America and the New World Order

It has become an issue since the end of the Cold War--what is America's foreign policy for the "new world order"? Today especially, foreign lands that were unknown before the Cold War except in geography books, grip the United States's attention and beg for American intervention into their intra-state conflicts. This beckoning immediately raises questions on America's purpose in the world and its national interests. Americans view intervention, the entrance into a conflict using military and political coercion, as a quick solution, but it is inconceivable that the U.S. could respond to every injustice and violation of humanity in the world; Americans would undoubtedly balk at an intervention in every civil squabble or ethnic uprising. So, what factors should determine U. S. involvement in these conflicts?

When should America intervene?

Former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger offers some direction; in 1986, Weinberger derived six factors to consider before the commitment of military forces:  

1. Forces should not be committed unless vital interests are at stake;
2. If forces are committed, the U. S. must provide sufficient numbers and support to win. If the country is unwilling to do so then forces should not be committed;
3. Any intervention requires clearly defined political and military objectives;
4. The relationship between objectives and force size must be constantly reassessed and adjusted if necessary;
5. Before forces are committed the government should have a reasonable assurance of domestic political support from the public and Congress. This support requires candor from the government in making clear why vital interests are threatened;
6. Commitment of U. S. forces should be a last resort--'only after diplomatic, political, economic and other efforts have been made to protect' vital interests.^[1]

Mr. Weinberger's "tests" assert the idea of intervention as a pragmatic, last resort. The former Secretary of Defense requires political and military objectives to be clearly defined and reassessed; a mission's success must have concrete means of evaluation. Full commitment to the intervention is another prudent prerequisite. Americans, as evinced in Vietnam, do not enjoy failure; they are willing to commit only if success is the outcome. Mr. Weinberger, following the Vietnam Paradigm, also requires the public's and Congress' general support before the commitment of forces. Domestic support is crucial to military morale; doubt at home translates as failure abroad, a self-fulfilling prophecy. These principles clearly define the factors which should be met before intervention; however, Mr. Weinberger offers another crucial test. "Forces should not be committed unless vital interests are at stake;" yet, who defines America's "vital interests" and what are they?

Why should America intervene?

Americans are pragmatic people, willing to help those nations who cannot help themselves or who are beyond the means to return to a peaceful state. The scope of this aid is what leads to disagreement within the Congress as well as the general public. The term "vital interest" is a subjective analysis of America's needs. First, it is imperative that a conflict impact the American people, almost plaguing their minds; it must affect society's machinery, its daily business. Americans intervene to help others and themselves.^[2] An American self-interest is essential; otherwise, it will not garner the support that Mr. Weinberger deems necessary for a successful operation. Second, intervention must serve some purpose, have some tangible goal to evaluate its success.

In the Post-Cold War Era with the absence of a communist nemesis, interests have centered mostly on the "promotion of values," the protection of human and civil rights through humanitarian assistance and "peacekeeping" or "peace enforcement." The incidents in Somalia and Bosnia illustrate this new world mission.

Case Studies

SOMALIA

Somalia may be labeled as a purely humanitarian mission, possessing no other U.S. interest except the compassion of feeding the hungry. Criticism exists, though, about the prudence of intervention into a country with relatively little interest to the U. S. and against the nation's sovereignty. The international legalities shall be avoided, seeing that the U. S. mission was sanctioned by the Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali; the prudence of intervention will be the issue in question.

The main criticisms are based on Mr. Weinberger's first test; the U. S. had little interest in the East African nation. Most of the outcry for intervention came from the Secretary-General coupled with terrifying media reports. Somalia was no threat to America's domestic borders nor its economic well-being; Somalia was, at most, a clan war hindering aid to starving people. Americans, nevertheless, supported a limited mission to help feed the Somalis; if so, the question arises--what failed in Somalia?

In response to Mohamed Farah Aideed's lack of cooperation with UN peacekeepers, the Pentagon in November 1992 proposed that a U. S.-led force distribute aid with the expectation that UN peacekeepers would take over shortly. On 3 December 1992, the Security Council adopted Resolution 794 approving the U. S. operation. President Bush intended the mission to be "limited in scope and time," writing the Secretary-General:

I want to emphasize that the mission of the coalition is limited and specific: to create security conditions which will permit the feeding of the starving Somali people and allow the transfer of this security function to the UN peacekeeping force.^[3]

With Clinton's inauguration, a drastic shift in military objectives occurred. On 26 March under American pressure, the Security Council passed Resolution 814 essentially calling for an extensive "nation-building" plan in Somalia. In total, President Clinton committed the U.S. to more than a humanitarian mission, he had endorsed a resolution intended to expand U. S. involvement. Clinton's idealism, however, was without "clearly defined political and military objectives," and by June 1993, the U. S. with UN support had become little more than another Somali faction. Consequently, horrific news stories, like the dead, naked American dragged through the streets, became headliners. Questions erupted in Washington; a bipartisan effort pressured the Clinton administration for answers. Finally, under heavy criticism, the administration agreed to withdraw troops from Somalia by March 1994.

President Clinton's plan in Somalia was an evident departure from Mr. Weinberger's principles. A scheme which ultimately called for Somalia's rebuilding overstepped the original objectives and prolonged U. S. presence. Americans supported distributing aid, however, they balked at occupying a foreign country. Not only was "nation-building" not a vital interest, it disregarded the general public and Congress; President Clinton failed to ask for support in such a large-scale mission. Furthermore, such intervention had no clear goal, except for the utopian vision of a peaceful Somalia; the means to reach the objectives were entrenched in rhetoric, not pragmatism.

The new administration made errors in its first venture in foreign politics, however, to label Operation Restore Hope a "failure" would be a gross oversimplification. Chester A. Crocker, chairman of the board of the United States Institute of Peace, argues that involvement in Somalia saved an estimated quarter of a million lives; it was Clinton's inexperienced administration and the shift towards a "sweepingly ambitious new 'nation-building' resolution" which caused the intervention's ill-turns; Crocker states:

The Somalia 'failure' was less a failure of either humanitarian intervention or muscular peacekeeping than a failure to apply them wisely. The failure was of another order: strategic confusion followed by a collapse of political will when the confusion led to combat casualties.^[4]

Americans should take a lesson from the mission in Somalia; in the new world order, the U. S.'s role should be as intense as during the Cold War period. America's attitude has recently regressed to the pre-World War I isolationist sentiment; yet, its interests are far from isolationist. Americans want to prevent human rights abuses; however, if the U. S. wants to promote the values of human kindness, it must be willing to intervene in foreign conflicts. Intervention necessitates a full, willing commitment. In tandem, the U. S. government must also be willing to commit forces to the operation in a pragmatic, objective manner.

BOSNIA

The recent intervention into Bosnia presents a chance to apply the lessons in Somalia. Again, the situation is largely humanitarian, although there are also political implications. The military success is difficult to assess at this point; however, the issue is the intervention's purpose and prudence. For this topic, there is substantial data and criticism for analysis. Overlaying Mr. Weinberger's tests to the situation, especially his first, third, and fifth factors, will facilitate this analysis.

Taking lessons from Somalia, President Clinton proceeded cautiously with regard to Bosnia. In accordance with a Senate resolution, Mr. Clinton sought Congress' approbation before the deployment of his 20,000 troops. Furthermore, Congress insisted that military objectives be clearly defined before granting its reluctant approval. President Clinton also outlined America's interest in the region: to assist in bringing peace to the former Yugoslavia, to curtail human rights abuses such as mass executions and ethnic cleansing, and to prevent the spread of the Balkan conflict into the rest of Eastern Europe. Mr. Clinton reassured Americans that his commitment was limited in time (promising a withdrawal within a year) and scope. Despite these reassurances, the question still remains--are the stakes in Bosnia a "vital" interest to Americans to warrant the deployment of 20,000 Americans?

Again, the vital interest prerequisite is the hardest to justify, to provide concrete data in support of intervention. There is no clear "good guy" or "bad guy" in Bosnia: Serbs and Croats are both guilty of ethnic cleansings, although Serbian transgressions tend to bear the brunt of news reports; the Bosnian Muslims are an equally hostile group, although the arms embargo has hurt them more severely. Thus, whom are American troops protecting? President Clinton insists the U. S. is not there to fight someone else's war; troops are only there to facilitate the implementation of the peace agreement, in an impartial manner. Richard K. Betts, a professor of political science and director of the Security Policy Program at Columbia University, argues:

Limited intervention may end a war if the intervenor takes sides, tilts the local balance of power, and helps one of the rivals to win--that is, if it is not impartial. Impartial intervention may end a war if the outsiders take complete command of the situation, overawe all the local competitors, and impose a peace settlement--that is, if it is not limited.^[5]

Clearly, Mr. Clinton's objectives are contradictory to Betts' thesis. Betts fears that the Bosnian mission, like Somalia, will boom into a large-scale combat situation costing more U. S. dollars and lives. Mr. Clinton must take caution to avoid Betts' prophecy. The President must heed Mr. Weinberger and constantly reassess America's mission and adjust if necessary, but he also needs Congress' support to avoid Somalia's outcome. Withholding U. S. troops would have stymied the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord; intervention in Bosnia was necessary and paramount. Currently, small successes in Bosnia are encouraging: the Serbian withdrawal from Sarajevo and the smooth NATO takeover. There are also disturbing incidents: a British helicopter coming under fire and a U. S. soldier injured by a land mine. News, though, is largely hopeful and uplifting; the ethnic groups want to make the peace plan work. President Clinton has adhered to his commitment and the preliminary outcome has been positive.

"With liberty and justice for all...."

The Cold War's end revealed a multitude of civil unrest. The U. S. found itself needing to adapt to the world's changing political environment. Humanitarian assistance replaced arms shipments; intra-state conflicts dominated over border disputes. However, the decision to commit forces and the determination for intervention has not changed. The mission in Somalia came under fire because it deviated from the established factors; hopefully, the situation in Bosnia will take lessons from Somalia's errors. Both decisions to intervene were prudent and justified initially. Americans are a caring, idealistic people; they want to help "save the world" when they can, but they will only commit to pragmatic, planned operations. In neo-Machiavellian terms, the idealistic ends justify the practical means.

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Notes

1. Thomas Halverson, "Disengagement by Stealth: The Emerging Gap between America's Rhetoric and the Reality of Future European conflict," Military Intervention in European Conflicts, Lawrence Freedman, ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1994) 83. [Back]
2. Ken Booth, "Military Intervention: Duty and Prudence," Military Intervention in European Conflicts, Lawrence Freedman, ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1994) 59. [Back]
3. John R. Bolton, "Wrong Turn in Somalia," Foreign Affairs 73.1 (1994): 60. [Back]
4. Chester A. Crocker, "The Lessons of Somalia: Not Everything Went Wrong," Foreign Affairs 74.3 (1995): 5. [Back]
5. Richard K. Betts, "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention," Foreign Affairs 73.6 (1994): 21. [Back]

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