Dear staff members, thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak to several key issues: (1) Russia’s systematic and hybrid interference in Moldova’s presidential elections (October 20 and November 3, 2024) and constitutional referendum (October 20, 2024); (2) the impact of such malign influence (including disinformation campaigns) on the election outcomes; (3) how hybrid warfare fits into Russian foreign policy more generally; and (4) why we should care and how the United States and its allies should respond.

Introduction

Recent voting results keep Moldova on a pro-Western path. But the country’s democracy is fragile. The Moldovan people are divided in their views. Moldova still struggles with ethnic and regional tensions. And most of all, Russia is exploiting these weaknesses. Russian actions are not an anomaly but part of a pattern — a sustained campaign over time in Moldova, and across the post-Soviet space, to maximize its own influence and crush the influence of the West and the voices of its neighbors. The U.S. has a profound interest in strengthening democracy worldwide — and there are good concrete ways we can help.

The pro-Western president of Moldova, Maia Sandu, won re-election on November 3 in a runoff in the former Soviet republic against a rival candidate she had denounced as “Moscow’s man,” Alexandr Stoianoglo. President

Sandu also pushed for holding a referendum on October 20 on whether to enshrine the “irreversibility” of Moldova’s “European course” in the constitution. The referendum passed, but by a tiny margin. Observers noted widespread voting irregularities.

Indeed, Moldova’s election season was marred by massive Russian interference in both campaigns. This meddling included cyberattacks, planned espionage at diaspora polling stations, and the outright buying of votes. Stoianoglo, who is under investigation for corruption, ran a campaign funded by fugitive pro-Russian oligarch Ilan Shor and, ultimately, by the Kremlin. The Russian disruption efforts appeared to have some effect even if they were not decisive: the referendum passed by a much smaller margin than polls had predicted only a few days before, apparently because of Moscow’s success in illegally wooing undecided voters. In both the referendum and presidential contests, the votes of the Moldovan diaspora determined the outcome. Without their boost, the country would have rejected a Western path.

Russia’s Hybrid War

Russia is at war with Moldova. For the moment, at least, Moscow’s weapons of choice are not drones, artillery and armored vehicles but disinformation, economic manipulation and cyber-attacks. Russia is using these tools to try to dominate the security and foreign policies of Moldova by exploiting its vulnerabilities. Moscow’s hybrid war capabilities are enhanced because pro-Russian leaders in Moldova benefit politically from the implicit threat of Russian direct military aggression even though it is at present a distant prospect.

What are the Kremlin’s goals? It is seeking to rebuild the Russian empire piece by piece, undermine the Western community of democracies and those who wish to join it, and, above all, push back on U.S. influence. Russia is tactically adept at pursuing these goals because it finds strategic benefits in creating chaos and undermining trust among its adversaries.

Russia’s methods in Moldova have varied by local circumstances and opportunity and are not new. At the end of 2022, Russia used its near monopoly on natural gas to raise prices, precipitating an economic crisis. It then turned to more direct measures: financing pro-Russian political parties and public protests, saturating the local media environment with propaganda, and, according to some reports, scheming to replace the Sandu government.

Moldova’s Weaknesses

Despite Sandu’s re-election and the passage of the referendum, Moldova possesses key vulnerabilities that are ripe for Russian exploitation. The voting results showed that disapproval of Sandu’s pro-Western policies remains especially strong in the countryside and among older generations. About half the population supports closer relations with Russia. Moreover, Moldovan society is increasingly polarized. Poverty is widespread, institutions are weak, and corruption is rampant.

In recent months, the autonomous region of Gagauzia, populated by a Turkic speaking ethnic group and where there are long-standing tensions with the central government, has become a focus of Russian attention. There Moscow’s narratives have deep resonance. The region’s leader, Yevgenia Gutsul, has close ties to Moscow and to pro-Russian oligarch Shor. (Shor has been tried in absentia for large-scale fraud and money laundering and was sanctioned in 2022 by the United States for his role in fomenting political unrest.)

Meanwhile, Russia’s control over the separatist region of Transnistria remains a source of potential instability. It comprises the strategically important strip of land between the Dniester River and hosts about 1,500 Russian troops and local militia. In recent months relations with Chisinau have become less tense. The local economy in the region has improved since Ukraine closed the border, a decision that has made Transnistria more dependent on trade with the European Union and less interested in severing ties with the central government. Moldova has strengthened its resiliency in other areas as well. For example, since December 2022, Moldova has become less dependent on natural gas imports from Russia.

Challenges Ahead

Sandu’s victories are essential steps forward for Moldova. But in the coming months Moscow is likely to step up its interference in the forthcoming parliamentary elections, which must be held before July 2025. Should Sandu’s Party of Action and Stability (PAS) be forced into a coalition, it may have to work with parties that are outright friendly toward Moscow. (The PAS majority in parliament has been key to preparing the legislative ground for eventual EU accession.) Indeed the three campaigns this autumn might be seen as a trial run for further Russian disruption of the electoral process in 2025. Meanwhile, the energy sector remains an area of possible Russian leverage. What happens after the current gas transit agreement through Ukraine in December 2024 remains uncertain.

Over the longer term, Moldova’s political and economic problems and the war in Ukraine may slow the country’s current Westward course. As we see in Georgia, countries around the Russian periphery can drift backward as well as move forward. In any case, Russia is likely to continue keeping up the pressure and by seeking to erode Moldova’s fragile if growing resilience. Things seem to be going in the right direction for the moment in Moldova but stepped-up support by the country’s democratic partners is vital.

Policy Options

For the U.S. and the EU:

1. The intensification of support for reforms needed to bring its institutions up to EU standards, including judicial and anticorruption reforms.
2. Increased support for Moldova’s energy independence from Russia.
3. A more focused push for to help Chisinau resolve the Gagauz and Transnistria issues.
4. Greater support for Moldovans in identifying and combating Russian disinformation.

Thank you for inviting me to testify and I look forward to your questions.