In his presentation, Dr. Shamir discussed the role of domestic factors and, in particular, public opinion in determining the conduct of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since the beginning of the second Intifada. His analysis and corresponding policy recommendations were derived from public opinion polling data that focused on the core issues surrounding the conflict in its most recent phase.

Shamir discussed the upcoming disengagement and placed it in the context of the Geneva Initiative, which preceded Sharon’s announcement of his plan by two months. This initiative, coupled with a favorable sentiment on the part of the Israeli public, a deteriorating economy, and protest groups refusing to serve in the territories, pressured Sharon for a new policy initiative and providing the impetus for the disengagement plan.

Shamir presented polling results from December 2004 showing that for the first time a permanent status framework along the lines of Clinton’s parameters received majority support both among Israelis and Palestinians. A year earlier, there was only minority support for the Clinton/Geneva framework as a combined overall package. Shamir explained this change by the surge of optimism following Arafat’s death, and the fact that the more recent survey, carried out in a different context, did not use the “Geneva package” label.

Despite strong reservations regarding the issues of the refugees and Jerusalem, the fact that the overall package received majority support in both publics indicates that people’s calculus, in this respect, is compensatory. The desirable components and the chance of reaching a permanent status agreement seem to compensate for the undesirable parts. This, Shamir suggested, provides a clear operational recommendation for all players in the game interested in conflict resolution. In order to move forward on this path of compromise, it is important to emphasize the overall benefits of a comprehensive package and the necessity of trade-offs it implies.

Shamir maintained that although Clinton’s ideas and the ensuing Geneva package fall within both publics’ win-sets, it would be overly optimistic to suggest, based on this data, that the two publics are currently ripe for a permanent status process, not to mention a permanent agreement. Expectations regarding the feasibility of a permanent status agreement are less than encouraging and provide a completely different reading from the endorsement of such an agreement. No less problematic is the dominance of groups and voices opposed to compromise in the political arena in both societies. In addition, the ongoing public discourse and the two leaderships’ public statements indicate that a permanent status framework along the Clinton parameters does not seem to have acquired sufficient legitimacy and normative approval in both publics. In neither society has the leadership promoted public debate on what would constitute an acceptable deal, leaving the public unprepared for necessary compromise and trade-offs.

Shamir maintained that there is still a long way to go in order to turn Israeli and Palestinian slim majority support for the final status package into a viable, politically relevant, policy option. Only when the concessions and trade-offs outlined in the Clinton package become an integral part of public debate and discourse can we begin to consider the possibility that those ideas have made normative inroads in public opinion in its fullest sense.

It is essential for both leaderships to begin to prepare their publics for a permanent status agreement that will necessarily call for painful concessions and trade-offs. The preparation of public opinion entails moderating the two publics’ expectations with respect to what a permanent status solution holds for them – legitimizing options such as sovereignty-sharing in Jerusalem, the presence of settlement blocks in the West Bank, a symbolic recognition of the right of return divorced of any practical implications, the end of conflict, and mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state of the Palestinian people.

Given the “closed-lips” orientation inherent in two-level games, other players such as NGO’s, opposition parties and international players have an important role in this respect, and indeed sometimes step in to shatter inhibiting norms and prepare public opinion for compromise. Their role becomes even more crucial when leaders in power do not seem willing or able to opt for costly and painful conflict resolution steps, as seems to be the case in the current Israeli-Palestinian game.

While the majority of Israelis support the dismantling of most settlements as part of a peace agreement with the Palestinians, Shamir suggested that this support is volatile, and renewed violence with the Palestinians could affect it. On the Palestinian side, the situation is now of a fierce power struggle between Abu-Mazin’s Fateh party and the militant Islamists, particularly Hamas. Virtually all of Abu-Mazin’s important political decisions in recent months have been guided by this power struggle. Those interested in a successful implementation and outcome of the disengagement, and first and foremost the U.S., must maneuver carefully within the parameters of both sides’ domestic games. They must try their best to keep the cease-fire alive and prevent a possible escalation of violence that will play into the hands of spoilers on both sides.

These spoilers threaten the orderly implementation of the disengagement and must be handled with determination if the momentum for its successful completion is to be preserved. Sharon must not yield to the settlers’ delay tactics and Abbas must take measures to stop the shelling of Israeli communities from the Gaza strip. At the same time, the United States should examine the attractiveness of unofficial talks with Hamas as an incentive to prolong the cease-fire beyond the elections and the disengagement, and to disarm in the foreseeable future. This initiative would need to be balanced, however, by significant and visible steps designed to strengthen Abbas’ political standing.

Given Sharon’s resistance to enter permanent status negotiations, the U.S. reluctance to push him to do so, and Abbas’ recent declaration that the era of interim agreements is over, it is most likely that the political process will reach a deadlock after the disengagement. In order to prevent the renewal of violence, perhaps on a much wider scale, Shamir recommended that a new framework for immediate resumption of Israeli-Palestinian dialogue be devised. This framework should consist of a stabilization and confidence-building initiative designed to solve short-term problems and rebuild cooperation. This measure would allow the rigid dichotomy between Sharon and Abbas’ preferences for a step-by-step and a permanent status process, respectively, to be bridged in the interim. It would also afford the parties the opportunity to unofficially reexamine the gaps in their positions on the core issues central to any permanent status framework while allowing for the strengthening of the Palestinian economy as well as Abbas’ government.

Jacob Shamir is senior lecturer at the Department of Communication and Journalism at Hebrew University of Jerusalem and co-director (with Khalil Shikaki) of the only ongoing joint Israeli-Palestinian survey research project. He has served as the head of the Smart Family Foundation Communications Institute at Hebrew University from 1999 to 2002, and has held academic positions at universities in both Israel and the United States.