Summary

Israeli analysts and pundits enjoy quoting Henry Kissinger’s assertion that "Israel has no foreign policy, only domestic policy." Kissinger’s comment, while stressed too strongly, captures well the common understanding among political scientists and international relations specialists that domestic considerations have a significant effect on foreign policy. This monograph focuses on one particular domestic imperative of utmost importance in periods of conflict and its resolution: public opinion.

Intercommunal and international conflicts affect the most basic elements holding societies together: beliefs, value systems, collective memories, and identity perceptions. The disruption of these same elements—due to conflict—can heighten emotions and increase stress, a situation that often takes a costly toll on society. These situations are made worse when leaders make bad policy decisions. In such times, then, leaders must be attuned to public sentiment, as public-opinion support becomes critical.

How does public opinion act as a domestic imperative on policymaking? This monograph addresses this question, using extensive research on both Israeli and Palestinian public opinion collected during the second intifada, which began in 2000.

Robert Putnam’s two-level game metaphor is particularly useful in providing an analytical framework for this study. In Putnam’s model, two heads of government negotiate at the international table an agreement that must be ratified by their respective constituencies. Simultaneously, separate bargaining processes take place: among the constituents of the respective sides, and between each constituency and its respective leader. Expanding on this framework, we see public opinion as a central and special kind of player in the Palestinian and Israeli domestic games.

Public opinion as a player in the domestic policymaking game raises intriguing questions about its nature and its channels of influence: Is public opinion sophisticated enough to grasp the essential features of the game? How does it assert its presence and policy preferences? What are its channels of influence? Can it be influential in a nondemocratic system, such as the Palestinian Authority (PA) under Yasser Arafat, as compared with democracies in which the public has direct or indirect ratification or electoral power? Does it act solely as a constraint on policy, or can it also provide new opportunities for leaders?

These issues are explored in the context of Palestinian-Israeli relations during the second intifada. This research monograph attempts to provide an in-depth overview of both Israeli and Palestinian public sentiment with regard to conflict resolution and peacemaking options and to examine the role of public opinion at crucial junctures in the Israeli-Palestinian two-level game. The concluding section assesses the prospects for a final-status settlement in the coming years and offers policy recommendations.

This study covers the period since the Geneva initiative of a group of Israelis and Palestinians proposing a draft of a final-status agreement, through Ariel Sharon’s unilateral disengagement, and up to the consequent political reversals in Israel and the PA. From October to December 2003, an important turning point was reached in the course of the second intifada: from sheer violence to the realization on both sides that it was again time to search for new ways to break the cycle of violence. The two initiatives—reflecting completely different visions of future Israeli-Palestinian relations—left an indelible mark on the conduct of the conflict; they are intimately related and provide outstanding illustrations of the role of public opinion as a player in the domestic policymaking game.

The Geneva initiative was a bold move on the part of domestic players to interfere with the leaders’ game, and it provides an example of the role non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can play in conflict resolution processes. It was meant to demonstrate that there could be substantial common ground between Israelis and Palestinians regarding a comprehensive solution to the conflict, and to shatter the belligerent climate of opinion at the time. While receiving lukewarm support, it nevertheless turned out to be a major trigger for Sharon’s disengagement plan.

The disengagement turned out to be one of the most formative events in the course of the conflict in recent years. With its unilateral logic, it completely shifted the terms of the game played between Israel and the Palestinians and set in motion the political turnabouts in Israel and the PA in which public opinion—through the electoral connection—was the major player. The disengagement was the background for the establishment of the political party Kadima, in November 2005. With Sharon incapacitated and Ehud Olmert at its head, Kadima won the March 2006 Knesset election, and Olmert sought to maintain Sharon’s unilateral logic in the West Bank.

The impact of Sharon’s unilateral approach, and more specifically of Israel’s disengagement from the PA’s domestic game, was complex, and it provides a fascinating and rare example of a game in which one leader exploits public opinion on the other leader’s side so as to exert political pressure on the other leader. This was the logic of Sharon’s game, and there can be no doubt that it strongly influenced the standing of Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas (also known as Abu Mazin) and contributed to the victory of Hamas in the parliamentary election held in January 2006.

The disengagement demonstrates well the dynamic relationship between leaders and their publics and suggests that public opinion should not be cast solely in terms of a constraint on policy; it can also open up opportunities for leaders involved in two-level games. Since the end of 2001, a majority of Israelis have supported the dismantling of most settlements in return for peace. This sentiment provided an opportunity (and impetus) for Sharon’s dramatic change in policy. This step, however, was not perceived as normative, and only Sharon’s declaration of his disengagement plan legitimized the dismantling of settlements in the eyes of the Israeli public.

Another case in which public opinion provides a major opportunity for its leaders—on both sides—is the issue of a permanent-status settlement. We show that at least at one point in time, both Palestinians and Israelis supported a permanent-status package along the lines of President Clinton’s 'parameters" and the Geneva initiative. This fact is highly significant and suggests that most any solution with the potential to elicit public support from both sides must resort to some variation of Clinton’s ideas. However, the level of support for such a package fluctuated over time and in relation to the political and military contexts. Moreover, and no less important, a more in-depth analysis of Palestinian and Israeli public opinion in its fullest sense suggests that both publics were far from being ready for the painful concessions and trade-offs that a final-status agreement entails. The climate of opinion on both sides did not indicate normative acceptance of such an agreement, and expectations for such an agreement were low; the long-range prospects for normalization and reconciliation, and especially for fundamental ethos-changing steps, were also viewed with skepticism.

The Geneva initiative was an attempt to change the rules of the game from the outside. The unilateral approach and the disengagement were essentially another attempt to change the rules of the game by one of the key players. Kadima’s victory in Israel and Olmert’s avowed commitment to the unilateral approach, combined with the ascent to power of Hamas in the PA, seemed to foreclose the path to negotiation. Nevertheless, the analysis of Palestinian and Israeli public opinion and of the two-level game during this period suggests that the resumption of negotiations over a final-status deal is the best way to proceed. The two publics, however, are not yet ready for the painful concessions and trade-offs that a final-status agreement requires. Entering such a process without due preparation risks a collapse similar to that of the Camp David summit in 2000. The leaders on both sides thus face the enormous challenge of preparing their publics for a final-status solution, and the sooner they take on this challenge the better. In that the likelihood of this happening is quite low, given the personal policy preferences and the dynamics of international bargaining, this study proposes that NGOs and the international community step in to assume this essential task.

About the Author

Jacob Shamir is senior lecturer at the Department of Communication and Journalism at Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He was a senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace during 2004–2005. Shamir served as the head of the Smart Family Foundation Communication Research Institute at Hebrew University from 1999 to 2002 and has held professorships and lecture positions at the University of Texas at Austin, Rutgers University, Bar-Ilan University, and Tel-Aviv University. His book The Anatomy of Public Opinion was published by the University of Michigan Press in 2000. He has also written numerous articles for Political Psychology, Journal of Peace Research, Public Opinion Quarterly, International Journal of Public Opinion Research, and Journalism Quarterly, among others. Shamir has received several grants from institutions in Israel for projects relating to public opinion and peace. He co-directs with Khalil Shikaki the only ongoing joint Israeli-Palestinian survey research project. Shamir received his master’s degree and Ph.D. from the School of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of Minnesota.