KEY TAKEAWAYS
KEY TAKEAWAYS
Two weeks ago, Israel announced that halting Hezbollah attacks had become an official goal of its post-October 7 war effort. Since then, Israel conducted a sophisticated clandestine attack on Hezbollah’s communications infrastructure and struck numerous Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon and the suburbs of Beirut, killing many of Hezbollah’s senior leaders. Then, on Friday, an Israeli airstrike assassinated Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, who led the group for over 30 years.
Nasrallah’s tenure at Hezbollah’s helm saw the group evolve into the crown jewel of Iran’s proxy forces and a lynchpin of its regional strategy. Under Nasrallah, Hezbollah fought a war with Israel in 2006, trained and armed Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” forces throughout the Middle East and helped prop up Syria’s Assad regime with brutal tactics. In Lebanon, Hezbollah became the country’s most dominant political and military force — one that many Lebanese saw as exacerbating the beleaguered nation’s manifold challenges.
After Hamas’ October 7 terrorist attack, Hezbollah exchanged fire with at Israel on a nearly daily basis, resulting in tens of thousands of Israelis and Lebanese displaced, and vowed to continue its offensive until a Gaza cease-fire was secured. His killing and Israel’s decision two days later to invade southern Lebanon mark another chapter of escalation in the post-October 7 Middle East.
What comes next? USIP’s Osama Gharizi, Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen, Garrett Nada and Mona Yacoubian discuss what Nasrallah’s death means for Lebanon, the Israel-Hezbollah war, Iran’s regional strategy and the prospects for a wider-regional war.
Gharizi: Israel’s killing of Nasrallah, coupled with a relentless attack on Hezbollah’s leadership and its administrative and military capabilities, carries with it several implications for the domestic situation in Lebanon. What does a severely weakened Hezbollah without its powerful and charismatic leader mean for the majority of the Shia community who have come to rely on the party for socio-economic needs? In a country where political representation is tied to sectarian identity and where patronage politics and services supersede those of the state, the collapse of Hezbollah’s administrative capacity threatens to plunge thousands of families into further financial hardship, worsening an already dire economic situation in the country.
Nasrallah’s death leaves a power vacuum both within the party itself and on the Lebanese political landscape, a reality that could enflame sectarian tensions. Even prior to the start of Hezbollah’s support for Hamas on October 8, 2023, tensions with Lebanon’s other communities — Christians, Sunnis and Druze — were rising due to a series of recent incidents where Hezbollah imposed its interests over others though violence and political overreach. This in turn has led to enmity and frustration with Hezbollah, adding to an existing sentiment among many that the party operates without regard to the broader interests of the state. These feelings have been further exacerbated by the party’s obstinacy on the matter of the election of the president: Hezbollah has been adamant that its preferred candidate be elected, leading to deadlock and a presidential void of nearly two years.
With Nasrallah’s death and the weakening of Hezbollah, there is concern that its political opponents will seek to pounce on the party’s weakened state and, in so doing, ratchet up sectarian tensions at a time when the country’s Shia community is taking the brunt of Israel’s onslaught: over 1,600 people have been killed and over 1 million have been displaced since the start of Israel’s attacks on Lebanon. Thus far, however, such attempts have not occurred, even if Hezbollah’s political opponents and critics have seized the moment to question the party's strategy and the cost it has inflicted on Lebanon.
Beyond its socio-economic impact and the implications for communal relations, the killing of Nasrallah and Hezbollah’s diminishing organizational and political capacity could provide an opening to resolve the presidential issue that has paralyzed the country’s governance for nearly two years. In this context, how the party’s allies, especially the speaker of parliament, react will be critical.
In short, with a devitalized Hezbollah, space may be afforded to its allies to maneuver in a way that allows a consensus candidate to emerge. However, this remains a moot point as Lebanon’s caretaker government has already announced that a parliamentary session to elect a president will only be convened once Israel halts its attack on the country.
Kurtzer-Ellenbogen: It is clear that Israel’s recent military operations against Hezbollah have dealt a meaningful blow to Hezbollah’s senior command structure and to its stockpile capacity. But beyond the tangible impacts, the symbolic and psychological power of the killing of Nasrallah cannot be underestimated. Israel has succeeded in demonstrating both Hezbollah’s vulnerabilities (and, by extension, Iran’s) and the strength and extent of its own intelligence and operational capabilities. For Israel, this latter outcome is an important pillar of its security goals. In the wake of Israel’s intelligence failures last October 7, Israel has sought to demonstrate to Iran and its proxies that it remains a military and intelligence force to be reckoned with, and one with the capacity to address multi-front security challenges at once.
For Israeli leadership, this has been a matter restoring deterrence and seeking to give its citizenry assurances that the failures that wreaked such devastation on its southern border communities on October 7 would not be repeated in the north at the hands of Hezbollah — an enemy long considered a far more lethal and capable force than Hamas. Since Hezbollah began its steady barrage of rockets into Israel beginning October 8, invoking solidarity with the Palestinian people in the wake of Hamas’ attack, 60,000 Israelis have remained displaced from their homes and public pressure to address this ongoing threat and insecurity has been mounting on the country’s leadership.
If in December 2023 Netanyahu was pledging to ensure “strong deterrence in the north” and “total victory in the south,” the scope and scale of the still unfolding operation against Hezbollah indicates that the goal in the north is now more expansive. While the leadership has long spoken of the unacceptability of Hezbollah’s Radwan forces on its border, and efforts have been made by the United States to address this situation through diplomacy, two weeks ago, the Israeli cabinet articulated that putting a stop to Hezbollah’s attacks was an official goal of the ongoing broader war.
Now, as the IDF has launched a ground invasion into Lebanon, with a stated aim of further damaging Hezbollah infrastructure, the question becomes whether benchmarks for success and a concomitant clear exit strategy exist. Israel has a long history of mutually bruising and non-decisive wars with Hezbollah. While it has likewise severely degraded Hamas capability over the past year, it remains mired in Gaza almost a year since it launched its ground invasion to achieve total victory over its still at-large leader, Yahya Sinwar.
A related question is whether the damage inflicted on Hezbollah, and Iran’s related leverage on Israel, can be parlayed into a path toward longer-term peace and stability. Israel has a need to restore security to its citizens along its borders, but still appears to struggle with a strategy for ensuring a post-Hamas Gaza that ensures a secure future for Gazans and for Israelis alike. A key challenge to date has been the absence of a longer-term political vision, centering a pathway toward a two-state political horizon, that regional and other international actors insist be on the table in order for them to constructively partner on stabilization efforts once a cease-fire is achieved. With its recent actions, Israel appears to be pushing back on Hezbollah’s efforts to connect its current round of struggle with Israel to a cease-fire with Gaza, separating the fronts to pursue decisive victory in the north.
The extent to which Israel’s recent gains vis-à-vis Hezbollah amount to a strategic win on the path to longer term multi-front security versus a shorter term tactical and deterrent victory that reduces the extent of threat to its northern border remains to be seen. This may rest heavily on this question of whether progress on the battlefield can be parlayed into political and diplomatic openings.
Nada: Nasrallah’s death was the latest in a series of significant Israeli blows to Hezbollah, Iran’s closest ally in the Middle East and the most heavily armed non-state actor in the world. Israel’s ability to cripple Hezbollah in a matter of weeks called Iran’s longstanding “forward defense” doctrine into question. For decades, the Islamic Republic has relied on its militia allies across the region to pressure Israel and deter strikes on Iranian soil. Hezbollah — sitting on Israel’s northern border with an arsenal of rockets, missiles and drones — was the centerpiece of this strategy.
Arab Hezbollah was also a useful partner in extending Persian-majority Iran’s influence in Arab societies. Hezbollah operatives played a key role in training other Arab militants across the region. But in the year since the Gaza war erupted, Israel has killed dozens of Hezbollah commanders and hundreds of fighters and destroyed weapons and key infrastructure.
In the short term, Iran may lean more heavily on the Houthis in Yemen, which could raise the risk for further escalation. The Houthis, a Zaydi Shia movement that emerged in the 1990s, have been the most belligerent of militias in the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance.” Since October 7, the Houthis — in solidarity with the Palestinians — launched more than 220 ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and drones at Israel and have attacked U.S. warships in the Red Sea that were protecting commercial vessels.
In the medium- to long-term, Iran may consider alternatives to its “ring of fire” strategy to counter Israel, especially if Hezbollah and Hamas have a difficult time reconstituting. One option would be to produce nuclear weapons. As of mid-2024, Iran could produce enough highly enriched uranium to fuel one nuclear bomb in as little as one or two weeks. Tehran would need several months or more than a year to assemble a warhead and marry it to a delivery system, such as a ballistic missile.
In the meantime, Iran does not appear to have a viable mechanism to deter Israel.
Yacoubian: Escalating tensions between Israel and Lebanon over the past two weeks coupled with the looming prospect of a limited Israeli incursion into south Lebanon, which Israel launched on September 30, have heightened the possibility of a region-wide war. This most recent episode of violence dates to Israel’s presumed intelligence operation targeting Hezbollah pagers and walkie-talkies on September 17 and 18. Those attacks were followed by the most intense Israeli strikes since October 8 on Hezbollah targets in the southern suburbs of Beirut, south Lebanon and the Bekaa valley. Intensive strikes have continued following Nasrallah’s assassination on September 27. The civilian death toll in Lebanon reached more than 1,000 by September 30, and several hundred thousand have been displaced. On September 30, Israeli sources previewed and then began ground operation into south Lebanon, with limited commando operations already taking place.
The latest escalation comes against a backdrop of mounting fears across the region that the violence could spiral into a larger conflict. Three key factors to watch for in the coming days and weeks will center on the depth and breadth of an Israeli incursion, Hezbollah’s response capabilities, and Iran’s retaliation strategy.
To date, Hezbollah’s response has been limited, firing rocket barrages primarily targeting northern Israel, with no civilian casualties reported. The militant group is clearly on its back foot with much of its senior leadership cadre wiped out, its communications networks compromised and many of its weapons depots destroyed. However, it would be premature to write Hezbollah off. The group maintains significant drone and missile capabilities and an estimated 40,000-50,000 fighters. Should Israel undertake a more significant operation into Lebanon, Hezbollah will likely seize the opportunity to strike hard at Israeli forces on the ground.
At the same time, Iran may feel greater pressure to respond against Israel. Tehran has adopted a more restrained posture, mindful of the dangers it could face in a larger, direct confrontation with Israel. Meanwhile, Iran’s proxies in the region have already undertaken additional strikes against Israel, with the Islamic Resistance in Iraq claiming responsibility for a drone strike on Eilat on September 25 and the Houthis claiming strikes on Tel Aviv on September 28. Israel responded by striking the Yemeni port of Al-Hodeidah for the second time this year.