Facing a growing threat from China, Taiwan has taken several steps in recent years to strengthen its defense and deterrence capabilities. Predictably, much of this has involved traditional military initiatives, such as increased defense spending, investments in asymmetric capabilities and the extension of compulsory military service for men from four to 12 months. Elected this January, President William Lai Ching-te is continuing that work, but also stressing the role that civil society can play in preventing a war. By enhancing civil-military integration, improving preparedness across society and building overall resilience, Taiwan aims to erode Beijing's confidence in its ability to swiftly and easily seize control of the island. But to successfully deter an attack and preserve the cross-Strait status quo, leaders in Taipei must demonstrate resolve while avoiding unnecessary provocation.
From All-Out Defense to Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience
Whole-of-society defense and resilience relies on civilians who are willing and able to help resist foreign occupation or attack. It requires the collective efforts of the diplomatic corps, military, security services, private sector, civil society and broader population to send a clear message to potential military aggressors that they will not go down without a fight. Countries such as Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden and Ukraine have all adopted similar whole-of-society approaches to help deter and resist potential Russian aggression.
China's increased use of gray-zone tactics, particularly disinformation campaigns and cognitive warfare that target the civilian population, clearly illustrate that national defense is no longer limited to frontline troops. Taiwan has already taken meaningful steps to make its society more resilient against online disinformation and misinformation, but the challenges China poses require something more comprehensive.
While conventional security frameworks rely on advanced weaponry or large standing armies, whole-of-society defense resilience encompasses the entire fabric of a nation. Traditionally, whole-of-society defense is aimed at mobilizing the civilian population to actively take part in defending a country against hard security threats. On the other hand, whole-of-society resilience emphasizes building capacity to handle a broader range of threats, like natural disasters or public health crises, and ensure a society is poised to recover. Taiwan is adopting a new approach that amalgamates these concepts and threads security through all facets of life rather than leaving it to military and law enforcement — every citizen bears a personal responsibility to protect and serve the country in times of crisis.
Taiwan’s investment in the all-out national defense began to take shape in 2021 when then-President Tsai Ing-wen announced reforms for Taiwan’s reserve forces. In 2022, she launched the All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency (ADMA) to streamline reserve mobilization, strengthen coordination between regular and reserve forces, and enhance cross-agency collaboration. During Tsai’s tenure, Taiwan began to devise plans to utilize all available personnel and material resources — both military and civilian — to resist a foreign invasion. Prior to 2021, civilian involvement in national defense was limited and Taiwan’s defense strategy primarily focused on conventional military preparedness.
Lai’s administration has also adopted a comprehensive defense strategy that includes preparing for military threats while also addressing non-traditional security challenges like natural disasters.
Since taking office in May 2024, Lai has built on Tsai’s foundation and broadened its focus by enhancing preparedness across critical areas such as infrastructure, energy, communications and social services. His administration has also adopted a more comprehensive defense strategy that includes preparing for military threats while also addressing non-traditional security challenges like natural disasters. To implement this vision, Taiwan must integrate its public and private sectors and improve civil-military cooperation to ensure a cohesive, prepared and informed response to potential crises.
Responsibility for that work lies with a new Whole of Society Defense Resilience Committee Lai established in June. Committee members include representatives from industry, government agencies, academia and research institutions, and they are focused on five primary areas: training and engaging civilians; managing materials and distributing supplies; maintaining energy and critical infrastructure; preparing to meet social welfare, medical and shelter needs; and reinforcing information and communications technology, transportation and the financial system.
Presiding over the committee’s first meeting on September 26, Lai emphasized the importance of a resilient Taiwan and noted that, “As our society becomes better prepared, our nation grows more secure; and as Taiwan shows more determination to defend itself, the international community will feel more at ease.” Using similar language in his National Day speech on October 10, Lai reiterated his intent to “strengthen resilience throughout Taiwan in national defense, economic livelihoods, disaster prevention, and democracy,” noting that these efforts would result in “greater peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.”
Balancing Civil-Military Coordination and Public Perception
Integrating the civilian and military components of the government, as well as civil society, is a daunting but urgent task. The bureaucratic positioning of the new committee seeks to break down some of those barriers. The committee is led by the National Security Council, the civilian organization responsible for policy planning and guidance, yet the committee’s secretariat lies in the ADMA, which sits within the Ministry of National Defense. To ensure these agencies coordinate as intended, future meetings will be chaired by the president or premier.
The committee’s first task will be to establish the civil-military coordination processes that will ultimately be tested in three key exercises over the next year: a tabletop exercise in December; an unscripted local drill in March; and a preparatory exercise linked to the Han Kuang military exercise, an annual military combat readiness drill, in June. Ambitiously, the committee also aims to mobilize 400,000 people — including active and former military personnel, volunteers from police stations, fire services and private disaster relief organizations.
If Lai’s government pushes too hard, it could incite panic in the population and spark political criticism that his party is unnecessarily provoking Beijing.
For Taiwan’s whole-of-society defense resilience to be effective, it will need the Taiwanese public to understand, support and willingly participate in the initiative. Yet the government has struggled to get broad buy-in and is searching for ways to raise awareness of both the scope of the need and the urgency of the threat. At the same time, if Lai’s government pushes too hard, it could incite panic in the population and spark political criticism that his party is unnecessarily provoking Beijing. To thread this needle, ultimately, Lai and his administration must strike a careful balance between demonstrating to China that external threats will be met with a formidable response, while also preserving democratic governance, a free-market economy and a peaceful and normal life.
Implications for Peace in the Taiwan Strait
The United States has expressed strong support for Taiwan's efforts to enhance its whole-of-society defense resilience. The director of the American Institute in Taiwan, the de facto U.S. embassy in Taiwan, Raymond Greene, recently praised Lai for forming the committee, calling it “a major step toward enhancing Taiwan's coordination across government, the private sector, and civil society to bolster Taiwan's resilience.”
However, the initiative has sparked concerns among some observers, particularly those in Taiwan’s opposition parties, who argue that it further feeds China’s narrative that Lai is bellicose and preparing for war. For its part, Beijing has not formally commented on the committee or its first meeting, likely because Taipei's official press release and related media coverage have downplayed threats from China in relation to the formation of the whole-of-society initiative. Nevertheless, on the day of the first committee convening, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense detected 43 Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aircraft operating around the island and 11 crossing the Taiwan Strait median line, a marked surge from two aircraft operating around the island the previous day. The same day, Taiwan also reported large-scale Chinese military activities nearby, with 29 PLA aircraft engaged in a “joint combat readiness patrol” with Chinese warships.
While Lai is actively advancing initiatives to strengthen Taiwan’s whole-of-society defense resilience, the deterrent effect could be undermined or offset by his more assertive public rhetoric toward China. In September alone, Lai accused Beijing of seeking to invade Taiwan in order to achieve global hegemony, declared Taiwan would never sign a cross-Strait peace agreement and claimed that the threat of communist China annexing Taiwan is stronger than ever. In his National Day speech on October 10, Lai again drew Beijing’s ire by claiming that China “has no right to represent Taiwan” and vowing to “resist annexation or encroachment upon [Taiwan’s] sovereignty.”
On one hand, Lai firmly believes that strengthening Taiwan’s resilience and defense will raise the costs of any potential aggression from Beijing, and this conviction lies at the heart of his cross-Strait policy. On the other hand, Lai’s provocative statements could prompt more aggressive responses from China. Given his commitment to both stronger defense preparation and assertive rhetoric, Lai will need to tread carefully to avoid unnecessary escalation in the months ahead.
PHOTO: Military vehicles in a parade in Taipei, Taiwan, on Oct. 10, 2021. (Lam Yik Fei/The New York Times)
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s).