United States Institute of Peace

Those dangers will increase in January 2025, as Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger — three army-ruled Sahel regimes who have proclaimed a new Alliance of Sahel States — formally complete their withdrawal from ECOWAS. That withdrawal will severely impact the regional economy, particularly for landlocked Sahel countries, by increasing import costs and restricting free movement, potentially leading to hostile border relations and heightened security challenges. West African governments should urgently negotiate terms of that withdrawal and prepare to mitigate the imminent risks.

Coastal West Africa: High Stakes, Rising Risks

The Sahel represents the world’s deadliest locus of terrorism (with nearly half of all terrorism-linked deaths last year) and one of its worst humanitarian catastrophes. Yet Sahel violence will multiply its threats to U.S. and international security and economies if it destabilizes adjacent coastal West Africa, a region with five times the Sahel’s population and globally vital shipping routes. Already the four nations of West Africa’s south-central coast — Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo and Benin — face rising security challenges as violence from the Sahel spills over into their northern border regions, compounded by the growing refugee influx. The U.S. government has targeted these four nations, plus neighboring Guinea, in its Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability.

Because Africa’s mushrooming population and economic importance will shape much of the world’s evolution in the 21st century, the United States and allied democracies have deep interests in protecting the stability of West Africa’s coastal states, notably their several resilient, if flawed, democracies. Senegal, Ghana, Liberia and Nigeria also are among the pillars of ECOWAS, which — while it needs updating — has been the most effective of Africa’s regional communities at reducing violent conflicts.

In response to this expanding threat, the coastal states are being forced to increase their spending on security and humanitarian aid, straining their already limited resources. The economic impact of the violence has also been significant, disrupting local trade and affecting foreign investment. United Nations and other monitors have reported the expansion of jihadist activities in coastal states, including increased attacks in Benin and Togo. Over 500 violent incidents have occurred near their borders, a tenfold increase from four years ago, straining resources and disrupting trade.

In Togo, jihadist-linked violence has escalated significantly, with attacks such as the July 20 assault on army barracks killing 12 soldiers. According to the U.N., an umbrella group of al-Qaida aligned affiliates, known as Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JMIN), has fortified its positions near Pama, Burkina Faso, illustrating how extremists are exploiting security vacuums in the Sahel states to grow stronger. Similarly, Benin has seen a surge in jihadist activities, with fatalities rising to 173 in the past year.

The violence spilling southward from the Sahel is forcing the four coastal states to spend more heavily on humanitarian and security operations. The disruption in trade and investment caused by the violence has led to estimated economic losses, with Ghana seeing a potential 1% reduction in its GDP. Senegal has also experienced a downturn, with a reported loss of nearly 5% in trade-related GDP, the London-based Overseas Development Institute estimated last year.

The four coastal states face long-term challenges to their stability from the poorer economic development and human security in their northern regions, compared to their more developed southern coastal zones. The spreading violence in Burkina Faso — where an al-Qaida affiliate killed at least 600 people in the district center of Barsalogho on August 24 — now exacerbates that problem. Similarly, JNIM’s September 17 attack on Bamako military installations underscores the Malian regime’s tenuous control over its capital, highlighting JNIM’s growing strength compared to Malian forces and Russian mercenaries. By early this year, a total of 87,000 asylum seekers had streamed into the northern zones of the four coastal states, 89% of them from Burkina Faso. That influx is straining communities’ capacities to provide basic services.

The Hazards of Border Closures

Against these regionwide risks, U.S. and international partners would do well in supporting African diplomacy to limit the damage from the coming split in ECOWAS. As the military rulers of the Sahel Alliance officially lead their landlocked countries out of ECOWAS in late January, they will form a 3,540-mile border between themselves and the remaining ECOWAS nations, which provide the three states with their main trade routes to seaports and the international economy.

The closure of Niger’s border with Benin has worsened economic pressures, particularly in migrant-reliant sectors. This has led to further trade reductions, including the suspension of oil operations at the Seme-Kpodji port, adding a layer of complexity to the broader economic instability. Notably, 70 to 80% of trade volumes passing through Benin’s port of Cotonou are destined for Niger while 30-35% of Burkina Faso’s imports enter through Cote d’Ivoire, underscoring the Sahel Alliance's heavy reliance on access to these coastal ports for its economic activities.

West African economies rely heavily on the mobility of people and goods. The Sahel states are especially dependent on trade; Cote d’Ivoire relies on migrant laborers for cocoa production, an economic mainstay. For 45 years, ECOWAS protocols have built a model for free movement, trade and consequent improvements of people’s lives among its member states.

The departure of Sahel states is highly likely to harm West African economies, with the most severe impact felt in those states. In 2020, Burkina Faso sourced 27% of its imports from Africa, primarily from Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo and Niger, with a 5% increase in intra-Africa trade. Mali's intra-Africa trade focused on Senegal (48%) and Ivory Coast (23%), making up 71% of its regional trade, while Niger mainly imported cereals, petroleum products and machinery from West African nations like Togo. However, the extent of economic and political fallout will increase if the two sides do not negotiate some form of continued cooperation on border management. Currently, no talks have started, and there is no plan in place to mitigate the effects of this split.

Hostile or uncooperative border relations between the military regimes and ECOWAS would severely affect Sahel herders and small-scale farmers reliant on cross-border trade, exacerbating poverty similar to the economic downturn during the COVID-19 pandemic. ECOWAS reported 6.7% GDP loss (around $50 billion) for member states due to border closures in 2020-2021. Such closures would likely boost opportunities for smuggling, a significant revenue source for armed groups. JNIM alone reportedly earns $7 million to $20 million from drugs and ransom, and $11 million to $15 million from migrant trafficking, according to the World Atlas of Illicit Flows.

The three military regimes all face continued jihadist or communal insurgencies and have turned to Russian forces for support. Those factors already complicate efforts within Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger to prepare for a transition to more effective democratic systems than in the past. If the separation between the new Sahel alliance and ECOWAS is not handled effectively, it could lead to a more severe divide and prolong the restoration of elected, civilian governance.  

Coastal States’ Refugees and Risks

While all West African countries face challenges from the violence and uprooted populations in the Sahel, they vary in their exposure. But the countries facing the most immediate burdens and risks from Sahel violence are the four south-central coastal states:

• Cote d’Ivoire shelters at least 55,000 refugees as of summer 2024, overwhelmingly from Burkina Faso, along with about 900,000 “stateless” individuals. The country suffered several terrorist attacks in the 2010s. In response, it has bolstered security and social support in the north. Cote d’Ivoire’s security minister, among others, has stressed the need for a regional security approach with U.S. support.
• Ghana remains the only coastal state not directly impacted by Sahel-based violent attacks, thanks in part to its resilient, 36 years of democratic rule, which strengthens its ability to respond to emerging risks. However, it has still absorbed over 15,000 refugees from Burkina Faso, leading to significant economic and security pressures. The World Bank has flagged Ghana's economy as being "in distress" due to unsustainable public debt. To manage the spillover effects, Ghana has expanded its military and security operations in the north. Despite these efforts, the country faces accusations of systematically denying asylum to Fulani refugees, though Ghana denies these claims.
• Togo hosts 29,000 refugees as of July 2024 and has suffered the second most extremist attacks, after Benin, by Burkina Faso-based groups. Between mid-2023 and mid-2024, extremist attacks killed a reported 69 people, particularly near the Burkina Faso border. Togo’s domestic stability is weakened by the 57-year reign of the Eyadema family, with President Faure Gnassingbe governing under a state of emergency since 2022. In 2024, Gnassingbe extended his rule through constitutional changes, which opposition groups condemned as an effective coup. These long-standing issues of political rule and corruption have compounded the challenges posed by extremist violence.
• Benin has suffered the greatest spillover violence from the Sahel “with a doubling in the number of recorded fatalities” from mid-2023 to summer 2024, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies has reported. Extremist groups have established strongholds in remote national parklands that straddle the borders with Burkina Faso and Niger. Benin hosts an estimated 15,000 refugees, international relief agencies say, and bears economic costs that included a 12% increase in its military budget in 2022 alone. Benin’s established democracy has eroded since 2016, democracy advocates such as Freedom House note, with political violence in the past two national elections and a consequent lessening of the country’s likely ability to absorb shocks.

Over the past 15 years, the Sahel’s chaos spread as citizens lost faith in authoritarian regimes or corrupt democracies that governed more in the interests of elites than in ways to help broad populations build security, livelihoods and hope for better futures. Sahel extremism, insurgencies and civil warfare accelerated with eight military coups since 2020, worsening climate shocks, highly militarized responses by governments and their partners, and in recent years, Russia’s involvement.

The best way to protect West Africa’s coastal states from a similar decline is to buttress their democracy and resilience while that effort remains viable. The challenges of increasing migration threaten both economic stability and security, as strained resources and disrupted social ties can lead to heightened tensions. The withdrawal of military-ruled Sahel states from ECOWAS complicates this situation, highlighting the urgent need for negotiations to establish cooperative border practices. Coastal states can better prepare to absorb migrants without compromising security or economic stability by investing in infrastructure, prioritizing effective border management, and developing collaborative strategies that facilitate migrant integration while reducing conflict risks.

Strengthening regional cooperation and creating policy frameworks to enhance governance and integrated border management will also be essential for maintaining border stability. Nigeria, increasingly positioning itself as a key interlocutor for the United States and Europe in the fight against trafficking in persons, has the potential to lead efforts in enhancing coordination among West African nations. Its established strategic interests in the region make Nigeria a strong candidate to foster partnerships that can effectively address migration challenges on a regional scale.

Partnership from the United States is also vital. In 2022, a USIP study group on coastal West Africa recommended a more high-level, coordinated approach to U.S. engagement — and America’s commitment to stronger, longer engagement through its Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability is a promising step. International partners can best support the economic growth so necessary to stability with a strategy of investment that flips the script from the traditional development aid model of the past six decades.

Rachel Yeboah Boakye is a research analyst with USIP’s Africa Center.