On January 13, Taiwanese will elect a new president in a race that is likely to have significant implications for the island’s relations with China as well as U.S.-China relations, regardless of who wins.

A TV screen shows news about the presidential race in a noodle restaurant in Taipei, Taiwan, on Nov. 15, 2023. (An Rong Xu/The New York Times)
A TV screen shows news about the presidential race in a noodle restaurant in Taipei, Taiwan, on Nov. 15, 2023. (An Rong Xu/The New York Times)

Taiwan has emerged as a critical flashpoint between the United States and China. Chinese leader Xi Jinping has made unification of Taiwan with China a core goal — and one he is determined to achieve by force if necessary, as he has made clear on several occasions.

Contrary to media coverage ahead of the vote, however, cross-strait relations are far from the only issue on the minds of Taiwanese voters. The country is facing a challenging economic situation marked by low wages and soaring home prices. Parliamentary elections are also being held alongside the presidential vote.

USIP’s Rosie Levine, Carla Freeman and Andrew Scobell discuss the significance of the Taiwanese election, its implications for Taiwan’s relations with China and how the United States can promote peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

Who is leading in the presidential race and what are the candidates’ positions on cross-strait relations?

Levine: As Taiwan’s presidential elections approach on January 13, the three-way race has tightened. Taiwan institutes a public opinion polling blackout in the 10 days before election day, so the last polls were taken on January 2 and public opinion may shift in the final stretch of the race.  

For the majority of the race, polls suggest that William Lai (or Lai Ching-te) has maintained a lead, but his position is far from secure. Lai, the current vice president representing the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), has positioned himself as a vote for continuity for Taiwan. He is a familiar face in politics since the 1990s, serving as a legislator in the Legislative Yuan before joining Tsai Ing-wen’s administration, and has picked another political insider as his running mate: Hsiao Bi-khim, a well-known figure in Washington who most recently served as Taiwan’s highest representative to the United States.

Lai is followed in the polls by Hou Yu-ih, the nominee from the Kuomintang (KMT). Hou is the former mayor of New Taipei City and has campaigned for closer connectivity with China. As Hou articulated, cross-strait dialogue is “a crucial way to defuse crises and ensure peace and stability.” Hou has promoted his party’s unique capabilities to prevent war with China and ability to bring fresh vision to the office, after eight years of DPP rule.

Trailing in third is Ko Wen-je, founder and candidate for the recently founded Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), who has positioned himself as an alternative to the major parties. He seeks to maintain “dynamic equilibrium” by balancing Taiwan’s relationship between the United States and China. Although this new path initially resonated with voters, as election day looms nearer, his numbers have dropped and the two leading candidates have sought to marginalize Ko to firm up their own positions in the close race.

On the surface, there are similarities across the three candidates’ positions on cross-strait relations: All reject formal declarations of independence, rebuff China’s territorial claims and seek to maintain a relationship with the United States. Lai would likely seek to maintain peace in the Taiwan Strait by forging a closer relationship with the United States, Hou by reestablishing ties with China and Ko by seeking to balance the two.

What’s at stake in the Taiwan elections? Why is it important?

Levine: The results of this closely watched election could prove pivotal for the Taiwanese people and the prospects for conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan’s incoming president will have to manage heightened tensions with China and an increasingly precarious cross-strait relationship. The sitting president, Tsai Ing-wen, has been credited with maintaining a stable relationship across the Taiwan Strait amid an uptick in Chinese aggression. As Tsai’s final term concludes, Taiwan’s top role will be left to a newcomer who may adopt a different posture.

Chinese leader Xi Jinping has ramped up rhetoric about unifying Taiwan with China — in his San Francisco meeting with President Biden and then more recently in his New Year’s Eve address. How might China respond to the outcome of the election?

Freeman: Xi Jinping has taken a hard line on cross-strait relations throughout his tenure. His recent New Year’s address included an unusually strong message to Taiwan voters on cross-strait unification, which he called an inevitability. Xi asserts that China prefers peaceful unification (or “reunification”) but has refused to disavow the use of military force to achieve this goal, or as a response to any declaration of formal independence by Taiwan. Ahead of Taiwan’s election, Beijing has increased pressure on the island by sending large numbers of military aircraft and warships toward Taiwan and has promoted the idea that Taiwan’s voters are making a choice between “war and peace,” suggesting that the risk of cross-strait conflict increases with a win by the DPP candidate, whom Beijing characterizes as a separatist.

If the KMT candidate, Hou Yu-ih, wins, Beijing will respond to the outcome of the election as a de facto endorsement of its “One-China Principle.” As a result, it is likely to soften the hard line it has taken against Taiwan since Tsai Ing-wen’s first term, with immediate actions, including reversing the trade restrictions it imposed on Taiwan ahead of the election and opening the door to cross-strait dialogue. Groundwork has already been laid for the latter with a series of recent cross-strait trips by KMT representatives, such as KMT vice-chairman and former Taiwan diplomat Andrew Hsia’s mid-December travel to China.

If voters choose Lai over Hou, Beijing’s response will be quite different. Beijing will certainly take punitive action of some kind, including raising the level of its military pressure on Taiwan or taking further steps aimed at crippling Taiwan’s economy. Some experts speculate that China could go beyond intensifying gray zone activities to roll out a large-scale military exercise encircling Taiwan, amass troops in Fujian province across the strait or even block supply routes to Taiwan’s small offshore islands. This is a risky approach given the danger of miscalculation and the likelihood of a significant reaction from the United States amid a still fragile U.S.-China relationship.

What will be the implications of the vote for the United States?

Levine: If current vice president, Lai Ching-te, wins, his victory could trigger new rounds of harassment by China. A victory for either opposition candidate, who have campaigned on reestablishing warmer relations with China, would add new complexities to Taiwan’s balancing act between a strong defense relationship with the United States and a close economic relationship with China. Whatever the outcome, new leadership at the helm of Taiwan’s democracy in a pivotal moment could bring new challenges to maintaining peace across the strait.

How should the United States promote peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait?

Scobell: Washington should focus on clearly messaging Beijing three core points.

First, that U.S. policy on Taiwan remains unchanged and continues to be firmly based on the three joint communiques, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and the “Six Assurances.” While China insists that the only documents that should govern U.S. policy on Taiwan are the 1972, 1978 and 1982 communiques jointly formulated by Washington and Beijing, it understands that the United States’ Taiwan policy is also guided by the TRA passed by Congress in 1979 and the Six Assurances provided to Taipei by President Ronald Reagan in 1982. In essence, the TRA and Six Assurances commit the United States to standing by Taiwan and not engaging in any negotiations with China concerning the status of Taiwan.

Second, that Washington remains committed to maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and opposes the use of coercion or force. This is hard for Beijing to swallow because each side has a different definition of what constitutes the status quo and China is convinced that Washington continues to work to change it. Nevertheless, the Biden administration should continue to reiterate that when it comes to Taiwan’s elections, Washington favors no particular candidate or party and Washington stands ready to work with whomever wins.

Third, the United States should continue to demand that China not interfere in the election and respect the will of the people of Taiwan as expressed through the democratic process.


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