KEY TAKEAWAYS
KEY TAKEAWAYS
When leftist candidate Luis Arce won Bolivia’s 2020 elections, many hoped that the country could finally enter a period of stabilization and peace. The surprisingly peaceful transfer of power came after one of the most tumultuous periods of recent Bolivian political history. President Evo Morales, a leftist indigenous leader, was ousted in 2019 after massive protests and electoral fraud allegations, followed by the controversial interim presidency of Jeanine Añez and the violent and sometimes lethal protests against her government, alongside the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. When the moderate, technocrat Arce won with an overwhelming 54% victory in the first round, it was seen as an indicator the country wanted a degree of national unity and could find the space to heal.
Four years later, the promise of a united Bolivia is far from materializing. In the political sphere, the ruling Movement for Socialism (MAS in Spanish) party is experiencing a harsh internal civil war between the supporters of President Arce and those of Morales, the party’s founder. For 18 years, the traditional opposition, absent clear leadership, has been unable to present a coherent alternative to MAS rule. The country’s judicial and electoral institutions – which in other contexts could serve as “referees” for political competition – have historically been seen as coopted, and the legacy of Morales’ 2019 ouster still weighs heavy on their legitimacy before the general public and major political actors. On the economic front, the country is on the verge of a potential debt default, as its international reserves hit historic lows and Bolivia’s economy suffers from a lack of investment and competitiveness, fueling public discontent and unrest.
Bolivian civil society and international actors can play a key role in identifying and mitigating points of conflict over the next 12 months.
As Bolivia approaches its election season in 2025, these variables point to a potential surge in political violence, as the system becomes overwhelmed by polarized narratives in a fragile socioeconomic environment. Bolivian civil society and international actors can play a key role in identifying and mitigating points of conflict over the next 12 months, helping Bolivian institutions to manage the heightened polarization in the country, preventing it from falling into conflict.
Arce was propelled into power with the support of his mentor, Morales. He had been Morales’ finance minister for almost 11 years, largely perceived to be the brains behind the Bolivian “economic miracle” that saw impressive growth rates and a radical reduction in inequality and poverty. With Morales living in exile in Argentina and unable to run in the 2020 elections, Arce was perceived to represent the continuity of the MAS government. But as the Arce administration began to show growing interest on taking policy decisions more autonomously from Morales, the rift between mentor and mentee widened. As with similar cases in other Latin American countries — like presidents Uribe and Santos in Colombia or presidents Correa and Moreno in Ecuador — the shadow of the charismatic, popular leader weighed heavily on the new government.
Back in Bolivia since 2021, Morales has claimed that his resignation in 2019 came as a result of a coup organized by the opposition (mainly based in the western department of Santa Cruz) and private interests. He has dedicated most of his time to arguing for his return to power in 2025. For Morales and his supporters, the Arce government has not done enough to redress the damage done by the opposition in 2019, and has conceded some of the key principles of MAS by compromising with the private sector over key economic policies. As a result, MAS’ majority bloc in Congress has split in half, rendering the legislature divided into three blocs (MAS-Arce, MAS-Morales and the opposition) that have been so far unable to reach any sort of significant agreement to solve the current economic stagnation or put forward a national unity proposal to heal the wounds opened by the 2019 crisis.
Further pulling apart both sides is that Arce himself is angling for reelection this year, triggering an internal conflict for control of MAS leadership and its mechanisms to define a candidate. Back in October, each leader called for their own “MAS Congress” to proclaim themselves as the sole candidates, with public events happening in parallel at the same time in different cities, leading to violent clashes between militants of the same party that left at least 20 injured. Complicating the process is the fact that Morales has been barred from running for president by Bolivia’s Constitutional Tribunal, which he has not recognized as legitimate.
The traditional opposition on the other hand has suffered from a lack of organization and visible leadership since its defeat in 2020. Some of its main leaders, such as Santa Cruz activist Romulo Calvo, governor Luis Fernando Camacho and Añez, are currently in prison for their alleged participation in the “coup” of 2019, among other charges of corruption for Añez and racism for Calvo. For the leaders not in jail, former interim President Carlos Mesa (2003-05) has been repeatedly unable pose an electoral challenge to a MAS candidate or to broker a coalition with the Santa Cruz-based opposition.
Bolivia’s judicial system has long been perceived as biased and prone to instrumentalization by the executive branch. During the Añez administration, MAS militants were investigated and arrested on sedition and/or terrorism charges (including Morales himself) for their alleged “electoral fraud” in the 2019 elections. As the page turned in 2021 with the new MAS Arce government in place, the same judicial system moved quickly to end these processes and open new ones against the previous administration on charges of corruption, abuse of power and the alleged “coup” against Morales. Arce has been accused of using the judicial system to prevent Morales from running by its dissident MAS faction, and by the opposition of trying to carry out an alleged “self-coup” along with the top courts that would supposedly close Congress and have the president rule by decree.
The credibility of the electoral system, headed by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE in Spanish), despite having conducted elections in 2020 that have been considered generally free and fair, has suffered because of the TSE’s conduct during the 2019 elections in favor of MAS. Morales’ supporters have consistently protested the TSE’s decisions to not recognize their leader as a candidate, nor his attempts to reassert control over the ruling party. Both sides of the political spectrum believe the Arce administration is attempting to instrumentalize the judicial and electoral system to remain in power, a claim that the current government has consistently rejected.
The deliberate attack on the credibility of the judicial and electoral institutions … moves political competition away from the democratic space.
The deliberate attack on the credibility of the judicial and electoral institutions not only strips them away from the necessary administrative and logistical tools they need to appropriately carry out their tasks, but more dangerously, moves political competition away from the democratic space. Outside democratic norms and principles, opponents are reduced to enemies that are excluded from political life, incarcerated, cancelled or sent to exile. This defining characteristic of 21st century polarization opens the door for potential outbursts of violence as political actors weigh their forces in the street, and not in Congress or the ballot.
The political and institutional degradation has not been confined to these spheres, but it has rather spilled into the socioeconomic sector, directly impacting the lives of common citizens. Gridlock in Congress has prevented the Bolivian people from electing a new set of judges to the country’s top courts at the end of 2023. (Bolivia is the only country in the world that conducts open elections for these positions.) It has also rendered the Bolivian government unable to invest the necessary resources to keep its energy sector operating, nor jumpstarting the long-awaited lithium extraction and processing industry. From the economic miracle of the 2000s and the mid-2010s, Bolivia is now on the verge of debt default.
The natural gas industry, which for most of the past 20 years has spearheaded the country’s economy, has suffered from a lack of investment that has in turn rendered it inefficient to extract, or process the fuel, nor has it allowed Bolivia to discover new reserves. In the meantime, successive governments have maintained costly fuel subsidies that have depleted the country’s international reserves as the only industry that could replenish them is in long-term decline. The plan to move away from an extractive to an industrialized economy never really materialized during Morales, something that Arce hopes to achieve with lithium.
The plan to ramp up lithium extraction and processing to compensate for the loses of the gas sector in the short time could cover, in the medium term, the costs necessary for the recovery of the energy sector and become a cornerstone of the country’s long-term industrialization. However, such a plan has fallen short of its promises, as corruption scandals over the nascent industry have already erupted and domestic lithium processing has not reached expected levels. Furthermore, the contracts with foreign companies, mainly Chinese and Russian, have been mired in controversy for the lack of transparency in their signing process, environmental concerns and the real potential that these ventures become just another mechanism to extract natural resources from the country without having a real positive impact in local communities.
These political, institutional and economic variables seem destined to collide during the 2025 election and brew the perfect storm for violence and conflict. Polarized actors might be tempted to tap into the emotions of a population frustrated by the state of the economy and the inefficacy of their political system. The country’s institutions might find themselves overwhelmed with unrest, and, facing pressure from all sides, forced to take unpopular decisions that might inflame conflict and division even further. But Bolivians and the international community still have time to take proactive steps and interrupt such a vicious cycle before it spirals out of control.
The country’s institutions might find themselves overwhelmed with unrest, and, facing pressure from all sides, forced to take unpopular decisions that might inflame conflict and division even further.
Trusted actors such as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and the Electoral Observation Department of the Organization of American States (OAS), as well as the United Nations, can accompany and support the processes of the upcoming judicial elections to allay fears of bias or instrumentalization of the current institutions, and grant legitimacy to the new judiciary. The IACHR’s Interdisciplinary Group of Independent Experts (GIEI in Spanish) was key in shedding light and taking the first steps toward truth regarding the violence of the end of 2019. The OAS and the U.N. can also support the electoral system to prepare for the presidential elections next year and provide good offices between the parties as conflicts erupt. Local civil society organizations are also key to mobilize public support in favor of a debate based on issues, and on the consolidation of a national agenda outlining the priorities for any future administration, ensuring the transparency and due process of the elections.
Back in 2019, Bolivians consistently rang the alarm of a possible conflict as the electoral process advanced. The failure to heed such calls resulted in a constitutional crisis, dozens dead, hundreds injured and a fractured country whose wounds have not yet healed. Five years later, there is an opportunity to defuse a similar crisis before it happens.