United States Institute of Peace

While nothing major came out of the meeting, it served as a reminder that cross-Strait relations are not necessarily as straightforward as they seem. Although there are still obstacles to official communication between the elected government in Taipei and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders in Beijing, many individuals nevertheless maintain lines of communication and working relationships across the Strait to help preserve a basic level of stability.

USIP’s Jennifer Staats and Naiyu Kuo look at what Xi and Ma wanted to accomplish with the meeting, what it means for cross-Strait relations and what lessons this provides for U.S. policy.

What were Xi and Ma hoping to accomplish?

For both men, the purpose of the meeting was more about symbolism than substance. For Xi, the primary goal was likely a friendly photo-op to dampen the voices of those in China who have been advocating for a tougher approach following then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022. The meeting received largely positive front-page coverage in China’s state-owned media, which encouraged further cross-Strait exchanges and helped make the case that Beijing is making progress in the right direction toward unification with Taiwan.

Although the meeting took place in the East Hall at the Great Hall of the People, where Chinese officials typically host foreign leaders, Ma is not a current official, nor would Beijing perceive the leader of Taiwan to be on equal footing with the general secretary of the CCP. To illustrate that point, the official readout from the Chinese government did not assign Ma any official title, but simply referred to Ma as “mister.” Furthermore, the East Hall had served as the venue for negotiations about the return of Hong Kong and Macau to China, prompting Taiwanese media to see it as Beijing’s implicit political signal of Taiwan’s eventual return to the motherland.

Finally, Xi likely also wanted to capitalize on the symbolic significance of the April 10 date. Ma’s visit was reportedly scheduled for April 8 initially, but Beijing postponed it two days to coincide with President Joe Biden's meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, where maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait was among the major topics. The following day, Biden also held the first-ever trilateral summit with his counterparts from Japan and the Philippines in Washington, which Chinese scholars labeled an “anti-China gathering.” April 10 also marked the 45th anniversary of the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act, which serves as a cornerstone for unofficial U.S.-Taiwan ties.

For Ma, the visit was more about boosting his own political relevance and advocating for the view that Taiwan is historically and culturally linked to China and should move toward closer relations with the mainland, which he sees as inevitable. Yet his trip has drawn the ire of both his own party and the ruling DPP. Some very senior members of the KMT claim to have been unaware of the trip or of the message Ma planned to deliver, and the party did not fully endorse the meeting until the trip was over.

What does the Xi-Ma meeting mean for cross-strait relations ahead of Lai’s inauguration?

In the April 10 meeting, Xi largely repeated his official positions and the rhetoric from Beijing did not deviate from previous statements on Taiwan. Xi stressed the official Chinese view that Taiwan is a part of China, saying “people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are all Chinese” and “there are no knots that cannot be untied, no issues that cannot be discussed, and no force that can separate us.”

The meeting was likely also intended to remind President-elect Lai that a warmer relationship with Beijing is possible if he changes his approach. Indeed, following the visit, Ma publicly urged Lai to adhere to the “One-China” framework in his May 20 inauguration speech. Nonetheless, given Ma's lack of authority and his perceived Beijing-friendly stance, the meeting's impact on Taiwanese perceptions of China or Lai’s approach to China will likely be minimal. Additionally, Lai's recent decision to retain key foreign policy and national security personnel from President Tsai Ing-wen’s administration signals a continuation of Taiwan’s policy trajectory over the past eight years aimed at distancing Taiwan from China’s influence.

What are the different types of cross-Strait exchanges and dialogue taking place?

This was the first time Xi had received a current or former president of Taiwan in Beijing, but it was not the first meeting between the two men. In November 2015, Xi met with then-president Ma in Singapore two months before Taiwan’s 2016 presidential elections. Ma also led a student delegation to the mainland in the spring of 2023, which was the first time a current or former Taiwanese (or Republic of China) president had visited mainland China since 1949.

Despite the absence of an official communication channel between Beijing and Taipei since 2016, informal channels do bridge the Taiwan Strait. Ma is not the first Taiwanese politician, current or former, to travel to China this year. Notable KMT figures like former Taipei City Mayor Hao Lung-pin and Vice Chair Andrew Hsia have made trips to China, while former a former KMT chair and a former vice chair are scheduled to visit China this summer. KMT legislative caucus whip Fu Kun-chi led a delegation of KMT lawmakers on a visit to China in late April, where they held meetings with high-ranking Chinese officials.

These efforts build upon a history of cross-strait engagement between the KMT and the CCP, exemplified by former KMT Chair Lien Chan's four meetings with Xi between 2013 and 2018.

In times of crises or heightened tensions, select representatives from Taipei meet with counterparts in Beijing to lower the temperature, but these meetings generally remain out of the public eye. Even President-elect Lai has publicly acknowledged the importance of communication. In late April, he called for party-to-party talks and reiterated a willingness to engage in dialogue with Beijing “on the premise of reciprocity and dignity.”

Yet the primary obstacle to official communication remains Beijing's insistence that Taiwanese interlocutors accept the 1992 Consensus, which was negotiated between the CCP and KMT and Beijing believes reflects an agreement that both sides work toward “national reunification.” Lai rejects that formulation, so Taipei and Beijing will likely continue to rely on backchannel efforts, which are better than nothing but might not effectively prevent misunderstandings or reduce the risks of military confrontation.

What lessons can U.S. policymakers take from this engagement between Xi and Ma?

The meeting is unlikely to change the trajectory of cross-Strait relations, but it does indicate that Beijing views engagement with Taiwan as an important component of peaceful unification. Indeed, perhaps the best way to prevent war in the Taiwan Strait is to ensure that Beijing still views peaceful unification as a viable option. To that end, Washington should not discourage or seek to limit communication between Taipei and Beijing that might serve as pressure release valve for both sides.

China’s ongoing efforts to encourage exchanges and interactions across the Taiwan Strait also suggest that Xi might not be planning a military showdown with Taiwan in the near future. Yet China will continue to use a combination of carrots and sticks to appeal to and coerce Taiwan, and gray-zone pressure will likely escalate around the May 20 inauguration. Existing backchannels across the Strait can help manage the tensions, but the United States cannot count on those exchanges to succeed. Washington must ensure it is sending clear signals to both Beijing and Taipei to avoid miscommunication or unwanted escalation and continue its efforts to help Taiwan defend itself and deter military conflict.