KEY TAKEAWAYS
KEY TAKEAWAYS
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy outlined to the Ukrainian parliament last week, for the first time in a public address, his victory plan to end the war. The plan, a roadmap on how to bring to the conflict to a close, contains five sections and three classified annexes that cover everything from meeting military requirements today to rebuilding the Ukrainian economy at the conclusion of the war. Zelenskyy has attempted to gather resources for the war and rally allies around a common goal. He spent the past two weeks on the road, briefing senior U.S. leaders, including both presidential candidates, Europeans and NATO’s secretary-general on what he sees as vital to ending Russia’s war on his country in an enduring way: NATO membership.
Much attention has been paid to requests for military aid, but not enough to the most important point in the plan: the need for a robust security guarantee in the form of a formal invitation to NATO. According to Zelenskyy’s plan, a security guarantee with teeth is the best way to end the war. Yet arriving at such an outcome has long been the most elusive aspect of Zelenskyy’s wartime diplomacy. How can the international community truly secure Ukraine against future Russian aggression?
Ukrainian trust in international security guarantees and institutions that fall short of NATO’s mutual defense pledge, known as Article 5, has steadily eroded since the Budapest Memorandum collapsed in 2014 with Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine.
The memorandum, signed in 1994 by the United Kingdom, Russia, Ukraine and the United States, promised respect for the “the independence and sovereignty of the existing borders of Ukraine” and to “refrain from the threat or use of force” against Ukraine in exchange for Ukraine’s forfeiture of nuclear weapons. At the time, Ukraine held the third largest nuclear arsenal, which it inherited from the Soviet Union.
Russia violated that international treaty, one that it had negotiated, signed and ratified, when its “little green men” — Russian commandos, Putin later admitted — invaded Crimea in March 2014. The assurances in the memorandum committed the UK and the United States to come to Ukraine’s aid, which they did with political, military and non-lethal aid. After Russia’s 2014 invasion, former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma said signing the agreement was one of his biggest regrets, describing it as an “empty promise.”
France, Germany and the Organization for Security and Co-operation (OSCE) in Europe tried to negotiate an end to Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine through a series of talks that produced the Minsk agreements (often referred to as Minsk I and Minsk II) in September 2014 and February 2015, respectively. Ukraine made concessions to Russia, promising to alter its constitution, decentralize power and recognize the “special status” of the two provinces Russia had invaded and in which it had set up puppet governments in exchange for: “permanent monitoring on the Ukrainian-Russian state border and verification by the OSCE”; “withdrawal of all foreign armed formations, military equipment … and disarmament of all illegal groups”; and “the creation of a security area in the border regions of Ukraine and the Russian Federation.”
In trying to end the current war, Ukrainians have sought some type of arrangement that would either deter Russia from attacking again or impose harsh real consequences.
But the Minsk agreements did not include security assurances and the OSCE was not given a full-fledged peacekeeping function. France, Germany and the OSCE sought to achieve a cease-fire without solving the crux of the problem: that Russia didn’t consider Ukraine an independent country and remained willing to use force to occupy its territory.
Ukrainians, understandably, have lost all trust that Russia would abide by any treaty or agreement. And so, in trying to end the current war, they have sought some type of arrangement, institution or mechanism that would either deter Russia from attacking again or impose harsh real consequences.
Ukraine’s leaders have pursued a dual-track diplomatic approach to achieving this outcome.
First, Ukrainian leaders have assiduously engaged allies and partners to explain the importance of ensuring Ukraine is a prickly “hedgehog,” armed to the teeth with a strong standing army. As of August 2024, the United States and Ukraine’s other allies have donated approximately $145 billion in short-term military assistance toward winning the war and boosting Ukraine’s military. The United States also has asked that members of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group — an alliance of 57 countries including NATO and the European Union — organize a series of “capability coalitions” to coordinate and ensure that Ukraine has the necessary capabilities to defend itself in the future in areas such as air defense, artillery and maritime security.
Second, in parallel, Ukraine’s leaders have sought to ensure Ukraine’s security through a strong treaty-based deterrent. To date, more than 20 countries have signed bilateral security agreements with Ukraine, although many are nonbinding. This past July, these countries established a coordinating mechanism under the Ukraine Compact to convene “swiftly and collectively at the most senior levels to determine how to support Ukraine” if it is again attacked. These are important first steps. But Ukraine needs more.
Ukraine’s preferred security guarantee is NATO membership, where allied members could directly come to its aid if attacked again. Zelenskyy first applied for NATO membership under an accelerated procedure in September 2022, and discussions in Ukraine and Europe about new deterrent structures began roughly around the same time. At NATO summits in Vilnius (2023) and in Washington (2024), allies confirmed that Ukraine’s future is in NATO and that is irreversible.
Ukraine’s supporters should help Ukraine strengthen the “iron bridge” between now and Article 5 protections. One possibility is to formally invite Ukraine to join the Joint Expeditionary Force — a UK led, multi-nation group of units that complements NATO forces. Ukraine is already an observer member and will observe training exercises this year and next. Another option that is being discussed is for the U.S.-Ukraine bilateral security agreement to be ratified by Congress to demonstrate to Russia the seriousness of Washington’s willingness to come to Ukraine’s aid in the future. A bipartisan effort is currently underway.
Putin will never stop in his quest to smash Ukraine into submission unless he is forced to. President Zelenskyy is right to flag in his long-term 10-point peace formula and his more immediate victory plan that the war can’t end, and peace can’t prevail, until Ukraine is a member of an alliance. Ukraine’s future will be in NATO and many members already support Ukraine joining. But creative thinking on what to do along that path will be necessary before any talks can end the war on terms favorable for Ukraine.