(excerpt)

Crocker, Chester A., Fen Olser Hampson, and Pamela Aall. eds. Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World. United States Institute of Peace: Washington D.C., 1999, pg. 143-144.

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P. 139: This chapter examines the expansion of private actors into the diplomatic field and the increased attention that the foreign policy elite is now devoting to the concepts of conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and "tracktwo" or "parallel diplomacy."¹ This new trend has been especially visible in Burundi, which, after the Rwandan genocide, became a test case for post-Cold War intervention in a domestic conflict. In Burundi, external actors initiated a large number of explicitly conflict-oriented activities, in addition to the more standard humanitarian and development programs. However, although nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) proved to have competitive advantages in dealing with the conflict and had accomplishments to their credit, they also augmented the fragmentation of the international response. The competing definitions of the problems and the resulting mismatch of responses led to a general misdiagnosis of the conflict's most critical forces. The experience of Burundi also shows that efforts by private actors, however well intentioned, cannot substitute for strategic commitment by states to deal with the issue of violence.

p. 149: In the end, it appears that every political tendency in Burundi has found a temporary ally among the international negotiators, who, in turn, have become part of the problem. Through their various international negotiators, Burundians have discovered the potential power of the media and of international public opinion, and have become obsessed with manipulating both. At the same time, Burundians have intensified division among the various international agents by underlining and exploiting their different agendas. For instance, discussions surrounding the UN secretary-general's proposition to send a multinational force to Burundi has thrown a harsh light on the various international interests and positions. Another example is Synergies Africa's role in the internal negotiations between the government and the National Assembly in 1997 and 1998--a role that the regional mediators saw as more competitive with than complementary to the Arusha process. Not only did the internal negotiation process seem to build some trust but it was also seen as giving the conflicting parties an undesirable degree of leeway and an excuse to exit the Arusha process.

P. 152: In conclusion, NGOs that are specialized in mediation and conflict resolution have the potential to play a positive role that official actors seem incapable of playing�but only if that role is undertaken within the framework of a coherent and coordinated official strategy. As seen in Burundi, NGOs are particularly effective in the prenegotiation phase by helping to spur dialogue between the protagonists. They can also alert public opinion to official policies and impose norms of action. However, their sheer number, their sometime diverging institutional agendas, and their various definitions of the problem risk fragmenting and therefore hindering the international response. Given that the post-Cold War context tends to encourage nonstate interventionism in conflict situations, international players have at least the responsibility to evaluate the comparative advantages of the different agents of intervention, to understand the eminently political nature of this action and its impact on conflict, and to develop a code of conduct and accountability to regulate these activities.