KEY TAKEAWAYS
KEY TAKEAWAYS
A casual observer could be forgiven for thinking that the U.S. does not care about the Indian Ocean. Even after a U.S. focus on the Indo-Pacific emerged in 2017, only a single substantive mention of the Indian Ocean appears in each of the three high-level U.S. strategy documents released in 2022: National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS). Instead, most of the attention to the Indian Ocean segment of the Indo-Pacific is focused on India, which has become a key U.S. partner and has arguably been the driving factor in the shift in U.S. strategy from the “Asia-Pacific” toward the Indo-Pacific.
Yet, the Indian Ocean is important to the United States. With 80% of global maritime oil shipping transiting it, along with one-third of the world’s container shipping and bulk cargo traffic, the stability of the Indian Ocean is critical to the global economy. The U.S.-led Operation Prosperity Guardian to counter Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden is a recent, high-profile indication of U.S. commitment to defending the security of the Indian Ocean in its northwest approaches, even if the conflict is often framed in terms of the Middle East. Beyond this operation, the U.S. Department of Defense assigns ongoing responsibility for the vast Indian Ocean region to three U.S. combatant commands: U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, U.S. Central Command, and U.S. Africa Command.
Without explicit strategic guidance beyond passing references in U.S. strategy documents, we must infer U.S. security objectives in the Indian Ocean. There appear to be three persistent priorities: 1) ensure the free flow of commerce, 2) maintain U.S. military access, including at Diego Garcia, and 3) prevent the Indian Ocean from becoming a priority given increasing requirements in the Pacific, Arctic and Atlantic theaters.
Washington appears to be increasingly recognizing the importance of the western Indian Ocean … and is taking action at the levels of strategy and policy, diplomacy and military operations.
On the cover of the IPS, the western edge of the Indo-Pacific map stops at India’s border with Pakistan and Maldives’ archipelago in the central Indian Ocean. However, since the IPS was issued in February 2022, there have been several disparate indications that Washington is looking beyond this region's borders. The last time U.S. attention focused on the western Indian Ocean was roughly 10-15 years ago when this area was discussed as the “business end” of the Indian Ocean. At the time, there were combat-support operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and Horn of Africa, and the Iran deterrence mission, among other missions. As these threats and operations lessened, U.S. attention shifted eastward in the Indian Ocean due to greater concerns about China, more robust outreach to partners and allies such as India and the Quad, and the development of an Indo-Pacific strategic framework. Yet, Washington appears to be increasingly recognizing the importance of the western Indian Ocean, suggesting that it may be starting to conceive of the Indian Ocean as a region on its own terms.
In fact, the U.S. is taking action at the levels of strategy and policy, diplomacy and military operations. The U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa, released in August 2022, contains a salient reference to the Indian Ocean. The document declares its intent to “Transcend Geographic Seams” amid the recurring bureaucratic organizational challenge for U.S. policymakers to engage stakeholders from three continents — Africa, Asia and Australia — on their Indian Ocean equities. More recently, a fact sheet released by the Department of State in early 2024 to mark the second anniversary of the IPS makes notable mentions of Washington’s partnerships in the Indian Ocean region, including U.S. participation in the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), which spans the entire littoral. A fact sheet released last year similarly highlights U.S. policy efforts on various issues such as climate, food and maritime security in the Indian Ocean region beyond solely South Asia to encompass its western and eastern sides in African and Southeast Asian nations such as Madagascar and Seychelles and Indonesia and Thailand, respectively. Finally, increased western Indian Ocean diplomacy can be observed through actions such as the reopening of the U.S. embassy in Seychelles in June 2023 and Deputy Secretary Richard Verma’s visit to the IORA Secretariat in Mauritius in May 2023.
Through the bipartisan Indian Ocean Region Strategic Review Act, congressional leaders in the House and Senate are now calling for an examination of U.S. interests in this vast region and the development of a formal strategy and implementation plan toward it. Of note, the language in the legislation highlights two countries in the western Indian Ocean: Seychelles and Comoros. First, if the act is realized, U.S. policymakers would be wise to consider reviews of the Indian Ocean conducted by previous administrations to better understand the persistent challenges of U.S. strategy development toward this diverse region. Second, in practice, the IPS is largely Pacific-focused due to China’s aggressive activities in this theater, with secondary attention to the Indian Ocean. As a result, Washington should recognize that U.S. objectives in the Indian Ocean are not entirely congruent with the IPS — and do not need to be.
There are indeed some continuities between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean segments of the Indo-Pacific in the contemporary era of strategic competition and against the backdrop of nontraditional security challenges such as natural disasters. Yet, U.S. objectives in the Indian Ocean — one of multiple theaters for global U.S. strategy and operations — are different from the IPS due to the unique attributes of this theater. Until progress is made on the act and the next iteration of the IPS is issued by the new administration, observers must wait to grasp the extent to which this collection of indicators and strategy development processes lead to a cohesive U.S. approach toward the Indian Ocean as a discrete entity. Foremost, the countries of the Indian Ocean will continue their dynamic journeys of economic, social, and military development, while interacting with outside powers, including the U.S. and China.
This article was originally published by the East-West Center.