Diplomatic Statements Heat Up

At first, Beijing’s rhetorical response to the January election itself was relatively restrained. Statements from China’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs initially downplayed the significance of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) winning the presidency. A few hours after the election, a spokesperson from the TAO asserted that the DPP “does not represent the mainstream public opinion” in Taiwan, noting that 60% of the electorate did not vote for Lai.

Other parts of the Chinese government took a tougher position, likely intended to respond to nationalist pressures at home. Two days after the election, a magazine of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee, Qiushi Journal, republished a previous speech by General Secretary Xi Jinping from July 2022, including Xi’s vow to “develop and strengthen Taiwan’s patriotic, reunification forces.” Later that same week, China’s Ministry of State Security, which oversees Beijing’s intelligence and counterespionage work, issued a rare statement on WeChat that pledged to intensify counterintelligence and “anti-separatist” efforts related to Taiwan, after echoing previous warnings from Xi that “ultimate reunification with Taiwan is inevitable.”

In mid-February, Beijing’s top leaders started to adopt a firmer tone, hinting at a possible shift in its Taiwan strategy for the years ahead. China’s most threatening statement came at the Munich Security Conference on February 17, when Foreign Minister Wang Yi asserted, “To uphold the one-China principle, one should support China’s peaceful reunification, and to maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, one must oppose ‘Taiwan independence.’” While China has long demanded that other countries oppose Taiwan’s independence, this is the first time that Beijing has also insisted that countries support peaceful unification. This comment struck a nerve in Taiwan, where suspicions are high that Beijing intends to modify its Taiwan strategy to prioritize promoting unification over opposing independence in the future.

Similarly assertive tones were present in Beijing’s annual Taiwan Work Conference on February 22 and 23. Wang Huning, China’s highest-ranking official responsible for Taiwan policy after Xi, said that China must “further grasp the ‘strategic initiative’ to achieve the complete unification of the motherland,” emphasizing the need to push more actively for unification. Wang also used “combat” to describe China’s approach to Taiwan independence separatism, a departure from the milder “oppose” used in last year’s conference.

‘A Frog in Boiling Water’

China has also used diplomatic, legal and psychological pressure to intimidate the people of Taiwan. Some in Taipei claim to feel like a “frog in boiling water,” with Beijing slowly establishing a “new normal” that increases pressure against Taiwan in ways that are difficult to counter.

Just two days after Lai was elected president, Nauru announced that it would switch formal recognition from Taipei to Beijing, leaving Taiwan with only 12 diplomatic allies. The swift move, purposefully timed as a response to Lai’s victory, underscored a well-prepared and coordinated effort by both Beijing and Nauru ahead of the election, and served as a reminder to the Taiwanese people that the diplomatic shift was a “punishment” for choosing the wrong leader on the island.

On January 30, China also announced its decision to change civil aviation routes M503, W122 and W123 without consulting Taiwan, citing the need to alleviate airspace congestion over the Taiwan Strait. The move normalized the flight of Chinese civilian aircraft closer to the island and further encroached on the tacit boundary between Taiwan and China. Taipei responded forcefully, saying that the unreasonable actions from the CCP are “highly likely to escalate tensions,” and others, including the United States, France and Canada, also voiced concerns that the unilateral change could lead to regional instability.

Since last December, China has been regularly sending surveillance balloons near Taiwan, and the number increased noticeably after the election. Between January 14 and February 14, Beijing sent almost 50 high-altitude balloons over the Taiwan Strait, some violating Taiwan’s airspace and even directly flying over the island. The daily count peaked at eight balloons on both February 9 and 10, surpassing the pre-election record of five balloons in one day. The TAO claimed in late January that the balloons floating over Taiwan were for “civilian use,” citing China’s long-standing practice of using balloons for meteorological monitoring activities. By ignoring the Taiwan Strait median line, the civil aviation route changes and balloon tactics reflect Beijing’s continued gray zone tactics that seek to erode Taiwanese confidence in the newly elected government without escalating to conflict.

Finally, after a brief pause in the days before the election, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) resumed its provocative practice of sending aircraft across the Taiwan Strait median line on January 17. The scale and frequency of the PLA’s activities around Taiwan in January and February did not reach the average levels observed last year, but Beijing has left itself room to increase those flights if it needs to demonstrate displeasure toward Taiwan in the future.

Beijing’s Pressure Could Escalate Tensions

China’s delicate balancing act is likely designed to help Beijing keep its options open without painting itself into a corner. In the short term, the CCP leadership would prefer to avoid a major crisis with Taiwan that would divert attention and resources away from addressing key domestic challenges such as a sluggish economy, ongoing corruption investigations and recent leadership changes in the PLA.

Yet this continued pressure campaign is risky. Without proper crisis management mechanisms or direct communication channels in place, China is increasing the likelihood that an accident or misunderstanding could inadvertently escalate tensions. For example, China is normalizing maritime patrols around Taiwan’s Kinmen islands, and two Chinese fishermen died when their boat capsized as Taiwan’s coast guard chased them out of Taiwan’s “restricted waters” on February 14. The Chinese coast guard responded by boarding a Taiwanese tourist boat near the islands on February 19 and sending five coast guard ships into Kinmen’s restricted waters on February 26. China is unlikely to back down, and future skirmishes around the outlying islands are likely and could be difficult to restrain.

What to Watch This Year

A number of events have the potential to increase tensions in the Taiwan Strait this year. China’s Two Sessions — the concurrent annual meetings of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, which began on March 4, and China’s National People’s Congress, which opened on March 5 — could reveal potential changes in Beijing’s official policies toward Taiwan. On May 20, Lai will lay out his administration’s cross-strait policy platform during his inauguration speech, which will likely prompt Beijing to respond with a signal about its intentions.

Both Lai and Beijing may be tempted to test the waters of one another’s resolve. For instance, Beijing could suspend preferential trade arrangements in the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, which it threatened to terminate in the run-up to the elections. Beijing could also enact new laws or revise the 2005 Anti-Secession Law to send a stronger signal against Taiwan independence. Similarly, Lai could deviate from current Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen’s foreign and cross-strait policies after taking office in May in ways that suggest a further shift toward independence.

The situation will likely remain tense through the end of the year. Nationalist sentiment in China will run high in early October during the annual celebration of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, and Lai’s first National Day address on October 10 provides another opportunity for him to make important policy or political declarations. There is also some concern in Taipei that Beijing could seize the opportunity to escalate actions against Taiwan later this year while Washington is preoccupied with the U.S. presidential election in November, while others believe Beijing might refrain from such actions to avoid becoming the center of the debate.