Summary

• Religious extremist groups in the Islamic world are deeply divided along ideological and sectarian lines. Stereotyped images of Islam as a monolithic religion predisposed toward violence do not do justice to the fact that most Muslims are peaceful. Such stereotypes also fail to take into account the multi-faceted complexity of those Islamic groups that choose violence as a political strategy.
• The rise of religious extremism in South Asia and the Middle East has to do primarily with four factors: the absence in much of the Muslim world of democratic, accountable governments, and, indirectly related to this, disputes over contested territory; the failure of governments in some Islamic countries to address problems arising from rapid social, demographic, and economic changes in the last century; financial, logistical, and moral support provided by external actors; and the breakdown within Islam itself of ijtihad—the established tradition whereby religious clerics independently interpret the Koran in order to apply Koranic law to diverse and changing circumstances.
• Extremist groups in the Middle East and South Asia display a diversity of motives and methods of operation, reflecting the widely varying circumstances in which they have arisen and operate.
• Individuals join extremist groups for a number of reasons, including the desire to promote specific political goals, as well as in response to a variety of financial, spiritual, and emotional incentives. The groups also attract individuals who, regardless of their social class or economic background, feel they have been humiliated and treated as "second class" by government authorities and others.
• Successful extremist groups have clear missions, rely on a division of labor between relatively young, uneducated "foot soldiers" and better-educated elite operatives, and have developed a variety of fundraising techniques. Many groups rely heavily on the Internet to raise funds, as well as on contributions from foreign governments.
• The ability of these groups to meet their goals depends on four additional factors: access to weapons; mastery of the art of public relations, including use of the media to promote their causes; access to intelligence sources and development of counter-intelligence techniques; and the establishment of "corporate headquarters"—either in a physical area or virtually, via the Internet.
• Not all religious schools (madaris) in Pakistan are "factories of terrorism" as commonly depicted in the Western press. Many of the older madaris are long-established centers of learning that have produced serious Islamic intellectuals, while others are providing important educational and social welfare services not available from the government. Similarly, most religious schools in Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, and Egypt teach traditional religious values rather than seek to inculcate militancy among the young.

About the Report

What are the factors, including the roles played by educational systems and the media, that give rise to political violence and terrorism in Pakistan, Egypt, and the occupied Palestinian territories? How do jihadi (holy war) groups in Indonesia and Pakistan use Islam to mobilize support? What strategies have Hamas, Hezbollah, and Islamic Jihad employed to attract, retain, and deploy recruits in the West Bank, Gaza, Egypt, and Lebanon, and what motivates their behavior?

Written by Judy Barsalou, director of the USIP's Grant Program, this report summarizes presentations and discussion at a Current Issues Briefing on April 17 that featured three current grantees of the Institute: Mustapha Kamal Pasha (American University), Jessica Stern (Harvard University), and Muhammad Muslih (Long Island University). The event presented findings from their grant-funded research projects.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policies.