KEY TAKEAWAYS
KEY TAKEAWAYS
The resistance’s capture of the northern city of Lashio on August 3 marks a watershed moment in Myanmar’s conflict. After a month of fierce fighting, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and allied resistance forces captured this crucial stronghold in northern Shan State, dealing a severe blow to the beleaguered junta. This represents more than just the loss of a major city. It is the first time that a military regional command has been captured by resistance forces.
Even more, the prestigious Northeastern Regional Military Command (NERMC) is widely regarded as the strongest among the military’s 14 regional commands. The loss is another major setback that has provoked frustration within the military’s inner circles and among its key internal supporters.
Although the fall of Lashio and capture of the NERMC is historic, it is also the continuation of a sustained trend of resistance gains.
Despite possessing superior aerial power and weaponry, Myanmar’s military, known as the Sit-Tat, has deteriorated into just another of the many armed groups operating in the country, rather than a dominant national army. As the resistance continues its assault on junta forces across the country, it has only deepened its steadfast resolve to remove the Myanmar military from power and achieve a new political paradigm no longer dominated by the military.
In late 2023, resistance forces launched a coordinated assault on the junta, dubbed Operation 1027, which was centered on northern Shan State but replicated in conflict theaters across the country. When fighting in northern Shan State was interrupted in January 2024 by a China-brokered cease-fire, many analysts and diplomats concluded that the conflict in Myanmar had reached a stalemate. Some expected that the regime would concede its losses in ethnic areas and consolidate control in central Myanmar. They predicted that this would motivate ethnic-armed organizations (EAOs) to withdraw from the broader fight and focus on consolidating their gains in newly won areas.
Myanmar’s military has deteriorated into just another of the many armed groups operating in the country, rather than a dominant national army.
This view assumes that the warring parties would be content with a power-sharing arrangement – EAOs maintaining their respective territories while the Myanmar military controls the center. Some analysts even suggested that the regime could “win” by holding urban areas and outlasting the fractious resistance. These assumptions tend to misunderstand the objectives of the conflict’s key actors and the dominant trend of the war.
Despite repeated claims that the junta would soon realize its losses and withdraw to the center, it has not. And it will not. The Myanmar military is committed to its self-appointed role as the nation's guardian, driven by a deep-seated delusion of its own indispensability. This ideological commitment is reinforced by the practical need to hold territory for resource extraction (particularly as foreign exchange dwindles), to tax border trade and to manage the complex logistics of a multi-front war.
Furthermore, the Sit-Tat overestimates its own fighting capability, underestimates the capacity of its adversary and expects the international community to shift power in its direction through cease-fires and political dialogue. For these reasons, among others, it will not concede territorial losses and is unlikely to accept a position as anything other than the dominant player in Myanmar.
As illustrated by statements from the leaders of resistance forces — such as the Karenni, Kokang, Three Brotherhood Alliance (3BHA), Kachin and Ta’ang — many ethnic minority stakeholders understand that the Myanmar military is a threat to their communities as long as it is in a position of power. Even where it is incapable of capturing and occupying resistance-held territory, the military deploys heavy artillery and air power to terrorize the public. This is playing out in Laukkai today, but can also be seen in other parts of the country like Minbya in Rakhine State, Camp Victoria in Chin State, and Laiza in Kachin State. These leaders also recognize this as an historic opportunity to eliminate or greatly weaken this threat. Some EAOs only recently joined the fight as this opportunity became clear to them.
Primarily for these two reasons, resistance groups continue to pursue their goal of removing the Myanmar military from power. There is little that internationals can do, at this point, to derail resistance groups who see this as an historic chance to eliminate Myanmar’s primary agent of instability and suffering.
Whereas phase 1 of Operation 1027 focused primarily on northern Shan State, during phase 2, the anti-junta resistance forces have set their sights on Mandalay — marking a new phase of the war and challenging the junta head on in Myanmar’s second largest city. Before launching the second wave of Operation 1027, leaders from the 3BHA and the National Unity Government (NUG) convened in a secret location in northern Shan State to coordinate the attack. Contrary to some reports claiming the NUG was not involved in 1027, the coordination around phase 2 mirrors the dynamics of phase 1, in which the NUG and 3BHA worked closely together to prepare for a new wave of conflict.
The anti-junta resistance forces have set their sights on Mandalay, marking a new phase of the war and challenging the junta head on in Myanmar’s second largest city.
On June 24, the T’ang National Liberation Army, joined by the Mandalay People’s Defense Forces and other people’s defense groups, launched offensives in Kyaukme. This was followed by a Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) attack on Lashio on July 5. Within days, resistance groups launched offensives on Nawnghkio and Mongmit in northern Shan State and Madaya, Singu, Mogoke, and Tabeikkyin in the Mandalay region. This new wave of operations was dubbed “Operation 1027 Phase 2” and “Shan-Man Operation,” referencing its targets in northern Shan State and Mandalay.
The resumption of hostilities in northern Shan State and new fighting in Mandalay further stretched the beleaguered military, which was losing ground in Rakhine and Kachin states, and facing sustained pressure in Karenni, Karen, Chin, Tanintharyi, Sagaing, Bago and Magway. Resistance forces fought with greater intensity than phase 1 and made more rapid advances. This is partly a result of the resistance’s greater military coordination and weaponry, but also because of the low morale of Sit-Tat forces, many of whom surrendered without contest. Over the course of a month, the resistance forces have succeeded in controlling six townships, including Lashio, home to the military’s NERMC.
The battle of Lashio featured the most intense urban fighting in Myanmar's civil war, with both sides engaging in conventional warfare on a scale not previously seen. The military, recognizing the strategic and symbolic importance of this regional command, fortified Lashio with extensive defenses and deployed heavy weaponry to prevent its fall.
Approximately 5,000 Sit-Tat soldiers were mobilized to defend Lashio, including troops from the NERMC, LID 99 and Military Operations Command 1, 14 and 16, along with artillery, tank, and armored vehicle battalions, and numerous support units. Additionally, the military reinforced its position with newly acquired advanced Chinese-built drones, which some believed could tilt the battle in favor of the Sit-Tat.
While the Sit-Tat utilized the cease-fire to prepare for an escalation of conflict, the MNDAA-led resistance forces also mobilized. They assembled about 6,000 troops for the battle for Lashio, drawn from its own forces, NUG-aligned people’s defense forces and other local defense forces. Beginning July 5, the resistance forces launched attacks on Lashio from five positions around the city. They gradually broke through the military's defensive lines and advanced toward the NERMC headquarters.
As the battle intensified, the involvement of other armed actors, such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and its ally, the Shan State Army-North (SSA-N), complicated the situation. While the regime struggled to contain the resistance’s advance, it sent delegates to the UWSA headquarters in Pang Seng, hoping the UWSA would intervene to halt the MNDAA’s offensive.
On July 12, the UWSA deployed 2,000 troops to Tangyan Township, east of Lashio, while the SSA-N sent forces to Mongyai, approximately 40 miles from Lashio. Both groups announced that the troops movements were to prevent the conflict from spilling over into their areas. The regime did not impede these movements, possibly hoping intra-EAO competition over territorial control might undermine the assault on Lashio.
To head off attempts by other EAOs to involve themselves in the late stages of capturing Lashio, the MNDAA announced on July 25 that the city had been liberated from military control. They claimed to have established administration of the city even though fierce fighting continued.
Facing the impending loss of a crucial regional command, the regime made several attempts to persuade the UWSA leadership to intervene and disrupt the MNDAA-led offensives. On July 27, some UWSA troops entered Lashio, fueling speculation that the UWSA would support the junta’s aims. However, the UWSA announced that they entered Lashio to protect their liaison office and assist the relocation of some residents — not to engage in combat.
Twice during the battle, the MNDAA announced unilateral cease-fires, aiming to alleviate pressure from China. Despite these cease-fire declarations, intense fighting continued on the ground as MNDAA forces pressed forward to gain full control of Lashio. This highlights a broader trend in which resistance groups superficially respond to Chinese pressure without allowing it to divert them from their strategic goals.
Contrary to predictions of an inter-EAO conflict that would undermine the offensive, MNDAA-led forces advanced and successfully captured both Lashio and the NERMC on August 3.
Around 2,000 junta troops and approximately 500 resistance fighters were killed in the battle for Lashio. Additionally, 4,783 individuals, including 2,000 soldiers and their family members, surrendered (author’s estimates). Numerous high-ranking military officials, including one major general and two brigadier generals, were captured by the resistance. The regime’s miscalculation with the UWSA also cost it dearly. Instead of fragmenting the resistance, the UWSA deployed 2,000 troops across the Salween River into Tangyan and took control of the town without firing a shot.
The battle of Lashio has had far-reaching effects on the trajectory of Myanmar's conflict. It has further demoralized the military and bolstered the morale and confidence of the resistance forces, which are now preparing to advance into central Myanmar.
Resistance control of northern Shan State and the surrounding areas also provides a valuable base of operations for resistance forces planning to escalate their offensives into Mandalay and Sagaing. Stabilized by this base, the resistance is preparing attacks on Madaya and Pyinoolwin, which will open direct paths to Mandalay.
Establishing a base in weapons-rich northern Shan State also helped achieve the objective of opening a weapons supply route to forces in Sagaing, Magwe, Chin and Rakhine. Since taking control of northern Shan State, resistance forces have initiated attacks on Thabeikkyin, a strategic junction linking northern Shan State, Sagaing and Mandalay, and are seeking to establish a corridor between resistance-controlled areas on the east bank of the Ayeyarwady River and Shwebo valley in Sagaing on the west bank. Linking northern Shan State and central Myanmar would be a boon to the over 50,000 resistance troops there who have struggled to expel junta forces from the open plains of Sagaing and Magwe partly because of their rudimentary weaponry.
Currently, the resistance forces appear to be planning a multi-pronged advance on Mandalay from Pyinoolwin, Madaya and Sagaing. To encircle Mandalay, operations in Myingyan and Ngatogyi to the west have intensified significantly. The resistance's push toward Mandalay is likely to be its most challenging and costly undertaking to date. The regime is expected to mount its strongest defenses, viewing the battle for Mandalay as existential. If the resistance manages to secure control over Mandalay, it would signify a dramatic new conflict landscape.
Although some argued before the fall of Lashio that the military is beginning to “regroup”, the Sit-Tat is, in fact, at its weakest point in modern history and showing no signs of regrouping. In addition to its historic losses in northern Shan State, the Myanmar military faces resistance offensives in Mandalay, Rakhine, Chin, Karen, Bago, Sagaing, Magway, Tanintharyi, Karenni and Kachin.
Within four months of offensives in Kachin State, the Kachin Independence Army has captured over 200 military positions, including several strategically significant bases and nine towns. In Karen State, the junta deployed its largest operation to date, named Aung Zeya, with 3,000 troops aimed to retake Myawaddy in Karen State. The offensive faced stiff resistance defenses in the Dawna hills and has been forced to retreat — never coming close to retaking Myawaddy. Meanwhile, the Arakan Army has achieved near-total control of northern Rakhine State and is steadily advancing toward full control of the entire region.
Plagued by low morale, poor fighting capabilities, inept leadership, public hatred and internal discontent, there are few scenarios in which the military could recover. Over the past three years, the military has deteriorated from a national army, capable of controlling the country through fear and force, into just one of many armed groups in Myanmar.
The resistance movement recognizes this as an historic opportunity to remove the military from power and achieve a new political order.
Although the conflict landscape in Myanmar is complex, two things are clear: (1) the conflict has consistently moved in a single direction that favors the resistance, and the Myanmar military lacks the capacity to alter its course; and (2) the resistance movement recognizes this as an historic opportunity to remove the military from power and achieve a new political order that is not dominated by the military, and it is unlikely to be diverted from that objective.
Ultimately, it may not matter much if the international community understands these facts — the war will be decided by those inside Myanmar — but international efforts that prolong the life of the military, by providing direct assistance, encouraging power-sharing negotiation, or otherwise, only increase civilian suffering. It would help if the international community would support the people’s will to remove the genocidal dictatorship from power.