KEY TAKEAWAYS
KEY TAKEAWAYS
Hamas, Fatah and a dozen smaller Palestinian factions signed on Tuesday in Beijing a joint statement calling for, among other things, the formation of a national unity government. Fatah, the secular party that controls the Palestinian Authority, and Hamas, which perpetrated the October 7 terrorist attack that led to the ongoing war in Gaza, have been divided since 2007. Their rivalry has long been a thorn in the side of the Palestinian cause and numerous attempts at reconciliation have failed. This latest attempt comes as efforts to devise a post-war governance system for Gaza are picking up steam.
China will see the outcome of the talks, known as the “Beijing Declaration,” as a diplomatic win and a boon for its campaign to project influence in the Middle East and to address issues that it perceives as intractable or ignored under the U.S.-led order. But the reality is that the stakes were very low for Beijing given the current situation in the Middle East.
USIP’s Robert Barron, Andrew Scobell and Adam Gallagher look at what drove these reconciliation efforts, why Beijing decided to host them and what this means for the situation in Gaza.
Barron: Palestinian division — factional and geographic — has been a reality since 2007, in the aftermath of a Hamas-Fatah civil war, which left Hamas in charge of Gaza, and the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority (PA) running parts of the West Bank. At its core, this division has been driven by the struggle for leadership of the Palestinian national movement. Fatah claims historical and institutional legitimacy — the party of Yasser Arafat leading the PA and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) — and sees non-violent negotiation as the path to self-determination. Hamas is not a part of the PLO or PA — rejecting both institutions’ acceptance of Israel — and promotes violence as the only way to end Israeli occupation.
In the past two decades there have been dozens of attempts to define a path toward Fatah-Hamas reconciliation, reunification and the benefits these could bring: the Cairo Declaration (2005), the Prisoners’ Document (2006), the Mecca Agreement (2007), the Sana’a Declaration (2008), the Cairo Agreement (2011), the Doha Agreement (2012), the Gaza and Cairo Agreements (2014), the Doha talks (2016), the Cairo Agreement (2017), the Fatah-Hamas-PIJ agreement (2020), and the Algiers Agreement (2022), among other efforts. Despite numerous commitments and handshakes, none of these ultimately succeeded.
An argument can be made that by signing this statement, Fatah and Hamas are acknowledging that Palestinians will not be served by continued division.
The question now becomes: has the Gaza War changed the parties’ calculus? An argument can be made that by signing this statement, Fatah and Hamas are acknowledging that, whatever comes next, neither party (nor the Palestinian people) will be served by continued division, isolation and stagnation — that future Palestinian governance in Gaza and the West Bank will require unity, legitimacy, factional and diplomatic compromise, and capacity beyond what each party holds individually at present.
Additionally, reconciliation may be the most appealing political move for both parties. Offered choices for what they would like to see from Palestinian leadership, 51 percent of those polled in May/June by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) chose “an immediate reconciliation and unification of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip” as their top choice — up from 42 percent three months earlier.
For the factions, the Fatah-Hamas/West Bank-Gaza division had its costs over the past 20 years, and perhaps now their calculation is that the costs of continuing the division over the months and years ahead may be higher. Still, the distrust between the parties and individuals at the top of them runs very deep, and outside pressures, ambiguity and potholes have scuttled many similar initiatives in the past. All of those challenges remain after Beijing.
Scobell: This week China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs pulled off a high-profile diplomatic publicity stunt. Indeed, Beijing’s prime motivation for hosting these disparate Palestinian factions was to promote the image of China as major force for peace and reconciliation in the Middle East following the Iran-Saudi rapprochement it brokered last year. China seeks to burnish its stature as a champion of the oppressed and downtrodden. Moreover, Beijing seeks to dramatically differentiate itself from the United States in the Middle East. China works to portray itself as a tireless peacemaker in contrast to the United States, which is depicted as a warmonger. A report in a newspaper controlled by the Chinese Communist Party, proclaimed that “China has made another significant contribution to the peace and stability of a world in turbulence.”
Beijing seeks to dramatically differentiate itself from the United States in the Middle East.
Where the Middle East is concerned, China has tended to tread warily, trying to maintain cordial relations with all parties. This has generally meant sticking to anodyne statements urging all parties to pursue negotiations and performing pro forma shuttle diplomacy over serious efforts at meaningful mediation or conflict resolution. By inviting an array of Palestinians factions for talks in Beijing, China was accepting some risk but arguably there was little downside. One potential negative was alienating Israel, but China has already antagonized Israel with its response — chiefly, it’s lack of condemnation of Hamas — to the massive October 7 terrorist attack. Moreover, the risk of China being seen as failing to unify Palestinian factions would have been more than counterbalanced by how the initiative would enhance Beijing’s positive image as a champion of the Palestinian people.
Gallagher: Given the trouble in even organizing the talks, the Beijing Declaration came as somewhat of a surprise. Still, some analysts expressed cautious expectation ahead of the talks that the Beijing-hosted meeting would result in moves toward reconciliation, particularly because both of the major factions sent some of their top leaders. But no one should hold their breath that Palestinian divisions are now part of a bygone era, as demonstrated by the numerous failed attempts at reconciliation noted above.
The joint statement calls for the formation of an interim unity government for Gaza and the West Bank, the unification of Palestinian institutions, plans for the reconstruction of Gaza and preparations for elections for the Palestinian National Council. Additionally, the agreement stipulates that the PLO is the “sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people,” said Wang Yi, China’s foreign minister. But, as has often been the case in previous failed efforts, the devil is in the details, or, more precisely, the next steps.
In this case, there are no concrete plans for the formation of a unity government or any of the other key initiatives included in the statement. One of the most notable aspects of the statement is what it doesn’t address: how the Palestinians envision security control over Gaza and whether Hamas accepts previous commitments the PLO has made, like recognizing Israel’s right to exist within the pre-1967 borders.
Some observers have suggested that the talks and joint statement amount to very little, and that Hamas and Fatah have no serious plans to reconcile. Their real motivation, these detractors suggest, was to appease Beijing, as the Palestinians need all the powerful friends they can get right now. Indeed, the statement simply articulates the “obvious” requirements for Palestinian unity, said former Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh. Ultimately, what came out of Beijing is just the first of many steps. There will need to be numerous follow-up talks and more detailed plans to move forward.
These talks come against the backdrop of the ongoing war in Gaza and questions over the contours of the enclave’s post-war governance. Just days ahead of the talks in Beijing, the UAE hosted a meeting with Israel and the United States to discuss Gaza’s future after the war. The Emiratis, who have Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s support to play a role in post-war Gaza, have said they will not be part of any solution that involves Hamas.
Israel rejected the move toward reconciliation, with its foreign minister saying that a unified Palestinian government would not come to fruition because “Hamas’ rule will be crushed.” Since October 7, the Netanyahu government has consistently emphasized that it aims to completely destroy Hamas. A unity government with Hamas in its ranks is also a non-starter for the United States. “When it comes to [the] governance of Gaza at the end of the conflict, there can’t be a role for a terrorist organization,” U.S. State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller said.
The outcome of the Beijing talks is likely to have limited impact on the situation on the ground today.
So, while Palestinian division had long been an obstacle to the Palestinian cause, and reconciliation a prerequisite for progress toward statehood, the outcome of the Beijing talks is likely to have limited impact on the situation on the ground today.
Beijing will certainly seek to portray the outcome as another diplomatic win and a sign of its growing influence in the Middle East. Palestinian reconciliation fits within China’s three-part plan for Israeli-Palestinian peace. But getting these factions to sign a piece of paper is one thing. To truly demonstrate its diplomatic heft, China will need to continue to press the parties to make good on the Beijing Declaration. If past is prelude, that will be a significant challenge.