the fragility of their power and the potential for public outcry against their governance. Such measures indicate a recognition that discontent is simmering beneath the surface, and the Taliban is eager to quash any emerging voices that could galvanize the population.
As Haibatullah attempts to enforce the new vice and virtue law, the growing resistance is impossible to ignore. Besides the opposition from Afghan scholars, women and civil society are pushing back, both inside Afghanistan and in the diaspora, as they continue to fight for the rights and freedoms that were promised but never delivered. This week there were a slew of arrests of Afghan scholars who have been outspoken on women’s rights, including a prominent scholar who used to lead the Council for the Protection of Religious and Jihadi Values in Kabul. Afghan women have sent an official request to the OIC’s Fiqh Academy to issue a fatwa (a legal opinion or decree handed down by an Islamic religious leader) against the Taliban’s misuse of Islamic sources, including the Quran and hadith, in this new vice and virtue law. In a brief response, the OIC said women have the right to education and to speak and be seen; it now has the opportunity to review the law and issue an official legal ruling condemning the Taliban’s misinterpretations.
Internationally recognized mechanisms, such as the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan appointed by the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, must be empowered to not only monitor human rights violations tied to the enforcement of this law but also impose consequences that are connected to economic outcomes, normalization and recognition as part of the U.N. Doha process. The U.N. Doha process on Afghanistan is a diplomatic initiative aimed at facilitating dialogue between the international community and the Taliban, focusing on securing peace, stability and the protection of human rights, including ensuring the Taliban’s compliance with international law. It seeks to address key issues such as governance, women’s rights and security in Afghanistan, with the ultimate goal of fostering an inclusive political solution. It will be essential to incorporate the monitoring mechanism of the special rapporteur into the U.N. Doha process as part of a formal mechanism to set milestones for Taliban compliance.
Internally, the Taliban face growing dissent over the law, offering a potential opportunity for the Taliban movement to be responsive to its constituencies and change leadership. By supporting more responsive moderate elements within the Taliban, such as those already questioning the law’s necessity, a reorganization of leadership (or recognition of local leadership) in the regime could frame a retreat as aligning with Islamic jurisprudence and local oversight. This internal pushback could provide a way for the Taliban to back down without appearing to surrender to external pressure beyond the Taliban movement, opening the door for broader reforms.
By maintaining pressure on the Taliban and supporting the growing internal and external resistance to their regime, the international community can help safeguard the rights of Afghan women and prevent further erosion of human rights in the country.
Mohammad Osman Tariq is an Afghan religious scholar who has written about religious institution building in Afghanistan. He is also a senior advisor to the Religion and Inclusive Societies program at USIP.