Hamdaniya

Located about 20 miles east of Mosul, Hamdaniya is one of 14 districts contested by the Government of Iraq (GOI) and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). It is comprised of three sub-districts: Hamdaniya Center (more commonly known as Qaraqosh, and also as Bakhdida), Bartella, and Nimrud. It is home to Christian and Shabak communities, as well as smaller populations of Yazidis (Ezidis), Kaka’is, Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmens. Each subdistrict has a different demographic composition and varies with regards to social and political dynamics.

Hamdaniya Center is mainly inhabited by members of various Christian denominations (Assyrians, Chaldeans, and Syriacs). It also includes a significant presence of Shabaks and, to a lesser extent, Kaka’is. One of the main security actors in Hamdaniya Center is the Nineveh Protection Unit (NPU), an armed group linked to the Assyrian Democratic Union party. Despite falling officially under the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) umbrella, the NPU is perceived to be largely independent from the PMF.

The subdistrict of Bartella is largely composed of members of the Christian and Shabak communities, though unlike Hamdaniya Center, the Shabaks are perceived as more dominant socially and politically. This is largely due to the presence of security actors composed mainly of Shabaks, such as the PMF 30th Brigade.

In Nimrud, the social composition includes a large Sunni Arab population and a smaller, though sizeable, Shabak community. The main security actors in Nimrud are those tied to the federal government of Iraq, including the Iraqi Security Forces.

In the post-ISIS period, Hamdaniya district as a whole has seen an increase in tensions between members of the various Christian denominations and those from the Shabak community over land, political representation, security, and cultural identity. These tensions are magnified by the district’s disputed status, which has caused competition—for the loyalty of and influence over residents—between factions tied either to the federal government or KRG.

Sinjar

Located in western Nineveh, Sinjar district is also disputed between the KRG and the GOI. The district is comprised of three subdistricts: Sinjar Center, Sinuni, and Qayrawan. Sinjar Center is home to a majority Yazidi community, with a smaller Arab and Kurd Shia population; Sinuni’s population is made up of members of the Sunni Arab community and the Yazidi community; and Qayrawan is predominately comprised of the Sunni Arab community, with tribal dynamics—the Shummar, Al-Bumtaiwat, and Johesh are the largest tribes—particularly salient in the subdistrict.

Current social and political dynamics are impacted by several historical and recent developments, including the Arabization strategy implemented by the Baathist regime in the 1970s that sought to buttress support for the regime by changing the demographics of the district in favor of the Sunni Arab community (it also affected other areas, such as Hamdaniya). This strategy came at the expense of the Yazidi community, a large segment of whom were displaced into government-owned townships. The former subdistrict of Al-Qahtaniya, which has a majority Yazidi population, was also detached from the district. In its place, the Sunni Arab majority subdistrict of Qayrawan was added. More recently, the atrocities committed by ISIS against the Yazidi community have strained relations between Yazidis and Sunni Arabs, with demands for justice and accountability high.

In terms of political dynamics, the district was largely under the control of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the KRG from 2003 until ISIS’s attack in 2014. The battle against ISIS and the September 2017 KRG independence referendum changed political and security dynamics as new political and military actors entered the district, namely the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), the People’s Protection Units (YPG) and Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS; also referred to as Civil Protection Units). This in turn led to two rival local administrations for Sinjar: a new one supported by PMF leaders, and the one supported by the KDP and KRG. The bifurcation of governance units coincided with a fragmented security environment in the district, with Iraqi security forces, Peshmerga forces, PMF groups and their local affiliates, and the PKK and their local proxies positioned throughout the district. Complicating the security situation further is Turkey’s repeated strikes and threats against the PKK and its affiliates in Sinjar. 

In October 2020, the GOI and KRG signed a pact that attempts to resolve these administrative and security challenges. It calls for the establishment of one recognized local administration headed by a neutral figure; for security in the district to be the sole domain of the local police, National Security Service, and intelligence; and for removal of other security forces from the district’s boundaries—explicitly requiring removal of the PKK from the district and the surrounding areas. The agreement, which remains unimplemented as of May 2023, is seen as a needed but insufficient step to addressing the issues afflicting Sinjar. Communities are particularly aggrieved that the agreement did not take their needs and concerns into account. Communities have also voiced concerns that the agreement does not address other key tensions in the district, such as the strained relationship between Sunni Arabs and Yazidis.

Tal Afar

Tal Afar is located in northwestern Nineveh, between Sinjar and Mosul, and is made up of four subdistricts: Tal Afar Center, Ayadhiyah, Zummar, and Rabia. The majority of Tal Afar’s population is considered Turkmen, split between Sunni and Shia communities. These communities largely reside in Tal Afar Center. Ayadhiyah’s demographic groups include sizable Sunni Arab and Kurdish communities, as well as a smaller Sunni Turkmen community. Rabia’s main demographic group is Sunni Arabs, with Shummar and Johesh the leading tribes in the area. Zummar is considered a disputed territory and has residents from the Sunni Arab and Kurdish communities.

In the post-ISIS period, pre-existing tensions between the Sunni and Shia Turkmen communities were exacerbated and new ones created. Such tensions include concerns about marginalization and exclusion, demographic change, and support for violent extremism. Tensions between Kurds and Arabs in Zummar were also heightened in the post-ISIS period, as reports surfaced about Peshmerga forces preventing Arab families from returning to the subdistrict. Recent efforts to allay intra- and inter-communal tensions have culminated in local peaceful coexistence agreements announced in Tal Afar Center, Ayadhiyah, and Zummar. USIP supported the processes that culminated in the agreements in Ayadhiyah and Tal Afar Center. The PMF, ISF, and local police are all present in the district.

Tal Keif

North of Mosul, Tal Keif is made up of four subdistricts: Tal Keif Center, Al-Qosh, Wana, Tal Skuf, and Fayda. The district is a predominantly Christian area, but is also home to Yazidis and a small Sunni Arab population. Post-ISIS, the relationship between Sunni Arabs and their Christian and Yazidi neighbors has frayed. Demographic changes and the division of control between the Iraqi government and KRG has left many of Tal Keif’s Christians scattered across northern Iraq, hesitant to return because of uncertain security conditions. With local security provisions split between the Iraqi Security Forces, PMF, and KRG, ISIS threats loom given Tal Keif’s two ISIS detention centers and terrorism court. Tal Keif Christians are also concerned about permanent changes to the demographic composition in traditional communities. The large number of displaced Sunni Arab families that resettled in Tal Keif after ISIS took over Mosul are playing increasing roles in local governance.

Mosul

Mosul, Nineveh’s most populous district and the seat of the provincial capital, is comprised of six sub-districts: Bashiqa, Hammam Al-Alil, Mahalabiya, Mosul Center (also known as Mosul City), Qayyarah, and Shoura. Bashiqa is considered a disputed territory as lands were detached from Hamdaniya district and merged with the sub-district as part of the Arabization campaign undertaken by the Baathist regime. The population of the district, largely concentrated in Mosul Center, is mainly composed of members from the Sunni Arab community, with smaller Christian, Ezidi, Kurdish, and Turkmen communities spread across the various sub-districts. 

Mosul district was heavily impacted by ISIS: the extremist group made Mosul its capital up until the district was liberated in July 2017. ISIS’s control of the district and the subsequent fight to defeat it led to heavy casualties and the displacement of 1.7 million people. By 2020, the majority of those displaced during the conflict had returned to their areas of origin, per UNHCR. A key issue in Mosul in the post-ISIS period has been the return and reintegration of families with perceived ISIS affiliation.