The U.S. can’t assess yet the precise impact the confirmed death of Taliban leader Mullah Omar will have on the group’s talks with the Afghan government, but officials do believe the insurgency faces a more stable and united administration than at any time in the past six years, according to Dan Feldman, the outgoing U.S. special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Andrew Wilder, Dan Feldman, Stephen J. Hadley
Andrew Wilder, Dan Feldman, Stephen J. Hadley

While the challenges in Afghanistan are legion, the political stability ushered in with the unity government headed by President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah is the linchpin for making progress on every front, from the battlefield to the economy, Feldman told an audience at the U.S. Institute of Peace on Aug. 5. A year ago, before the U.S.-brokered the deal for joint leadership in the aftermath of disputed elections, the prospect of any stabilization seemed remote, the envoy said.

“Omar’s death has complicated the picture.” – U.S. Special Representative Dan Feldman

Feldman, making what he described as a “valedictory address” after six years with the State Department’s office of the special representative, said the current Taliban offensive during the fighting season was anticipated as the U.S. draws down its forces.

Former U.S. National Security Advisor and current USIP board Chairman Stephen J. Hadley, who joined a discussion with Feldman, added that the Taliban had doubled down on its attacks while engaged in reconciliation talks, probably seeking a hedge against the negotiations’ failure and to improve their position at the bargaining table.

The Taliban is beginning to see that time may not be on their side, said Hadley, who just returned from a 10-day trip to the region. The Afghan security forces are generally holding up, and the self-styled “Islamic State” militant group is starting to siphon off some Taliban fighters, he said. And the fact that Omar has been dead for two years raises questions for the group’s adherents about who is giving orders and whether they are being used as agents of Pakistani foreign policy. The Taliban could fracture or change direction, Hadley said.

“I wouldn’t say anyone is optimistic or pessimistic either,” Hadley said. “There’s an alignment to take advantage of, if possible.”

Among the many obstacles to seizing that opportunity are poverty, instability, lack of well-functioning institutions and capacity. The unity government needs to act more decisively, especially on issues such as filling key appointments, Hadley said, and it’s urgent that the economic crisis brought on by the withdrawal of international assistance be addressed.

“Omar’s death has complicated the picture,’’ Feldman said. “But the Taliban think of themselves as a movement that emerged to end a civil war. Now they have to decide whether to continue to fight or to finally end the violence that has stunted Afghan development and become part of a legitimate political system of a sovereign, united Afghanistan.”

Diplomacy was a key driver in creating conditions that might lead to a settlement of the conflict, said Feldman, who joined the special representative’s office under Ambassador Richard Holbrooke and assumed the top job a year ago. Diplomacy nurtured the national unity government and put bilateral relations with Pakistan on a firmer footing, opening the opportunity for Afghanistan and Pakistan to work toward peace, he said. Additionally, he credited diplomacy with securing financing to help with the country’s reconstruction and advancing the role of women in the society.

Metrics of Progress

By most metrics, the country has shown marked improvement since 2001, he said, citing access to education, independent media and infrastructure, as well as economic growth, and health and life expectancy. World Bank figures show that economic growth soared at an annual average of 9 percent from 2003 to 2012, though it has dropped since then, to an estimated 2 percent in 2014.

While the population has benefited from U.S. efforts, the unity government must operate in a more inclusive fashion, he said, warning that those who feel excluded – whether members of parliament, civil society activists or local leaders -- may turn into “spoilers” in the peace process.  

The core U.S. security interest in the Afghanistan is to degrade al-Qaeda to ensure the group and its affiliates pose a diminished threat to international security, Feldman said.

U.S. and Afghan relations with Pakistan have long been stressed over the Taliban and other extremist groups sheltering along the Afghan border. Today, the countries are engaged in a strategic dialogue on counter-terrorism, nuclear concerns and various economic initiatives that is putting pressure on extremists. Progress has been made on targeting al-Qaeda leadership and countering improvised explosive devices.

The U.S.-Pakistan relationship has recovered from a “tumultuous nadir” several years ago to a “strengthened and stable position” today, Feldman said.

Internally, Pakistan was jolted by what some in the country call its 9/11, Feldman said: The December 2014 attack by Tehrik-i-Taliban on an Army-run school in the city of Peshawar that killed 145 people, including 132 children. The massacre followed a military offensive against the Pakistani Taliban in the North Waziristan region, which in turn was triggered by terrorist attacks in Karachi.

Hadley noted the push had set up the Afghan military for an unexpected challenge, as many extremists were driven across the border just as local forces were taking over responsibility for security from the U.S. and were least prepared to confront the militant surge.

Pakistan’s Proxies

The U.S. continues to have concerns about Pakistan using proxies against perceived foes in the region, and its government must pursue all terrorist groups vigorously, Feldman said. Pakistan must move against the Haqqani network, which operates in Afghanistan, and against the sectarian violence of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, he said.

Still, the shifts in Pakistan’s handling of the extremist threat has helped drive the peace process. Feldman said President Ghani had displayed “great courage” in opening a dialogue with Pakistan. Likewise, Pakistan deserved credit for helping to further an “Afghan-owned, Afghan-led reconciliation process.”

For its part, Pakistan took unprecedented steps this year to facilitate contacts between the Afghan government and the Taliban, culminating on July 7 in the government’s first open meeting with senior members of the group for talks authorized by their leaders.

More broadly, regional powers, including China, have come to see that a stable Afghanistan free of terrorism is in their interest.

“In 2009, colleagues in Beijing refused to even have the word Afghanistan on our agenda,” Feldman said. Today, the U.S. is engaged in development projects with China in Afghanistan and has convened a trilateral China-U.S.-Afghan discussion.

The achievements in Afghanistan have come at a tremendous cost in blood and treasure for the U.S. and even more so for that country and its neighbor Pakistan, Feldman said. Any hope of solidifying those gains will require continued support for the government and vigorous American diplomacy.


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