How can the international community increase the likelihood of success in societies emerging from conflict?

This question was discussed at a public Institute event, Nation Building in the 21st Century: Prescriptions for Success, on March 9, 2007. The panel of speakers included Representative Sam Farr (D-CA); Ambassador James Dobbins, director of International Security and Defense Policy Center at the RAND National Security Research Division; Ambassador John Herbst, coordinator for the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization; and Beth Cole, senior program officer at the Institute. Daniel Serwer, Institute vice president for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations, moderated.

The discussion drew on a new RAND book, The Beginner’s Guide to Nation Building, whose authors include Dobbins and Cole, a “Framework for Success for Societies Emerging from Conflict” developed by USIP, and new operating models nearing approval by the U.S. government for the deployment of civilians to missions abroad. This USIPeace Briefing highlights the main points made during the discussion and does not represent the views of the Institute, which does not advocate specific policies.

Drawing on past experience, the panel emphasized that the success of future nation building missions depends on acquiring support from policymakers in Congress and the Administration, applying lessons learned in the past, using common frameworks and doctrine for the future, and increasing civilian capacity, which is sorely lacking.

Institutionalizing Change: Need for Political Will

In introductory remarks, Representative Farr acknowledged the difficulty of change but underscored the need to institutionalize nation-building efforts. Creation of the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was the first step. The second step was Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, which put stabilization operations on par with war fighting. The third step is proposed legislation authorizing expanded civilian capacity for nation-building missions. Representative Farr’s House Resolution 1084, the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act, authorizes a civilian reserve corps and funding. Senators Richard Lugar (R-IN) and Joseph Biden (D-DE) have already introduced a companion bill in the Senate. Representative Farr underlined the importance of strong support for these bills from constituents throughout the country.

Lessons Learned: Nation Building 101

RAND’s recently produced ‘primer’ attempts to sequence and prioritize issues as a mission chief would need to do when embarking on nation building: it focuses on planning, components, cost, and size.

Mission Planning

During the planning process, leaders should outline clear objectives, ensure their ambitions are in line with the resources available, determine the appropriate institutional framework, and decide on distribution of power and responsibility among stakeholders.

When outlining objectives, planners must consider how intervention will alter both the internal and external power dynamics of the host country. “The situation after intervention will be different; there will be a new internal balance of power as well as a new balance of power among neighboring states,” Dobbins said. If mission planners fail to take this into consideration, their approach will be misguided from the onset. Key political and social power brokers, both within the country and in the region, may be left out of the calculus, undermining long-term stability.

In addition to setting objectives, successful mission planning involves comparing resource commitments with objectives. Dobbins pointed out “often, when missions fail there is a discrepancy between the scale of one’s ambitions and scale of commitment.” This problem was manifest in Somalia as well as in Iraq.

Once objectives are determined and the commitment level is set, the appropriate institutional framework must be chosen. The RAND study found that in cases where invasion is not an issue, the “UN ought to be the default … it’s the best framework for most missions because of its low cost structure, high success rate, greater international legitimacy.” By contrast, nation-led coalitions or the NATO alliance are the better framework when an invasion or other peace enforcement measure is contemplated.

The RAND study identifies consultative forums as a critical feature of the planning phase. “The idea is to ensure layers of consultative machinery to operate throughout the mission.” Dobbins described the concept as a system of concentric circles. The neighboring countries are the most directly concerned—they inevitably get involved. As Dobbins stated, “we can tell [neighbors] to bug off, that we’ll take care of it, but they won’t…they have vested interests.” Neighbors tend to get involved in ways that are deleterious to mission objectives. Thus the mission must work to engage the neighbors in a convergent project of mutual interest, aiming to bring them within the consultative network rather than attempting to push them aside. In addition to neighbors, financial donors need to be engaged, usually through donors’ conferences. Finally, there are the major powers, in particular the permanent members of the UN Security Council.

Mission Components

There are several components that are standard to all nation-building missions. Success depends in large part on re-directing the energy of former combatants away from violent activities and integrating these players within the newly formed social, political, and economic structures.

Humanitarian and security needs are the first two components that must be addressed. Usually, the former is already in place prior to the mission’s arrival. With respect to the latter, intervention must move quickly to fill security vacuums. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) should begin rapidly, as should the training and organizing of a new police force. Simultaneously, the mission should address the needs of the justice and penal systems, which are necessary if the police are to be effective.

In addition to humanitarian relief and security, other key components of the nation-building mission are governance, economic stabilization, democratization, and development.

With respect to governance, the mission will inevitably empower locals from day one. But doing so affects the dynamics of the society. The focus should be on re-directing competition for wealth and power, steering it away from violence and toward peaceful processes for conflict resolution.

The primary economic goal should be creation of an environment in which normal commerce can resume. Societies emerging from conflict have typically proven favorable receptacles for international assistance. They are able to absorb more of their GDP as international assistance, and they yield more growth in GDP per assistance dollar invested than do stable societies.

Democratization and nation building are not meant to be “an abstract exercise in social justice,” said Dobbins. An intervention mission needs to co-opt previously violent energies of combatants, finding legitimate and peaceful ways in which they can share power. At the same time, an intervention mission cannot substitute entirely for popular sovereignty, which needs to support the effort.

Development, like other components, is not an end in itself but rather a means of re-directing competition away from violence. “Both democracy and development can be polarizing, so introducing reforms runs the risk of increased conflict,” Dobbins commented. Reforms therefore need to be evaluated upon their capacity to promote peaceful competition for wealth and power, and discourage violent competition. In the initial stabilization phase, assistance should focus on repairing rather than improving infrastructure. Multilateral, not bilateral, donors should finance major longer-term projects to improve infrastructure through loans, rather than grants, thus ensuring a degree of local buy-in.

Mission Cost and Size

Cost and size vary greatly depending upon the scale of commitment and the scope of one’s ambition. It is important to anticipate the scale of a mission prior to intervention and ensure that the appropriate resources are in place from the start. Although peace enforcement is much more expensive than peacekeeping, as Dobbins pointed out, “Peacekeeping doesn’t stop WMD proliferation, aggression, genocide, or famine—so if you are insistent upon stopping these things you have to go to the higher option.”

Ramping Up Civilian Capacity

The U.S. government has made some progress in ramping up civilian capacity for nation building. Ambassador John Herbst (S/CRS) is working to create an internal surge capacity (within the U.S. government) of civilian response teams—a minimum of 200 people across all agencies. S/CRS is also accelerating plans for a civilian reserve corps modeled on the military reserve. Herbst explained that, as envisioned, the civilian reserve will be comprised of people in civilian life who sign up for reserve status for three to five years, doing their normal civilian jobs yet training as a team from time to time. The reservists will have a commitment to serve from six to twelve months abroad at any time. While Congress has not yet authorized the civilian reserve, prospects for it are improving gradually.

Beginning to Create Doctrine: Framework for Success

In parallel with RAND’s preparation of its primer, the U.S. Institute of Peace has completed work on a common "Framework for Success" for future missions. This is based on end-states: a safe and secure environment, rule of law, stable democracy, sustainable economy, and social well-being. Within each of these end-states, the Framework defines intermediate goals. It also includes “critical leadership responsibilities" that cut across the five end-states. This framework is intended to be kept constant from one nation building mission to another, thus enabling both civilians and military to plan and train in ways that improve inter-operability.

The existing literature on nation building is overwhelmingly negative—it is largely about what not to do. As Beth Cole stated, "the nuggets—the best practices—are hidden in a pile of debris. The search for best practices is akin to looking for that diamond ring that got trucked to a voluminous landfill." The USIP Framework will be used as the basis for a website that will promulgate lessons learned and best practices; it will also provide a basis for developing doctrine and training curriculum.

Conclusion

Cole concluded the session on a high note: "If we have the RAND work, some kind of system for collecting lessons on an ongoing basis, a standardized framework, and an increase in capability seen with the civilian reserve...I think we are almost there...and if we can put all those pieces together with adequate resources we are really on our way to mission success."

This USIPeace Briefing was written by Beth Cole, senior program officer, and Christina Parajon, program assistant, in the Institute’s Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations. The views expressed here are not necessarily those of the Institute, which does not advocate specific policies.

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent international conflicts, promote post-conflict stability and development, and increase conflict management capacity, tools, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by directly engaging in peacebuilding efforts around the globe.