Three Questions to Watch
Can Ukraine’s strike into Russia’s Kursk region force Russia to slow its attacks in Ukraine’s Donbas?
In recent weeks, Russia has made slow, steady advances in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region, threatening the towns of Niu-York, Pokrovsk and Chasiv Yar. As of Wednesday (August 14), U.S. officials reported initial indications that some Russian forces have been pulled off the front line in Ukraine’s east and redirected to halt the incursion into Kursk. If the Ukrainian offensive can redirect enough Russian forces from eastern Ukraine to the Kursk region, this could be an important win for Ukraine.
However, if the Ukrainians have redeployed many of their own forces from the front in eastern Ukraine for the offensive in Kursk, it could leave them vulnerable to a Russian counterattack in Donbas. Ukrainians have reportedly been suffering significant manpower shortfalls since late last year and have instituted a controversial conscription law to address them. Ukrainian troops on the front line in Chasiv Yar expressed concern to reporters at the start of this week that the offensive in Kursk was not yet yielding any relief to weary troops in the east.
How far will Ukraine’s new show of resilience and initiative bolster its own morale and international support?
The stagnation of the battlefield over the past year has contributed to voices in the West disfavoring continued support for Ukraine. Now, “perhaps the most consequential implication” of Ukraine’s offensive will be to show its supporters that their assistance to Ukraine has “not been squandered,” USIP’s Ambassador Bill Taylor and other analysts have said.
The attack in Kursk shows that Ukraine’s armed forces still can seize the initiative — and that may encourage its Western backers to increase their support for Ukraine’s defense of its independence and democracy. In addition, the lack of a strong Kremlin reaction to the use of some Western weaponry in the Ukrainian Kursk invasion may embolden Ukraine’s Western backers to loosen further the restrictions on how Western military aid is used. Throughout the war, a central question for Ukraine’s international backers has been whether to provide weapons capable of striking into Russia — and, once provided, what limits should be placed on their use against targets in Russia. So far, U.S. and European authorities have avoided criticism of Ukraine’s use of Western arms in its strike into Kursk, suggesting that they may be comfortable with new limits.
This Ukrainian strike is also clearly a morale boost for Ukrainians — and, while the effects of strengthened morale are hard to quantify, they unquestionably will favor Ukraine. Ukraine’s latest conscription efforts have proven unpopular and a weary population has questioned whether continuing the war makes sense.
Could Ukraine’s incursion complicate Putin’s political position at home?
With the Putin regime’s almost complete control over mainstream media in Russia, it is unlikely the narrative on the war will change dramatically in that country. Indeed, a quick read of major newspapers in Russia shows simply an intensification of the Kremlin’s line that Russia is really defending itself against NATO and the United States (who are fighting through Ukraine). There is no indication in the Russian press that the public in general is upset or concerned about the conduct of the war. This continues a trend highlighted by Russian opposition media: While Russian citizens in border regions like Belgorod had been subject to Ukrainian raids and drone or missile attacks, people elsewhere in Russia seemed not to notice or care. To be sure, under Putin’s authoritarian rule, it is possible and, indeed, likely, that many ordinary Russians are unhappy with what is happening on the battlefield. But they are either afraid or unwilling to show that, much less take the additional step of holding the Kremlin accountable. In that regard, the war’s cost to these border zones has never resonated nationally in a way that would impose political costs on Putin. And now, social media accounts of Russians fleeing the new offensive are unlikely to do so either.
One key to understanding the so-far quiescent Russian popular response to Ukraine’s cross-border strike is in the way that Putin’s 24 years in power has encouraged Russians to think ambiguously about their borders. The Kremlin’s message, heavily absorbed by Russians, has been that their people and nation extend well beyond the territorial boundaries of the Russian state.
Indeed, the whole pretext for Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is his absurd argument that Ukraine is Russia. He argued that Russia’s military violence in Ukraine’s Donetsk and Luhansk provinces was really Moscow’s effort to “rescue” Russians, living in Russian lands, who were being attacked and oppressed by an illegitimate Ukrainian government. The Russian illegal annexation of Donetsk and Luhansk (and Ukraine’s Kherson and Zaporizhia provinces) codified this reality in Russian minds. Thus, by eliminating the border between Russia and Ukraine, the Kremlin has essentially been telling the Russian people for two years that this war is being fought on Russian soil already. Ukraine’s recent attack into Russia’s internationally recognized territory may seem less distinct or new to those Russians who have fully imbibed Putin’s worldview.
As is typical for authoritarian rulers, Putin’s greater structural vulnerability is upheaval within the systems of repression through which he maintains control: Russia’s security agencies and allied institutions. An example was last year’s brief revolt by the Wagner Group, the Kremlin-aligned mercenary force. But as of now, with the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk, no indicator of such turbulence — for example, a wave of social media criticisms by mid-level Russian military or security officers — has arisen.
PHOTO: Ukrainians recover the body of a Russian soldier from a destroyed border post at Sudzha, Russia. Ukraine’s strike into Russia has changed the picture of what had been a stagnating battlefield in Ukraine. (David Guttenfelder/The New York Times)
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s).