Kissinger made keynote remarks at the end of a gathering of USIP’s International Advisory Council at the Institute’s Washington headquarters on May 13. Four decades ago, Kissinger, who served as national security adviser for President Richard Nixon and as secretary of state in both the Nixon and Ford administrations, guided the historic effort to reestablish contacts with the People’s Republic of China. His recently published book, “On China,” examines Chinese history with a focus on its foreign policy and U.S.-Chinese relations.

“I really believe that there is no immediate danger of a conflict, but there could be a historical danger that our two societies will drift into stepping on each other’s toes all around the world,” he said. Kissinger called the successful management of the U.S.-Chinese relationship “a historic task.” He also drew a distinction between American and Chinese worldviews, saying “American exceptionalism is universal. Chinese exceptionalism is cultural. The Chinese believe that they represent a unique civilization.” American exceptionalism is the longstanding notion that the United States has a special or unique place and role among nations, owing to its ideals and history. The Chinese are “torn” at times about asserting their power in the international system, he said, though “right now, I would think the dominant trend is to try to integrate themselves in some manner.”

Kissinger discussed other key issues as well:

Interests and values in foreign policy. “I believe you cannot put values and interests into absolute opposition to each other,” he said. “A workable international system must have an equilibrium of power, or the temptations to abuse the imbalance will be irresistible. But it also needs a sense of justice, because if the components of the international system do not believe that they are living in something compatible with their values then the balance of power by itself—it’s not enough to sustain the system.” On balancing interests and values, he argued, “This is where America has not been very successful, because we have had this missionary notion that American exceptionalism by itself can move the world in the direction of our desired objective.”

Libya. “I would reject the proposition that we have to be involved every place where there is a problem,” Kissinger said. “I would have agreed with [Defense Secretary Robert] Gates that Libya is not a central issue.” He added, “Once you intervene for humanitarian reasons…then you are drawn almost automatically into replacing it, so that regime change is an almost inevitable consequence of humanitarian intervention.” He added, “I would have certainly tried to avoid the situation so my sentiments would have been like Gates. But having gone in, I would probably have urged—indeed I did urge—that [Libyan leader Col. Moammar] al-Qaddafi has to be overthrown.”

Arab Spring. Kissinger urged caution in how the United States supports change in the region and a particular policy focus on Egypt. “Those on the outside who think they can influence events should be very careful when say they want to be in the vanguard of revolution, because they may be weakening the people they may need to reestablish authority,” he said. On Egypt, he noted, political forces are maneuvering for dominance. “It’s in our interest that it evolve in a moderate, pluralistic direction. But we can’t assume that there is one dominant trend yet. Of course, Egypt is an absolutely key country.” He added, “The good thing about the situation is that we have not yet become a perceived obstacle to the evolution.”

Afghanistan. Kissinger expressed doubts about current U.S. policy. He called for a regional approach to the conflict. “I do not believe that the goal we have set publicly in Afghanistan is achievable. I do not believe it is possible to create a government and a security system to which we can turn over the security situation.” He said his preference is not to talk to the Taliban, comparing that approach to the U.S. experience in Vietnam. Rather, Kissinger said he would seek to draw the neighboring countries into a negotiation with the aim of producing “a kind of international guarantee” that Afghanistan will not be a center of international terrorism. Said Kissinger, “It’s not been tried.”

Pakistan. Kissinger described a historical pattern of “ambivalence” in Pakistan’s relations with the United States: “They need friendship with the United States because they need the support of some outside country--outside the region--in the face of their security threats. But they also are tremendously affected by the Islamic political revival that is going on, so that the friendships, or the ties that they form with us do not have the emotional place that the religious ties they have with other movements [do]. And it comes to expression in Afghanistan.” On the recent death of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, he said, “I can’t believe that the [Pakistani] government did not know that he was there, or at least somebody in the government. And I assume, without knowing the facts, that we couldn’t have caught him without someone in the government giving us some information….This is my speculation on the subject.”