David Epstein
Pikesville High School
Baltimore, Maryland
Coordinator: Mr. Martr Hotz

With the end of an era when nations have habitually realized their territorial ambitions on the battlefield and with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, large-scale rivalries between countries have mostly given way to internecine conflicts. These clashes have been precipitated by a host of factors: military coups by rapacious generals, conflicting political ideologies, and most significant of all, traditional ethnic rivalries. In an effort to end these bloody conflicts—where more often than not, conventions of war concerning treatment of POWs, torture, and similar issues are ignored—the United States, frequently acting with NATO and the United Nations, has assumed the role of peacekeeper. Of course, as with the case of the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War, the scourge of aggressive warfare between nations has not yet been eliminated, providing another role for peacekeepers. Additionally, since the end of the Cold War the United States has been free to turn its attention to other problems around the world, which previously would have been ignored. And with increasing media attention on the plight of Somalis, Albanians, Rwandans, and others, the American public has been galvanized into acting to prevent such massive human rights abuses. I believe that peacekeeping of this sort, aimed at putting a stop to crimes against humanity and ending conflict, is an appropriate use of American power.

Peacekeeping is defined by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations as an "activity aimed at conflict control, which involves a...presence in the field...to implement or monitor the implementation of arrangements relating to the control of conflicts (cease-fires, separation of forces, etc.), and their resolution (partial or comprehensive settlements) and/or to protect the delivery of humanitarian relief."¹ In the case of factional conflict within a country, peacekeeping often takes the form of separating the enemy groups and ensuring the safety of civilians and other noncombatants. In the sphere of international combat, peacekeeping usually involves patrolling borders and otherwise monitoring the conditions of a ceasefire.

Historically, nations have maintained and employed their armed forces for the explicit purposes of defending themselves against aggression and pursuing wars of conquest. Consequently, armies have developed with the technology, command structure, and strategies necessary to fight and defeat other regular armies. Peacekeeping, however, is a radically different military venture: instead of simply defeating a foreign power that poses a threat to national security, armed forces must participate in a remarkably complex, often multinational undertaking aimed at preventing armed conflict and protecting civilians.

Because of its deviation from the military's traditional responsibility, peacekeeping has been viewed warily by many in the upper echelons of our nation's government and armed forces. Some senior policymakers bring up not unreasonable claims that peacekeeping duties reduce the battle-readiness of the military, both by taking troops away from routine training and over-deploying them in areas without strategic benefit. Peacekeeping does inevitably lead to the erosion of specialized military skills. However, soldiers engaged in peacekeeping operations do acquire new proficiencies, such as working in small, semi-autonomous units and functioning in international coalitions.² In addition to the problem of training, considerable numbers of troops are stationed outside the United States on peacekeeping duty: 11,100 in Bosnia and Yugoslavia; 12,700 in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia; and 36,000 in South Korea.³ However, this number is still relatively small compared to the nearly three million total American active duty troops and reserve forces.⁴

Some military officials also claim that overseas tours, where troops serve away from their families for months at a time, undermine their soldiers' morale; yet their ennui often stems more from unnecessarily restrictive army regulations (which sometimes prohibit soldiers from eating local food and socializing with the native population)⁵ than from the operation itself. Others claim that peacekeeping causes more problems than it solves by antagonizing the local population and creating various political troubles. Further legitimate concerns of American policymakers include the high cost of maintaining peacekeeping operations overseas, and the fact that small-scale peacekeeping operations could quickly draw the United States military into lengthy and bloody quagmires, leading to significant American casualties. It is important to point out, however, that this has not been the case with any of the peacekeeping operations in the past decade.

Whatever the potential downsides, peacekeeping remains a responsible and farsighted use of American power. Taking part in a multinational peacekeeping operation furthers our nation's position diplomatically, as it shows a commitment to international cooperation. European nations have been urging the United States to maintain its commitment to peacekeeping in the Balkans, and a unilateral withdrawal from Bosnia and Kosovo would strain transatlantic relations and diminish American leadership of NATO. Intervening to check regional conflicts serves our long-term national security interests as well. Fighting in far-off areas can quickly destabilize regions important to our country for various strategic and economic reasons; stable and calm conditions are the necessary foundations for U.S. investment and foreign military cooperation. The Gulf War and subsequent military activities provide an ideal example: maintaining the peace between Kuwait and Iraq is essential to guarantee the flow of oil from the Middle East. And from an ethical standpoint, remaining idle while grave human rights abuses are being committed is selfish and contemptible. As Michael O'Hanlon and Stephen Solarz contend, "To stand by in the face of mass slaughter debases our nation's principles and insults our collective conscience."⁶ Moreover, our nation is better equipped than any other to handle peacekeeping operations.

Although often used to demonstrate the dangers of peacekeeping, Operation Restore Hope in Somalia confirmed peacekeeping's effectiveness and sustainability. After the Somali dictator Mohamed Siad Barre was overthrown in 1991, Somalia collapsed into civil war, with two prominent clan leaders, Ali Mahdi Mohamed and Mohamed Farah Aidid, vying for control. By the autumn of 1992, approximately half a million Somalis had died from warfare, disease, and starvation.⁷ Under mounting domestic pressure and with UN approval, President Bush sent in 21,000 troops to protect relief workers, safeguard food supplies, and curb violence, all of which they achieved. Army and Navy personnel also dug dozens of wells, rebuilt schools and clinics, and provided medical assistance to the Somalis.⁸ Viewing Aidid as the greatest obstacle to peace, in 1993 the UN authorized U.S. commanders to capture two of his top lieutenants. However, U.S. Rangers and other special forces were pinned down by heavy fighting in the streets of Mogadishu that left 18 American soldiers dead. After news programs showed the mutilated bodies of U.S. soldiers, political support for Operation Restore Hope waned and our soldiers were eventually withdrawn (although polls indicated that the American public still supported military intervention to prevent human rights disasters).⁹ While the political mission may have failed, the humanitarian aspects of Operation Restore Hope were greatly successful.¹⁰ Our intervention saved the lives of hundreds of thousands of Somalis at an extraordinarily minimal cost to our own troops.¹¹ And the oft-cited disastrous raid on Aidid's lieutenants reflected more on the military's flawed tactics than the viability of peacekeeping as a whole. In terms of lives saved and cost to our own country, Operation Restore Hope illustrated the triumph of peacekeeping.

A second notable peacekeeping mission of the past decade has been in Bosnia. After the 1991 splintering of Yugoslavia, a nation only tenuously held together by Tito, the breakaway republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina erupted in ethnic clashes between Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. In response to massive bloodshed and rampant human rights abuses, Western leaders called the heads of the various factions to a meeting, which resulted in the 1995 Dayton Accords. The United States, along with other nations, sent in soldiers to enforce the Dayton agreement and preserve peace. The Bosnian peacekeeping mission has been largely successful: the war has effectively ended, elections were successfully carried out in 1996, and human rights abuses have been halted.¹² However, some point out that operations in Bosnia have taken a significant toll on the American military. After participating in peacekeeping in Bosnia, the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division was temporarily downgraded to the second lowest rating for wartime readiness.¹³ In fact, all units sent to Bosnia require six months of specialized training before being sent overseas and purportedly need to spend six months retraining after returning from peacekeeping duty.¹⁴ Nevertheless, these problems are temporary and affect only a tiny portion of the United States military. At an extremely low cost to our own country, we have successfully maintained a lasting peace in Bosnia.

Assuredly, peacekeeping is an effective, advantageous use of American military power. With relatively little sacrifice, the United States can send troops to bring stability to volatile regions and prevent wide-scale human rights abuses, both of which benefit our own nation. Instead of selfishly turning our backs on nations afflicted with warfare and bloodshed, we should use our vast military resources to bring peace to these troubled areas.

Notes

1. "Peace-keeping," Glossary of UN Peacekeeping Terms (New York: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations Training Unit, last updated September 1998), www.un.org/Depts/dpko/glossary/p.htm, 26 September 2001.

2. William Langewiesche, "Peace Is Hell," Atlantic Monthly (October 2001), 56.

3. Michael O'Hanlon, "Come Partly Home, America," Foreign Affairs (March–April 2001), 5.

4. "Active Duty," Defense Almanac, www.defenselink.mil/pubs/almanac/almanac/people/activeduty.html, 1 January 2002, and "Guard and Reserve," Defense Almanac, www.defenselink.mil/pubs/almanac/almanac/people/reserve.html, 1 January 2002.

5. Langewiesche, "Peace Is Hell," 53, 71.

6. Stephen J. Solarz and Michael E. O'Hanlon, "The United States Should Intervene to Prevent Massive Loss of Life," in War: Opposing Viewpoints, ed. Tamara L. Roleff (San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 1999), 135. Reprint of "Humanitarian Intervention: When Is Force Justified?" Washington Quarterly (Autumn 1997).

7. John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections of Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), 31.

8. Hirsch and Oakley, Somalia, 67–68.

9. Steven Kull, "What the Public Knows That Washington Doesn't," Foreign Policy ( Winter 1995–1996): 102–115

10. Solarz and O'Hanlon, "The United States Should Intervene," 139.

11. Solarz and O'Hanlon, "The United States Should Intervene," 136.

12. Warren Christopher, Into the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998), 359.

13. Langewiesche, "Peace Is Hell," 80.

14. Langewiesche, "Peace Is Hell," 51.

Bibliography

"Active Duty," Defense Almanac. www.defenselink.mil/pubs/almanac/almanac/people/activeduty.html, 1 January 2002.

Buchanan, Patrick J. A Republic, Not an Empire: Reclaiming America's Destiny. Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 1999.

Christopher, Warren. In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998.

Ghalib, Jama Mohamed. The Cost of Dictatorship: The Somali Experience. New York: Lilian Barber Press, 1995.

"Guard and Reserve," Defense Almanac, www.defenselink.mil/pubs/almanac/almanac/people/reserve.html, 1 January 2002.

Hirsch, John L., and Robert B. Oakley. Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995.

Kull, Steven. "What the Public Knows That Washington Doesn't." Foreign Policy, Winter 1995–1996: 102–115

LaFeber, Walter. The American Age: U.S. Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad. New York: W. W. Norton, 1994.

Langewiesche, William. "Peace Is Hell." Atlantic Monthly, October 2001: 51–80.

O'Hanlon, Michael. "Come Partly Home, America." Foreign Affairs, March–April 2001: 2–8.

"Peace-keeping," Glossary of UN Peacekeeping Terms. New York: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations Training Unit (last updated September 1998), www.un.org/Depts/dpko/glossary/p.htm, 26 September 2001.

Solarz, Stephen J., and Michael E. O'Hanlon. "The United States Should Intervene to Prevent Massive Loss of Life," in War: Opposing Viewpoints, ed. Tamara L. Roleff. San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 1999. Reprint of "Humanitarian Intervention: When Is Force Justified?" Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1997.

Stevenson, Jonathan. Losing Mogadishu: Testing U.S. Policy in Somalia. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995.