Lai, who also goes by William Lai, won 40% of the vote, Hou Yu-ih of the main opposition party, the Kuomintang, came in second with 33% of the vote followed by Ko Wen-je of the populist Taiwan People’s Party with 26% of the vote. However, the Democratic Progressive Party lost control of the legislature — the Legislative Yuan — which could constrain Lai’s policy options. 

Beijing, which describes Lai as a “troublemaker” and “separatist,” had said the election was “a choice between war and peace.” Both Hou and Ko favor closer ties with China. Lai’s election could strain recent efforts by the United States and China to repair ties.

Chinese leader Xi Jinping insists he wants to unify Taiwan with China, by force if necessary. He reiterated this position in his San Francisco meeting with President Biden in November and then more recently in his New Year’s Eve address.

USIP’s Carla Freeman and Rosie Levine discuss the significance of Lai’s election, its implications for cross-strait relations and the challenges the new president will face.

What is the significance of Lai Ching-te’s victory?

Freeman: The victory of Democratic Progressive Party, or DPP, candidate Lai Ching-te is historic as it marks the first time since Taiwan became a democracy that any party has won three consecutive terms. Lai is serving as vice president in the current administration led by Tsai Ing-wen, and his election was a vote for continuity by a majority of Taiwan voters.

By choosing Lai, voters have sent a signal that they want more of Tsai’s measured but firm approach to cross-strait relations — trying not to provoke Beijing while promoting Taiwan’s brand as a dynamic democratic society and critical node in the global supply of semiconductor chips and other high-tech products.

China has threatened to take political control of the island by force if necessary if Taipei declares independence. The election of Lai is a blow to Beijing, which views the island as its rightful territory and had sought to portray the election as a choice between war and peace.

Beijing used a variety of tactics aimed at intimidating Taiwanese voters in the lead up to the election, hoping it would tip them into choosing the Kuomintang, or KMT, party candidate Hou Yu-ih. Xi Jinping has called Taiwan “reunification” the “core of the core” of China’s national interests.

The KMT accepts Beijing’s “one China principle” through a formula that enabled former Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou, of the KMT, to engage in dialogue on cross-strait issues with Beijing. Beijing has maligned Lai as a “separatist” for 2017 comments about himself as a “pragmatic advocate of independence” and has vowed to “smash” any move by Taiwan to independence.

As the election approached, China imposed trade barriers on Taiwanese products and sent large numbers of military planes and vessels close to the island. It also floated several suspected spy balloons over Taiwan, which traveled near an important air base on the island.

The outcome of the presidential election shows that most Taiwanese voters were unimpressed by these threats and voted for Lai anyway.

What are Lai’s priorities as Taiwan’s new president and what challenges will he face governing the island considering he did not receive a clear mandate from voters?

Freeman: Although Lai won the election, he did not receive a mandate from voters, receiving just over 40% of the vote compared to around 33% for Hou and 26% for the third-party candidate, Ko-Wen-je of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP). Moreover, Lai’s party no longer has control of Taiwan’s parliament, the Legislative Yuan, losing 10 seats so that it now has 51 seats to 52 in KMT hands. In addition, eight seats went to TPP representatives.

The narrow margin by which Lai won the presidency and the divided government that voters delivered means that it is likely to impact his ability to pursue some policies that require legislative approval. One issue that could be affected is the island’s ability to pursue higher military spending in the face of China’s assertiveness, or pursue some facets of the DPP’s domestic agenda, such as its efforts to find alternatives to nuclear power.

Levine: A notable outcome of the election is how well Ko Wen-je and the TPP performed overall. Although Ko came in last by a wide margin in the presidential race, he received 26%, or 3.6 million, votes, a significant amount for a third-party candidate. Further, in the legislative elections, the TPP won eight seats, which means they could wield outsized coalition power in a parliament where no party has the majority.

This is a significant victory for a newcomer party, which was only established in 2019 and put forward its first presidential candidate in this election. The TPP attracted younger voters who are frustrated with the dug-in positions of the two major parties and are seeking a different approach. Considering the demographics of TPP voters and the uphill battle the DPP will face as an incumbent party entering its third term amid economic hardship, rising housing prices and heightened military tensions with China, the trajectory of the TPP is notable and worth watching in future elections.

Has Lai’s election raised the prospect of Chinese aggression in the form of military action toward Taiwan? What consequences will China likely enact on Taiwan and to what extent will China’s own domestic challenges factor into Beijing’s response?

Freeman: Lai’s victory was no doubt a source of frustration for Beijing. However, Lai’s relative political weakness and the large number of seats in the legislature occupied by KMT party representatives represent opportunities for Beijing to influence the island without resorting to force. Beijing will seek to forge deeper links to the island through these channels, particularly by attempting to curtail the economic pivot away from dependence on the Chinese economy that the DPP has been pursuing with some success for the past eight years.

At the same time, Beijing will continue to try to hamper progress toward winning support for Taiwan internationally. The timing of Nauru’s decision to switch its diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing barely two days after Taiwan’s election, leaving Taiwan with only 12 formal diplomatic allies, is a sign that Beijing plans no respite for Taiwan as it seeks to pressure the island toward “reunification.”

Levine: Formal cross-strait dialogue has been suspended between China and Taiwan since 2016, when the DPP under Tsai Ing-wen took power. China has doubled down on its position that it won’t engage in formal dialogue with the DPP, which it considers a “separatist” party. This position has meant that for the past eight years, China has had to rely upon informal channels and intermediaries to manage tensions with Taiwan, all of this upon a backdrop of increased military activity and coercion.

At a press conference last week, Lai affirmed his position on cross-strait dialogue: “Our door will always be open to engagements with Beijing on the principles of equality and dignity.” Meanwhile, China maintains sanctions on Hsiao Bi-khim, the incoming vice president, and has routinely depicted Lai and Hsiao as separatists.

Beijing has continued to emphasize that the election results do not sway its efforts to reunify Taiwan with China, and separatism will not be tolerated. Likely, formal cross-strait dialogue will remain suspended despite increased military activity, and China will continue to rely upon intermediaries to understand thinking in Taipei. 

How has the United States responded to Lai’s victory?

Freeman: In response to Lai’s victory, Secretary of State Antony Blinken sent a congratulatory message (which China has criticized, along with messages from others around the globe) and sent a delegation of former high-ranking U.S. officials to meet the new administration. These gestures continue to emphasize the importance of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, despite the two having cut official diplomatic relations in 1979.

Following Lai’s victory, President Biden reaffirmed that the United States does not support Taiwan’s independence, and pushed back on Beijing’s framing that the United States and the DPP are working to change the status quo.