![The flags of Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) members in ASEAN headquarter at Jalan Sisingamangaraja No.70A, South Jakarta, Indonesia. From left the flags of: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam. (Wikimedia Commons)](/sites/default/files/styles/image_with_caption/public/2023-09/20230926_0asean_flags_wikicommons-project-web2.jpg?itok=VOibVZtN)
USIP, the East Asian International Relations Caucus (EAIR), the Institute of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations (IDFR), and the Institute of Malaysian and International Studies (IKMAS UKM) brought together scholars from Southeast Asia and the United States for a two-day workshop that examined questions such as: How has U.S.-China competition manifested in Southeast Asia? What kinds of benefits and challenges are presented by this competition? How can the agency of smaller states be understood and assessed in the context of great power competition? What options do states in Southeast Asia have? And what is the role of ASEAN?
The track 1.5 workshop in Putrajaya, Malaysia, in June 2023 provided government officials and regional scholars with the opportunity to discuss what U.S.-China rivalry looks like in Southeast Asia and how they interpreted the rivalry’s significance for individual states and the region collectively. The attendees offered their assessments in the form of an essay series that offers the vantage points of all 10 ASEAN member-states. The inclusion of all 10 helps correct a still-too-common focus on a select few states — specifically those that tend to align with Washington — as though they represent the complete Southeast Asian view.
Program Description
This ongoing USIP essay series seeks to explore the agency of Southeast Asian states and their policy options in the context of U.S.-China competition. The essays will examine whether there are domains (e.g., economic or security) where ASEAN states experience more or less pressure stemming from strategic rivalry.
A key theme that spans these essays is the risks and opportunities presented by strategic competition and how Southeast Asian states approach managing that competition to serve their interests. In other words, what does Southeast Asian agency look like amid strategic rivalry and what are the implications for these countries' much-coveted strategic autonomy?
The opinions expressed in these essays are solely those of the authors and do not represent USIP, or any organization or government.
Essay Series
![A historical map of China and Southeast Asia, in Danang, Vietnam, Nov. 1, 2017. (Quinn Ryan Mattingly/The New York Times)](/sites/default/files/styles/summary_image/public/2023-09/20230906_vietnam-china-sea-1_nyt_ac.jpg?itok=ITUT7yXz)
In Southeast Asia, U.S.-China Competition Is More Than A Two-Players Game
Alice Ba introduces the essay series, arguing that Southeast Asian countries are neither totally helpless nor completely without leverage when navigating U.S.-China competition.
![President Biden meets with President Vo Van Thuong of Vietnam in Hanoi, Sept. 11, 2023. The two countries inked a comprehensive strategic partnership, representing an historic upgrade of U.S.-Vietnam relations. (Kenny Holston/The New York Times)](/sites/default/files/styles/summary_image/public/2023-09/20230912_biden-vietnam-12_nyt_ac.jpg?itok=ipLnJIGL)
U.S.-China Competition Presents Vietnam with Risks and Opportunities
Nguyen Hung Son examines how U.S.-China competition is seen in Vietnam, highlighting opportunities and challenges for the future.
![A construction project financed by China, which is Cambodia’s largest trading partner, in Phnom Penh, Aug. 10, 2019. (Adam Dean/The New York Times)](/sites/default/files/styles/summary_image/public/2023-09/20230919_cambodia-leader-1_nyt_ac.jpg?itok=LFNmZGcu)
How Small States Navigate U.S.-China Rivalry: The Case of Cambodia
Charadine Pich and Chhengpor Aun explain three ways Cambodia’s agency plays out amidst U.S.-China strategic competition.
![Fishermen setting out nets off the coast of Bohol, the Philippines, April 11, 2018. (Ben C. Solomon/The New York Times)](/sites/default/files/styles/summary_image/public/2023-09/20230926_philippines-dynamite-fishing-2_nyt_ac.jpg?itok=HkDUcafO)
For the Philippines, Maritime Security Goes Beyond U.S.-China Rivalry
Charmaine Misalucha-Willoughby explains how maritime security is broader than geopolitics, including fishery and environmental dimensions which affect how small powers like the Philippines navigate great power rivalry.
![](/sites/default/files/styles/summary_image/public/2023-10/20231004_china-laos-invest_nyt_ac.jpg?itok=mHgMALiU)
How Laos and Other ASEAN Countries Can Leverage U.S.-China Competition
Ambassador Mai Sayavongs argues that, while U.S.-China competition poses challenges for ASEAN, there are also opportunities for countries like Laos and others in Southeast Asia to leverage in this tense geopolitical moment.
![The Malaysia-China Kuantan Industrial Park in Malaysia. Domestic factors and concern over debt led Malaysia to suspend some Belt and Road projects in 2018, but it continues to declare support for Chinese investment. (Lauren DeCicca/The New York Times)](/sites/default/files/styles/summary_image/public/2023-10/20231011_malaysia-china-pushback-11_nyt_ac.jpg?itok=z565fgpz)
Active Neutrality: Malaysia in the Middle of U.S.-China Competition
Cheng-Chwee Kuik says Malaysia is pursuing active, inclusive, and prudent "equidistant diplomacy" to hedge against multiple risks and cultivate long-term options in the middle of U.S.-China competition.
![Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken meets with Bruneian Foreign Minister II Dato Erywan Yusof, in London, United Kingdom, on May 3, 2021. Ron Przysucha/ U.S. Department of State](/sites/default/files/styles/summary_image/public/2023-10/20231026_blinken-yusof-2021_flickr_ac.jpg?itok=_WSn1ycs)
Why Brunei is Hedging Between the U.S. and China
Sufrizul Husseini says that Brunei seeks to advance its interests through relationships with Beijing and Washington while avoiding the dangers of rigidly tilting toward or away from either power.
![A usually busy road remains empty during a “silent strike” against the military coup in Yangon, Myanmar. March 24, 2021. (The New York Times)](/sites/default/files/styles/summary_image/public/2024-04/20240403_myanmar-protesters-3_nyt_ac.jpg?itok=NFHVlCqK)
How A Fractured Myanmar is Navigating U.S.-China Rivalry
Phyu Hnin explores how Myanmar’s civil conflict has made the country vulnerable to powerful foreign interests at the expense of Myanmar’s people — but that pro-democratic actors could use the U.S.-China rivalry to their advantage.
![The Singapore Chinese Cultural Center in Singapore, May 2018. Despite Singapore’s consistent denials, China insists on referring to it as a “Chinese country” and uses coercion to influence Singapore’s policy choices. (Ore Huiying/The New York Times)](/sites/default/files/styles/summary_image/public/2024-04/20240410_singapore-china-1_nyt_ac.jpg?itok=bHhdrTvw)
A Small State Heavyweight? How Singapore Handles U.S.-China Rivalry
Terence Lee explains how Singapore's form of governance arguably gives the city-state more latitude in addressing U.S.-China competition than other Southeast Asian nations.