Coercive Prevention: Normative, Political, and Policy Dilemmas
Peaceworks No. 35
For all that has been proclaimed about the importance of preventive diplomacy, the reality of international action falls far short. This report focuses on one particular aspect of this agenda, namely, the need to take a harder look at "coercive prevention," and particularly at the threat or use of military force as frequently necessary parts of overall preventive strategies. This is a very different approach from versions of preventive diplomacy that make its noncoercive nature a defining parameter and the use of coercion at best a last resort.
For all that has been proclaimed about the importance of preventive diplomacy, the reality of international action falls far short. While the first decade of the post–Cold War era did have some preventive successes, it was more marked (or marred) by missed opportunities. Even in such "success" cases as Kosovo and East Timor, whatever may have been achieved was achieved only after mass killings, only after scores of villages were ravaged, only after hundreds of thousands were left as refugees. Yes, these conflicts were stopped from getting worse—but they already were humanitarian tragedies.
This report focuses on one particular aspect of this agenda, namely, the need to take a harder look at "coercive prevention," and particularly at the threat or use of military force as frequently necessary parts of overall preventive strategies. This is a very different approach from versions of preventive diplomacy that make its noncoercive nature a defining parameter and the use of coercion at best a last resort. Yet one of the key lessons of the first decade of the post–Cold War era, based on Jentleson's work and that of others, is that while coercion rarely is sufficient for prevention, it often is necessary.
Bruce W. Jentleson is director of the Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy and professor of public policy and political science at Duke University. In 1993–94, Jentleson served on the State Department Policy Planning Staff as special assistant to the director. In 1987–88, while a Council on Foreign Relations international affairs fellow, he served as a foreign policy adviser to Senator Al Gore.
