On the evening of Jan. 22, President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi and his entire cabinet resigned. The collapse of the government followed the kidnapping of the president’s chief of staff, and the takeover earlier in the week of the Presidential Palace by an armed political resistance group known as the Houthis. The mass resignation came as a surprise, because a ceasefire and an agreement had been brokered only the day before.

Gaston is a German Chancellor Fellow at the Global Public Policy institute in Berlin. Until August 2014, she led USIP's rule-of-law research and programming on Yemen.

Why might this week’s events lead to the breakup of the state?

The Houthis initially did not accept Hadi’s resignation, likely knowing full well that they do not command enough influence and support against Yemen’s many factions and divided regions to maintain control. Complicating any attempt to govern going forward is a looming economic crisis. Yemen is the poorest country in the Middle East, and neighboring Saudi Arabia had been its main financial backer until it cut off funding in December due to the unrest. Given the Saudis’ distrust of the Houthis, they are unlikely to restore those critical funds to a Houthi-led government. Many fear the drop in financial support, combined with the political instability, will spark a mass economic and humanitarian crisis, unparalleled even by Yemen’s standards.  

One of the biggest immediate threats is the secession of the South, which was its own independent state prior to 1990. Southern Yemenis, led by the Southern Movement, “Hiraak”, have been increasing calls for secession since the Arab Spring crisis in 2011 upended Yemen’s political scene. The domination of north Yemen by the Houthis, whom the Southerners do not trust and have rejected despite frequent overtures, may be the tipping point leading to Southern secession.

What about the al-Qaida presence?

The Houthis are sworn enemies of Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and have clashed with them repeatedly in the tribal areas in recent months. Complete government collapse and the distraction of political crises may leave vast stretches of Yemeni territory open for the taking. During a similar security vacuum after the Arab Spring crisis, al-Qaida vastly expanded its territory, taking control of the eastern governorate of Abyan and declaring its own Islamic state.

How did this crisis emerge?

Growing frustration with Hadi’s government, which took office in a negotiated resolution to the 2011 uprising, came to a head when the administration cut fuel subsidies in summer 2014. The Houthis took advantage of widespread anger and resentment and mobilized a month of mass protests that shut down the capital and other areas. In September 2014, the Houthis seized control of the capital Sanaa militarily and its fighters took over many basic government functions, established patrols and checkpoints in the streets, guarded key ministerial buildings, the airport, and even some of the prison facilities in Yemen.

In October and November, the Houthis expanded control farther south of Sanaa to the governorate of Ibb, and seized the second-largest port in Yemen in Hodeida.

Who are the Houthis?

The Houthis are a Zaydi Shia ideological group that developed into an armed political opposition in response to perceived political persecution and marginalization under former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Unlike in neighboring countries, Sunni-Shia tensions have historically been low in Yemen, and Zaydis largely co-existed peacefully in the majority Sunni country.

As Salafism spread in Yemen (with Saudi backing) in the 1990s, Houthis began to organize against Saleh, harshly criticizing him for being anti-Zaydi and for being a puppet of the Saudis and Americans. In September 2004, Saleh’s government killed the Houthi leader, Hussein al Houthi, kicking off six rounds of fighting between the Houthis and the Yemeni military between 2004 and 2010.

The Houthis insist that they simply want a voice in the political process and greater autonomy in their own area. But critics accuse them of being pawns of Iran, bringing the regional Sunni-Shia conflict to Yemen.  The Houthi slogan, "Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse on the Jews,” is strikingly similar to Iran’s, although the Houthis deny direct support. Other critics point to their aggressive territorial advances, and argue that the Houthis are trying to re-take control of Yemen for themselves.  The Zaydis ruled north Yemen for nearly 1,000 years until their ouster in a 1962 Republican coup.

How could the Houthis overtake the capital?

The takeover of Sanaa would not have been possible without the support of some of the Houthis’ traditional enemies. Most surprisingly, one of those given the most credit for the virtual coup is Saleh, their former antagonist. Reportedly Saleh saw the Houthi advance as an opportunity to strike back at his former, right-hand man Ali Mohsin, who turned on him in the 2011 uprising. Evidence of Saleh’s assistance to the rebel advance prompted the United Nations Security Council to impose sanctions on Saleh and two Houthi leaders in November 2014.  

But Saleh is not the only odd bedfellow. Saudi Arabia views the Houthis as a dangerous Iranian proxy, but they did not support the group’s opponents this time, possibly due to broader regional rivalries. The poor performance of the transitional government and the resulting perpetual instability also strengthened the Houthi cause.

What sparked this latest string of events?

After the September takeover by the Houthis in Sanaa, Hadi had entered peace negotiations with the group, resulting in a new political arrangement, the Peace and National Partnership Agreement (PNPA). This technically left Hadi’s government still in charge but displaced an earlier agreement brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council in 2011, which has been the operative political framework since the 2011 Arab Spring crisis. The Houthis had long complained that the GCC agreement – signed only by the two main political coalitions – excluded not only them but also Hiraak from taking part in government. The PNPA forced a reorganization of the cabinet, including for the first time, allocation of ministerial representation to the Houthis and Hiraak. Since then Hadi’s government and the new cabinet have been nominally in control, but the Houthis did not withdraw their military forces.

Then on Jan. 14, a first draft of Yemen’s new Constitution was leaked to the press.  The new Constitution follows from the 2011 GCC agreement,  alarming the Houthis that the new PNPA framework was not being respected. They also have had long-standing objections to some of the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference that would have been cemented in the new Constitution.

After the Constitution draft was released, the Houthis on Jan. 14 kidnapped Hadi’s chief of staff and the former secretary-general of the National Dialogue, Ahmed bin Mubarak, who had been heavily involved in overseeing the Constitution drafting. A deal brokered on Jan. 21, which ultimately fell apart, would have exchanged the release of Mubarak and the withdrawal of Houthi forces from the Presidential Palace for significant changes to the proposed Constitution.

What is USIP’s engagement in Yemen?

USIP has supported the development of rule of law in Yemen since 2011. It provided grants and training on comparative rule of law and justice in transition to civil society. In 2012 and 2013, USIP began engaging local officials and communities Marib and Abyan in local Justice and Security Dialogues.

These two governorates will be critical areas to watch as this current crisis unfolds. Abyan was the governorate overrun by al-Qaida in the 2011, and it remains extremely vulnerable to transnational terrorist groups should a similar security vacuum emerge now. Marib has been the center of recent AQAP-Houthi conflicts, and ongoing attacks on oil and electricity pipelines there continue to undermine economic stability in Yemen.

USIP also has supported extensive research and analysis on rule of law and conflict dynamics in the post-Arab Spring transition. USIP-supported research hashave examined how the underlying multi-polar political dynamics led to this transition crisis, and how process issues in the National Dialogue Conference may have allowed the current political stalemate to continue.

Large-scale mapping and survey projects examined security and justice provision in half of Yemen’s governorates, perceptions toward transition in four key governorates, and the waning ability of traditional conflict resolution and mediation mechanisms to staunch violence.