Back to the Future? Kazakhstan’s Nuclear Choice

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • Amid climate and energy struggles, Kazakhstan is considering returning to nuclear power.
  • Both Russia and China are trying to lock Kazakhstan into their own nuclear technological models.
  • The U.S. can help shape Kazakhstan’s nuclear options in mutually beneficial ways.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • Amid climate and energy struggles, Kazakhstan is considering returning to nuclear power.
  • Both Russia and China are trying to lock Kazakhstan into their own nuclear technological models.
  • The U.S. can help shape Kazakhstan’s nuclear options in mutually beneficial ways.

Although Kazakhstan denuclearized over three decades ago when it split from the Soviet Union, the Central Asian nation held a referendum on October 6 over whether it should build a nuclear power plant. With 73% voting yes, the referendum could reverberate beyond Kazakhstan and the Central Asia region. Safe nuclear power would be a boon for Kazakhstan, decreasing its reliance on fossil fuels while increasing economic resilience and helping it to address its immense climate change challenges. There are also important U.S. interests at stake here. The U.S. and Western allies should constructively engage with Kazakhstan, including helping to build a new reactor, to avoid Russian or Chinese control of Kazakhstan’s new nuclear energy sector and its valuable uranium resources.

People walk by a sculpture of an atom near a region where the Soviet Union abandoned nuclear components and testing sites, in Kurchatov, Kazakhstan, April 2, 2011. (James Hill/The New York Times)
People walk by a sculpture of an atom near a region where the Soviet Union abandoned nuclear components and testing sites, in Kurchatov, Kazakhstan, April 2, 2011. (James Hill/The New York Times)

Whether and how Kazakhstan acts on the popular mandate to nuclearize its energy sector will have major ramifications on U.S. interests, global energy markets and regional — perhaps even global — peace and security. In 2022 Kazakhstan produced a whopping 43 percent of the world’s uranium and Uzbekistan next door produces nearly 7 percent, meaning Central Asia accounts for than half of global uranium production. Most of that is exported and processed in Russia or China. The West is still highly dependent on this uranium. Even now the United States imports 20 percent of the fuel for U.S. nuclear reactors from Russia, much of it produced from uranium mined in Kazakhstan.

Climate Change and the Nuclear Choice

Holding a referendum on such a strategically important national issue was an unusual move for a Central Asian government. Since independence from the Soviet Union, most referenda in Central Asia have been about constitutional changes, not important policy choices. In January 2022, a less contentious energy policy decision led to protests, armed conflict and threatened to topple the government. The Kazakhstan government brought the nuclear question before the people because Central Asia is suffering from a severe energy deficit and trying to address three 21st century climate-related problems. The government also saw the referendum as necessary to demonstrate popular support, as there is a legacy of national distaste on nuclear issues left over from the mistakes of the 20th century.  

The first problem is how to cope with the impacts of climate change. Winters have become much colder and summers much hotter. Demand for electricity is outpacing the ability to cleanly produce enough to help people cope.

The second is how to transition as much as possible to cleaner energy. Kazakhstan’s energy production is inefficient and dirty, using legacy Soviet methods like coal-fired electricity plants and needs to give way to clean energy to reduce Central Asia’s carbon footprint.

Finally, Kazakhstan’s post-independence economy has relied heavily on exporting oil. Like all hydrocarbon exporters, the coming transition to a post-carbon global energy economy means they need to find a new niche to replace reliance on oil exports, which won’t last forever anyway.

Kazakhstan’s Nuclear History

The history of the nuclear issue in Kazakhstan goes back to the Cold War. Semipalatinsk (now renamed “Semey”) in northeast Kazakhstan was an above ground nuclear test site for the Soviet Union from 1949 to 1963, and below ground thereafter until its closure in 1989. Over 450 nuclear tests were carried out in the “Polygon,” exposing 1.5 million people to radiation, leaving a horrific health legacy of cancer and birth defects that still impacts the inhabitants of the region. To add insult to injury, the Semey region is a center of Kazakh culture and the birthplace of many of its most revered poets, artists and intellectuals. 

As early as 1989 a strong grass-roots anti-nuclear movement formed around closing the test site and “anti-nuclear” became an important part of Kazakhstan’s emerging post-Soviet national identity. The fact that nearly 27 percent voted “no” in the referendum shows there is still some hesitation in Kazakh society despite official efforts to get to “yes.”

Another often missed part of the story involves Kazakhstan’s renunciation of its nuclear weapons after the Soviet collapse. Upon independence, Kazakhstan suddenly became one of the world’s largest nuclear weapons states with more warheads than France, England and China combined. It made a principled decision to hand over 1,400 Soviet nuclear warheads and 1,300 pounds of highly enriched uranium and joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapons state. In return, it received, under the 1994 “Budapest Memorandum,” security assurances from the United States, the United Kingdom and Russia that they would not use military force or the threat of miliary force against Kazakhstan.

Later, Kazakhstan and the other Central Asian states negotiated the 2006 Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia. In the treaty, the five Central Asian parties committed to not permit the manufacturing, stockpiling, testing, developing and possessing of nuclear weapons. Eight years later, the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council signed protocols supporting the treaty, although  as of 2024 the United States has yet to ratify its signature.

Kazakhstan’s Nuclear Future

While constrained under the NPT from enriching uranium or reprocessing spent fuel, Kazakhstan is capable of doing more than simply exporting its freshly mined uranium to Russia or China. In fact, Kazakhstan serves as the repository for the International Atomic Energy Agency’s emergency supply of low-enriched uranium. Both Russia and China are trying to lock Kazakhstan (and Uzbekistan) into their own nuclear technological models. China has opened a first stage non-military uranium processing facility in Kazakhstan and Russia is eager to build a nuclear power plant in the country, offering to build the world’s first small-nuclear reactor. They hope to lock Central Asia into their own technological and supply pathways.

It is in the interest of the West and the United States to help Kazakhstan shape its nuclear options to prevent a Russian or Chinese monopolization of Kazakhstan’s uranium resources.

It is in the interest of the West and the United States to help Kazakhstan shape its nuclear options to prevent a Russian or Chinese monopolization of Kazakhstan’s uranium resources and to diversify Western sources of uranium for future clean energy needs. In a greener global energy future in which nuclear power replaces dirtier coal and oil, access to uranium could become a major source of resource conflict both globally and regionally.

This represents an obvious opportunity for the C5+1 initiative — a diplomatic platform for the U.S. and the five Central Asian governments — since it plays into both the need for a balanced, secure and independent economic future for the Central Asia region and is an area of important strategic need for the U.S.

The United States and the West could engage in several ways, including first of all by competing to build and support the nuclear reactor approved in this month’s referendum in a consortium that builds on the West’s relative strengths. They could also help Kazakhstan play a larger role in uranium processing and to some extent replace its oil exports with uranium exports at higher value. The United States could also collaborate with Kazakhstan on research and development of other innovative nuclear technologies, including small modular reactors and next-generation reactors, provide technical assistance and training programs to develop Kazakhstan's indigenous nuclear capabilities and encourage Western mining companies to invest in Kazakhstan’s uranium production in exchange for long-term supply contracts.

Kazakhstan seems open to this engagement; its president, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, announced after the vote that he “personally” thinks the nuclear power plant should be built by an international consortium:

“This is not an easy question. The government needs to conduct an analysis and hold appropriate negotiations. But my personal view on this issue is that an international consortium should operate in Kazakhstan, consisting of global companies with the most advanced technologies. As they say, time will tell.”

Russia, China, South Korea and France seem to be on the short list. While it is not completely clear how such a consortium would work, it appears to be a signal that Kazakhstan is looking for a way to have a balanced engagement and that the doors are open to interested parties.


PHOTO: People walk by a sculpture of an atom near a region where the Soviet Union abandoned nuclear components and testing sites, in Kurchatov, Kazakhstan, April 2, 2011. (James Hill/The New York Times)

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s).

PUBLICATION TYPE: Analysis