KEY TAKEAWAYS
KEY TAKEAWAYS
Over the past three years, the Sahel and West Africa have seen an alarming number of military coups. With the region’s stability and security hanging in the balance, the international community has promoted peaceful democratic transitions (and found early success in Gabon). Meanwhile, coup regimes in countries like Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger — which recently formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) — have sought closer cooperation with China and Russia, prompting concern and dismay from supporters of democracy. Often lost in all this tumult is Guinea, which saw its own coup d’état in September 2021. Unlike some of its counterparts, the Guinean military has managed to avoid the attention, engagement or scrutiny of the West as it continues to entrench itself in power.
Following the September 2021 coup, military authorities in Guinea formed the National Committee of Reconciliation and Development (CNRD) as the principal governing body. Colonel Mamady Doumbouya, who led the coup, was sworn in as interim president the following month.
The CNRD took a number of popular actions in the aftermath of the coup, including the release of political detainees, a reduction in fuel prices and the reopening of land borders. The CNRD also made overtures to political parties, civil society, economic and professional organizations, and religious actors, among others, in a bid to strengthen social cohesion. Guinea’s interim legislative body — the National Council for the Transition (CNT) — reflected a diverse array of civilian voices. Meanwhile, the CNRD promised that CNRD members would not partake in future elections and established a special court to tackle corruption.
But perhaps the CNRD’s biggest action in the months after the coup was its commitment to establish a civilian-led constitutional order by the end of 2024, which offered Guineans a definitive timeline for a return to democracy.
Many hoped these were signs the military intended to establish more inclusive governance in Guinea after years of economic hardship and former President Alpha Condé’s drift toward authoritarianism.
However, three years on from the coup, the initial optimism has mostly faded.
There has been a noted deterioration in living conditions across the country and an increase in social and political tensions. Citizens’ frustrations regarding poor government service delivery were compounded by the explosion of Guinea’s main fuel depot in December 2023, which led to electricity shortages and increased fuel prices.
Meanwhile, the transitional timeline has experienced significant delays as dialogue frameworks have crumbled. General Doumbouya and the CNRD have neglected to allocate a budget for elections. They’ve also repeatedly delayed both the release of a draft constitution and a constitutional referendum. The former was finally presented to the CNT only at the end of July.
Instead, the transitional authorities have forcefully crushed dissent and arrested civil society activists and members of the press. The CNRD initially promised to tackle corruption and created a special court, but there is now a widespread sense that this court’s investigations and prosecutions are directed toward the CNRD’s political enemies.
Demonstrations have also been banned since 2022, but there are still significant protests in the capital Conakry and other cities that are held by both pro-democracy groups and citizens angry over frequent power cuts, internet blackouts and high commodity prices. Security forces often meet these demonstrations with violence and impunity, fueling further confrontations.
There is also major distrust between the CNRD and parts of the military. General Doumbouya has discharged over 700 military personnel since the start of the transition — including General Sadiba Coulibaly, the former second-ranking official within the CNRD. General Coulibaly was arrested and died while in detention at a secret location in June.
Citizen frustrations, media restrictions and closing civic space has contributed to a growing distrust toward transitional authorities.
This potent combination of citizen frustrations, media restrictions and closing civic space has contributed to a growing distrust toward transitional authorities, leaving Doumbouya and the CNRD increasingly isolated.
However, the high demand and lucrative prices for Guinea’s plentiful mineral commodities — such as bauxite, diamonds, iron and gold — have provided a cashflow for the military authorities to purchase arms, ammunition and equipment to further intimidate and suppress demonstrations, while increasingly fueling corruption. So, with mining operations continuing as they were before, the CNRD is able to stymie or delay democratic reforms and ignore calls for elections.
Despite the CNRD’s opposition to any form of protest, civil society organizations (CSOs) continue to advocate for a peaceful, inclusive and democratic transition and a return to a constitutional order.
Given the threats to Guinea's transition, it is important to strengthen civil society as a partner for stability and democracy, particularly at the community level. Investing in civil society helps to build the credibility and legitimacy of actors who hold out real hope for social transformation in an environment increasingly rife with extremism.
To this end, the mobilization of young people and women in civil society, especially in a country strongly marked by patriarchy and gerontocracy, remains the best guarantee of reducing the marginalization of vulnerable groups and fostering the emergence of new leadership capable of helping Guinea re-commit to its democratic transition.
Several groups in Guinea are working to empower CSOs in consolidating the rule of law, peace and social cohesion over the long term.
Guinean CSOs are working toward improving democratic governance and citizen mobilization by conducting capacity-building workshops, consultations and advocacy roundtables with key civil society actors to help them effectively participate in advocacy and manage community conflicts in connection with the transition. They are also conducting consultations between civil society actors and local and regional authorities to help identify citizen priorities.
Additionally, CSOs provide training workshops to equip youth leaders with the necessary tools to promote peace, democratic governance and positive change within their communities and Guinea as a whole. They are creating networks of youth community leaders by organizing sessions for continued engagement and collaboration among participants, and provide community micro-grants to youth leaders aimed at solving specific problems in their communities by focusing on promoting democracy, governance, transparency, accountability and inclusion.
Despite active measures taken by Guinean CSOs to shape a democratic and peaceful political outcome, there appears to be international silence regarding Guinea and its transition and an overly cautious approach by the regional Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
It’s true that Guinea doesn’t face the same insecurity, violence and extremism that plague other countries in the Sahel and West Africa. But that’s exactly what makes Guinea’s transition so important: In a region facing crisis, Guinea’s relative stability and commodities shouldn’t be taken for granted and its transition shouldn’t be swept under the rug.
Guinea’s currency, access to the sea and revenue from mining corporations provide it with assets and advantages the AES countries do not possess. And as AES countries seek to cut ties with ECOWAS, Guinean representatives continue to participate in the ECOWAS parliament and its officials maintain cordial relations with ECOWAS.
With these relative advantages, many hope that Guinea can serve as a model for peaceful transitions and potentially persuade states to remain in ECOWAS and avoid long-term resource exploitation at the hands of Russia and China in exchange for modest short-term gains.
Many hope that Guinea can serve as a model for peaceful transitions and potentially persuade states to remain in ECOWAS.
Guineans, for the most part, see the United States as a trustworthy partner. This is where the United States has a unique opportunity to support Guinea’s transition economically and diplomatically. Therefore, the U.S. government and international partners should support Guineans in their democratic transition, hold authorities accountable to the previously negotiated transitional milestones, and continue to denounce political or any form of violence perpetrated against Guinean citizens.
Due to the closing of political and civic space, intimidation from military authorities, and politically motivated criminal charges, political opposition leaders have fled the country. Yet, they continue to advocate for a return of democracy, respect for human rights and a free media. The United States can work with Guinean authorities to permit such leaders, including former Prime Minister Cellou Dalein Diallo, to return safely to Guinea and shape a peaceful, inclusive transition.
The United States should continue high-level engagement with transitional authorities to advise on risks related to inter-ethnic conflict and the dangers tied to investments in critical minerals from authoritarian governments.
But the United States should also explore a complementary approach — one that spurs inclusive economic growth and development and identifies concrete steps for genuine democratic reforms. Practical steps taken toward democratization could be rewarded in the form of technical and economic assistance from the United States, such as building the capacity of the mining sector and its workforce by providing machinery and equipment in exchange for strengthened labor and environmental practices.
The United States can also support trainings and workshops in neglected communities that explore fiscal responsibility and transparency, conflict prevention, inter-ethnic harmony, and advocacy to foster peace. This could be further coupled with educational exchanges and study abroad opportunities for Guinean youth and greater military and security cooperation between the United States and Guinea, given its strategic location in West Africa.
The United States can also bolster social cohesion through ad-hoc technical support to government ministries, institutions and CSOs engaged in reconciliation activities. This could allow for increased trust and understanding between authorities and communities and promote civic debate on democracy and a peaceful transition.
Amid great power competition, U.S. disengagement would leave Guinea to escalate its relationship with China and Russia — and possibly join AES. Therefore, it is important that the United States remains proactive and engaged in Guinea and outlines a clear strategic vision in support of a return to constitutional governance by disincentivizing Guinean authorities from prolonging their grasp on power and working with them and civil society to achieve transitional milestones.