Summary

• In Iraq, the United States planned to remove Saddam Hussein from power and quickly organize a replacement regime, while holding the existing bureaucracy in place to administer the country. This plan became untenable when looters destroyed government ministries and their staffs scattered. As a consequence, several independent and uncoordinated streams of activity to create governance in Iraq got under way.
• Under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), there were three major phases in the process of building new governance structures in Iraq. Each phase marked a significant change in policy and implementation. Actions to establish Iraqi governance were undertaken by coalition military forces, the CPA, and the U.S. Agency for International Development through a private contractor. The ad hoc and disjointed nature of these efforts exacerbated the challenge of establishing governance in Iraq.
• Important lessons for future peace and stability operations were identified by those who participated in CPA efforts to establish governance in Iraq. Recognizing the importance of preplanning and prepositioning resources was foremost among these lessons.
• Interagency planning that fully integrates civilian and military activities is vital for developing governance structures in a postconflict environment. Postconflict tasks should be an integral part of military operational plans, and relevant civilian agencies and experts should participate in that planning process. The U.S. government should form interagency planning groups to develop combined political-military contingency plans.
• Civilian agencies and organizations of the U.S. government need to develop greater capacity to plan and carry out operations. This requires fostering interagency planning expertise, having access to greater logistical and transportation resources, and creating personnel systems to ensure that there are enough trained and qualified personnel available.
• U.S. government agencies and other organizations involved in building governance structures should develop finance systems that allow them to get money moving quickly. Those working with indigenous governing bodies should leverage reconstruction dollars to empower local officials by allowing them to deliver real improvements in the lives of the population.
• Establishing democracy requires not only setting up proper institutions but also education, long-term mentoring, and capacity building. People with no experience of civil society or democracy often have enthusiasm without the understanding of how to ensure fairness and transparency. Populations formerly dominated by dictatorial regimes may also lack the personal initiative and responsibility to truly embrace democratic institutions and become functioning members of them.
• Building democratic structures requires an understanding of the cultural and historical context of the people in the country. Area experts can be of great assistance in the planning process by designing structures that are more likely to be accepted by local populations and integrated into the existing culture.

About the Report

This report is a product of the United States Institute of Peace's Iraq Experience Project. It is the third of three reports examining important lessons identified in Iraq prior to the country's transition to sovereignty in June 2004 and is based on extensive interviews with 113 U.S. officials, soldiers, and contractors who served there.

This report is focused specifically on governance in Iraq under the Coalition Provisional Authority. The other two reports examine security and reconstruction, respectively. These reports are intended for use as training aids in programs that prepare individuals for service in peace and stability operations, so that lessons identified in Iraq may be translated into lessons learned by those assigned to future missions.

Celeste J. Ward, formerly the director of national security policy with the Coalition Provisional Authority, prepared the report. The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training conducted the interviews under a contract with the Institute.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect views of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions.