Iran’s recent detention of 15 British sailors and marines, captured in the contested waters of the Shatt al-Arab near the Iranian coast, has exacerbated tensions between the United States and Iran. The incident also underscored the opacity of the Iranian political system; it is unclear on whose directive the Iranian navy acted. With U.S.–Iranian relations already strained due to the Islamic Republic’s activities in Iraq and its nuclear ambitions, understanding the Islamic Republic’s power structure and decision-making processes has become increasingly important. To answer the question "Who rules Ahmadinejad’s Iran?" USIP’s Iran Policy Forum convened an off-the-record discussion with leading specialists on Iranian politics. This USIPeace Briefing highlights the main points made during the discussion and does not represent the views of USIP, which does not advocate specific policies.

Tehran, April 4, 2007 - Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad gives a medal of honor to an Iranian Revolutionary Guard who was among those who intercepted the 15 British sailors and marines. (Photo Courtesy: AP)

The Iranian constitution provides an incomplete picture of the internal structure and decision-making processes of the Iranian government. While the constitution establishes four branches of government—the executive, the legislative, the judicial, and the office of the Faqih (Supreme Guide)—significant sources of power in the Islamic Republic lie outside the parameters of the constitution. Elections are semi-competitive and elected officials wield some measure of authority, but decision-making is consensual rather than unilateral and informal networks frequently supercede their formal counterparts, contributing to the opacity of the Iranian system.

This is not to say that the republican aspects of the Iranian system do not impact the decision-making process. The president, currently Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, appoints the provincial governors, who play a significant role in managing local affairs. The Assembly of Experts, which has a minimal role in day-to-day affairs, ultimately is empowered to select the successor to the Supreme Guide. Elections take place on all levels, and although the selection of candidates is limited by the religious establishment, elected officials, as Ahmadinejad has demonstrated, influence policy decisions.

Public opinion also has significant influence on the character of Iran’s decision-making. The results of recent elections furnish evidence of this influence: they have produced presidents as divergent in character and political platform as Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Mohammad Khatami. International pressure and world opinion, particularly public opinion in the Islamic world, affect Iran’s foreign policies as well. Iranian support to groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas stems in part from the support that those groups enjoy in the Muslim world. In turn, Iran’s leaders perceive that support for these groups contributes to the nation’s regional standing; recent popular opinion polls conducted in the Arab world indicated that Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, and Ahmadinejad are currently the two most popular leaders in that region.

That said, the power of republican institutions and popular opinion in the Iranian political order is severely checked by non-elected actors and organizations. The Supreme Guide, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, retains considerable power. His representatives can be found in every Iranian governmental agency. He exerts influence over the parliament, which he has used, for example, to prevent parliamentarians from pursuing a new press law. Additionally, he nominates regional prayer leaders who sometimes gain significant popularity and influence throughout their respective regions. His advisers and representatives provide additional vehicles for the Supreme Leader to assert his sway. Recently, his chief of staff, Mohammad Mohammadi Golpayegani, was sent to discuss the vital subject of Russian-Iranian relations with Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin. Golpayegani also publicly issued a scathing disavowal of Ahmadinejad’s controversial remarks on the Holocaust.

Other non-elected and informal actors make significant contributions to the Iranian political sphere. The Council of Guardians, for example, frequently vetoes legislation, sometimes simply to spite or chastise members of parliament. Foundations, seminaries and independent ayatollahs wield great influence in the decision-making process. For instance, senior ayatollahs last year pressured the Iranian president to abandon an initiative permitting women to attend public soccer matches. This variegated power-sharing structure invites a characterization of the Iranian government as a feudal system of sorts, with its decision-making process disaggregated and its institutions vying with one another for power.

However decentralized the Iranian political system may be, there is order amid the apparent chaos. In fact, the mutual mistrust, loosely defined responsibilities and overlapping architecture characteristic of Iranian political institutions were in part intentional features of their design; Khomeini, ever fearful of international subversion, hoped to ensure the system’s impenetrability. As a well-known Iranian aphorism goes, “The order of the clergy is in its disorder.” In a sense this statement holds true in the case of the Iranian government as well; though it is an esoteric system, it is a system.

Given the diversity and multiplicity of political actors in Iran, factions that find themselves out of power usually find a place within this system to operate. This situation engenders solidarity within the regime; insiders are rarely fully banished from the circles of power. Informal social networks—often consisting of graduates of the same school or seminary, or notables hailing from the same hometown—connect individuals across the different institutions and create tight-knit bonds among them. These aspects of the Iranian system illustrate the deep roots of the power-sharing structure within Iranian society. The result is a system that is reasonably stable in spite of popular dissatisfaction. As a result of the intricate interconnections between political actors and interests, stability in Iran is not a function of how many people support or oppose the regime, but rather of the intensity of that support or opposition.

Ahmadinejad’s popularity among both the Iranian people and the political elites has declined somewhat over the past two years, and his authority is beginning to wane accordingly. The advent of new criticism of Ahmadinejad’s domestic and foreign policies serves as evidence that he has stumbled. Under Ahmadinejad’s watch, the Iranian economy has continued to deteriorate, and his anti-Semitic rhetoric has brought unwelcome and embarrassing negative attention to Iran. He remains an important and influential political actor, but no single individual in the Iranian system can determine Iranian policy unilaterally.

In short, decisions in the Islamic Republic of Iran are generated through a complex process characterized by formal and informal elements of checks and balances, collective policymaking, and institutional autonomy.

This USIPeace Briefing was written by Hesham Sallam, Andrew Mandelbaum, and Robert Grace, in the Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention. The authors would also like to thank Suzanne Maloney for her contributions to this article. The views expressed here are not necessarily those of the Institute, which does not advocate specific policies.

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent international conflicts, promote post-conflict stability and development, and increase conflict management capacity, tools, and intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by directly engaging in peacebuilding efforts around the globe.