Key Points

- Our deliberations were facilitated by dialogue with government officials and private-sector experts similarly grappling with approaches to eliminating the nuclear threat from Pyongyang without either acquiescing in its proliferation activities or precipitating armed conflict.

- North Korea's economic decline, its international isolation, and its impending domestic political transition present opportunities to persuade it to abandon the path of confrontation in favor ofa course of military stabilization, tension reduction, and political and economic engagement.

- Does North Korea have "the bomb"?
- Is "the bomb" THE security threat?
- Do we face an imminent military crisis in Korea?
- Is the North Korean leadership unpredictable or irrational?
- Is Pyongyang really in control of the negotiation?
- Will Pyongyang alter its behavior only when pressured?
- Is time on North Korea's side?
- Does North Korea want to join "the family of nations"?
- Is U.S. policy clear to North Korean officials?

• In a public atmosphere of heightening confrontation over North Korea's nuclear program, the United States Institute of Peace conducted an intensive five-month review of Pyongyang's proliferation activities. Our objectives have been to help clarify public understanding of a complex issue with serious security concerns for the U.S. and key allies, and to assess negotiating strategies for dealing with the North Korean challenge.
• The North Korean nuclear program presents a major challenge to the security of two treaty allies-South Korea and Japan-and to our interest in an effective global nuclear nonproliferation regime. It would be inappropriate, however, to view Pyongyang's program to construct nuclear weapons in its current state of development as constituting an immediate military crisis.
• That said, essential to an effective negotiating position is the maintenance of a credible U.S./South Korea military deterrent, including maintenance of a prudent readiness posture. Given Pyongyang's long history of the use of violence, it is necessary to convince the North Korean leadership that pursuing its military buildup-conventional as well as nuclear-is a losing course of action. Deterrence, however, is only the foundation of a policy; it is not a strategy for eliminating Pyongyang's nuclear challenge.
• We have potent diplomatic and economic assets for dealing with Pyongyang, based on a strong international coalition (including China), which can be brought to bear at the negotiating table.
• North Korea's self-imposed isolation, demonstrated willingness to use force, and on-again, off-again negotiating tactics easily lead to misreading of the circumstances it faces and of the risks and opportunities we face. Current public commentary on the situation implies either the hopelessness of efforts to negotiate an end to the North Korean nuclear weapons program, or the possible degeneration of the current confrontation into military conflict. We believe that the prospects for conflict, while not to be taken lightly, are not so stark, and that the options for negotiation are potentially more productive.
• The working group identified nine questions now shaping the public debate on this issue. Each is subject to misperceptions that impede development of a more effective Korea policy. These issues, which the group sought to clarify, include:
• Given the complexity and sensitivity of the North Korean challenge, the Administration could strengthen the policy-making process by appointing a senior coordinator to oversee the bureaucracy, be a public spokesperson on this issue, and coordinate policy with key allies. The coordinator could also be the point-person in dealing with North Korea in what without question will be a protracted and frustrating process.
• A negotiating strategy is the most effective approach to mobilizing U.S. and allied strengths in dealing with Pyongyang. In recent years North Korea has appeared somewhat responsive to negotiating options that played to North Korean needs. The North Korean leadership faces a difficult set of decisions about how to deal with its parlous circumstances. A well-cast U.S. negotiating position can influence Pyongyang's approach to dealing with its policy dilemmas.
• The working group concluded that the most useful negotiating position would be a package proposal which clearly spelled out for Pyongyang a strategic choice of two paths to its future: either to face increasing isolation and relentless international pressure if it persists in its current policy of confrontation and military buildup; or to take steps to defuse the military confrontation, build confidence and gradually engage the world economically and politically. North Korean actions down either of these paths should be responded to by proportionate U.S. and allied incentives or by actions to heighten deterrence and Pyongyang's isolation, as appropriate.
• What if Pyongyang won't deal? It must be recognized that the North Korean leadership may not be willing now to reach a negotiated resolution of international concerns about its nuclear program. The working group concluded, however, that standing pat is not a viable long-term option for the North given its domestic difficulties and international pressures. Hence, the Pyongyang regime will in time either opt for survival by giving up its nuclear program, or it will continue down the path of self isolation and confrontation. This latter course carries with it some significant risks and dangers for which our strategy must be prepared. However, we believe that if Pyongyang follows this path it will eventually succumb to its own internal weaknesses.