KEY TAKEAWAYS
KEY TAKEAWAYS
President Joe Biden’s top national security aide, Jake Sullivan, met with Chinese leader Xi Jinping last week, along with other top Chinese officials, as Washington and Beijing look to address bilateral tensions. Relations hit one of their lowest points in years in August 2022 after then U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan and China responded by cutting off bilateral communications on areas ranging from military matters to climate cooperation. But both sides have attempted to pull back from the brink with a series of high-level meetings in the last two years, including between Biden and Xi in November 2023.
While the visit demonstrated that both sides are ostensibly interested in responsibly managing their competition, the relationship remains strained over differences regarding China’s aggressive actions in the South China Sea, the war in Ukraine, technology and trade policy, and Taiwan, among other disputes. Indeed, any conjecture that the U.S. national security advisor’s visit was going to result in rosier relations was belied by provocative Chinese moves against Japan and the Philippines — two of the Washington’s closest Indo-Pacific allies — that bookended Sullivan’s trip on August 27 and 31, respectively.
USIP’s Carla Freeman and Dean Cheng look at why Sullivan and Wang met, the areas of disagreement and potential cooperation on the agenda and what comes next for U.S.-China relations.
Freeman: Sullivan’s visit was his first to China as national security advisor and the first by an American official in that position since the Obama administration’s Susan Rice traveled there in 2016. This reciprocated the visit of State Councilor Wang Yi — who serves as minister of foreign affairs and, more importantly, the director of the Chinese Communist Party’s Foreign Affairs Commission — to Washington last year. Wang and Sullivan have met several times through back channels in third countries but public meetings between senior U.S. and Chinese officials on critical security matters have been rare amid strains over Pelosi’s 2022 Taiwan visit and the Chinese spy balloon incident in early 2023. Senior military communications between the two sides were effectively frozen for 16 months until defense talks resumed in January 2024.
One important item on the agenda for Sullivan's visit was laying groundwork for a Biden-Xi phone call in the coming weeks. Along with meeting Xi, Sullivan held discussions with Wang and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission General Zhang Youxia. Rice also met Xi during her 2016 visit and held talks with Wang's predecessor, as well as a Central Military Commission vice chairman. Rice’s 2016 visit also took place in the summer before a U.S. presidential election when the incumbent was not on the ballot, and she carried a message of reassurance about the U.S. commitment to developing relations with China. Sullivan communicated a similar message of U.S. commitment, but one reflecting the relationship’s current strains. He relayed Washington’s desire for sustained communications between the two countries, both high-level and between the two countries’ diplomats and military brass. He reportedly also stated Democratic nominee Kamala Harris’s commitment to “responsibly manage” the U.S.-China relationship.
Cheng: The Biden-Harris administration dispatched Sullivan to meet with the Chinese in part in order to pave the way for what is likely to be the last senior-level conversation between Biden and Xi, as well as to discuss the various ongoing issues confronting the two states. It follows visits by Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo, highlighting the various aspects in which U.S. and Chinese policies are at odds.
Sullivan's meeting with General Zhang Youxia, one of the two vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), was an extremely rare case of outsiders being able to meet with either of the vice chairmen, who are the most senior PLA officers.
There was no indication of substantive progress on any of the key economic and security issues that divide the two nations.
The two sides noted that there had been an exchange of views, and spoke in broad generalities, indicating “progress and next steps on implementation of ... commitments, including counternarcotics, military-to-military communications, and AI safety and risk." Details were lacking, however, and there was no indication of substantive progress on any of the key economic and security issues that divide the two nations, including trade, Taiwan, South China Sea issues, or Chinese and American stances on Ukraine.
The two apparently did decide to initiate contact between their respective theater commanders. For the U.S., this will be INDOPACOM commander Samuel Paparo. His counterpart, notably, was not specified. (Most likely it would be the Eastern Theater Commander Lin Xiangyang).
The meeting also apparently helped further arrangements for a Biden-Xi conversation. But, given the changes in the political landscape since their last call, in April, it is unclear what the goal would be for such a conversation.
Freeman: Sullivan conveyed a wide range of U.S. concerns about China’s economic and political behavior, as well as regional and international security policies. On the economic front, Sullivan brought the message that the United States remains resolved to prevent China’s use of advanced American technologies in ways that undermine U.S. national security and that Washington remains dissatisfied with China's trade and non-market economic practices. Notably, a key bilateral science and technology agreement that was among the earliest signed between the two countries back in 1979 was allowed to expire in August, although officials continue to work on negotiations on a new such treaty.
Sullivan brought the message that the United States remains resolved to prevent China’s use of advanced American technologies in ways that undermine U.S. national security.
On the political front, Sullivan underscored the U.S. commitment to universal human rights and fundamental freedoms, also raising the issue of American citizens who have been wrongfully detained or are subjected to exit bans in China. Sullivan also addressed numerous areas of disagreement over China’s security behavior, not least Chinese support for Russia’s defense industrial base and its effects on U.S. allies. In addition, Sullivan also pointed to China's destabilizing operations targeting the Philippines and restated the U.S. commitment to defending its Indo-Pacific allies.
Cheng: According to the Chinese readout, Wang stressed that “a country’s security should not be built on the insecurity of others.” He reportedly also emphasized that the U.S. should stop suppressing China in the areas of economy and technology, specifically criticizing the American charges of Chinese “overcapacity.” Wang’s comments almost certainly refer to not only general economic criticisms, but ongoing American efforts to limit China’s ability to build more advanced microchips and to discourage foreign nations from using Huawei equipment in their telecommunications networks.
Importantly, despite the discussion of improving communications, the Chinese engaged in brinksmanship with the Philippines, a long-time American ally, ramming a Philippine Coast Guard vessel soon after the conclusion of the meetings. It is also not clear whether Sullivan reinforced INDOPACOM commander Samuel Paparo’s offer to escort Philippine vessels to the Chinese.
Freeman: Among the long list of concerns, Sullivan also addressed areas of common interest during his talks in China. Discussions included the areas that Biden and Xi had committed to in their November 2023 meeting on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in San Francisco. In addition to military-to-military communication, these included counternarcotics and law enforcement cooperation, repatriation of undocumented migrants, and a dialogue on AI risks.
Also mentioned in the White House readout on Sullivan’s visit were Myanmar, the Middle East and North Korea — all potential areas of common concern, although it is unclear how the two countries could work together on these issues. The climate crisis was also on the agenda, with plans for Biden’s climate envoy, John Podesta, to visit China soon.
Freeman: Beijing set low expectations for Sullivan's visit, with the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs posting a commentary on its website ahead of the trip with sharp criticism of U.S. policy toward China and characterizing the U.S.-China relationship as at a “critical juncture.” However, the messages from both governments following the meeting struck a conciliatory tone captured in the phrase used by both sides to describe the meetings: “in-depth, candid, substantive and constructive.” Each side restated its positions on areas of disagreement and topics on which working-level consultations were possible, a formula that provides solid ground for a Biden-Xi call.
It is unclear what outcomes might be expected from the call, which is likely to restate a mutual commitment to the agenda set last November at APEC for undertaking some areas of joint activity, including counternarcotics cooperation, ongoing military-to-military communication, talks on AI-related risks, efforts on climate change and people-to-people exchanges. There is a possibility that progress on renegotiating the science and technology agreement could be announced. Biden will almost certainly use the call to underscore to Beijing that the Biden administration will sustain its current China policies during the U.S. election season, which include its commitments to allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific.