Across locations, each community’s perceptions of obstacles to reconciliation are highly specific to the local context and each community’s particular grievances. But across all locations and communities, the most significant obstacle to reconciliation is lack of political will. This likely stems from the interaction communities have had with government actors tasked with advancing reconciliation, which, despite rhetoric about catering to their grievances, has engendered little progress.

• In Hamdaniya, majorities of both Christians and Shabaks increasingly believe that reconciliation is both necessary and possible. However, Christians perceive that although reconciliation is possible, lack of knowledge and incompetence in current approaches are significant obstacles. These perceptions have caused many Christians to be dismissive of reconciliation processes, regardless of their desire to reconcile.  This in turn has led to a general dismissive attitude towards reconciliation and has caused some Christian leaders and community members to withdraw from processes spearheaded by the government and international community.
• Most Yazidis from Sinjar district—both IDPs and those in their home communities—see reconciliation as necessary, but not possible. A significant obstacle they identified is lack of tribal will, signaling that Arab tribal leaders have not done enough. Many also believe that local people do not want to reconcile. This supports qualitative data indicating that Yazidis perceive reconciliation with the Sunni Arab community as contingent on several preconditions, including criminal prosecution, truth-seeking, and compensation and reparations for ISIS crimes.
  
  
  
  • Sinjar Yazidis living in their home communities overwhelmingly believe that reconciliation requires a discussion of past violence and abuses, and this inclination increased significantly over time (in Sinuni, from 26 percent in wave one to 84 percent in wave two, and 82 percent in wave three; in Sinjar Center, from 56 percent in wave two to 82 percent in wave three).
  • This contrasts starkly with Sinjar’s Sunni Arabs (both IDPs and residents) and Yazidi IDPs. Sunni Arabs living in Sinjar Center and IDPs from Sinuni feel the best way to move on is to leave the past behind without a truth-seeking process. Of Yazidi IDPs from Sinuni, only a third (31 percent) expressed a preference for talking about previous experiences of violence.
  • In Tal Keif, both the Christians and other residents (which includes Arabs and Shabaks) believe reconciliation is necessary, but in contrast to Hamdaniya, Arabs and Shabaks are less confident that it is possible. Arab and Shabak responses identifying main impediments to reconciliation were varied and did not show strong identification with any one obstacle. Tal Keif Christians—though they do believe reconciliation is necessary and possible—identified most strongly with lack of political will and lack of knowledge and competence as the main impediments.

• Further analysis is needed on the apparent drop in Yazidis’ (IDPs and residents) and Tal Keif Christians’ closer identification with their ethno-sectarian component. This could be a real trend but could also be an issue with sampling and/or changes in the survey methodology for this indicator. Wave four data will also help clarify the apparent drop.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

• Yazidi and Christian respondents are concerned about demographic changes in their districts and see it as a source of harm. They believe their interests would be better advanced by ethno-sectarian political parties and local (district and subdistrict) councils composed of their co-religionists. A majority of Hamdaniya Christians do not want IDPs from other communities to return. These positions should not be seen as subscribing to an ancient hatreds narrative as, for example, Christians in Tal Keif hold more positive views on ethno-sectarian diversity. Rather, in Hamdaniya these perceptions likely spring from institutional grievances and imbalances in local power dynamics as the Hamdaniya Christians continue to feel threatened by demographic changes caused by the exodus of Christians and influx of Shabaks from surrounding areas.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

• The majority of Hamdaniya Christian respondents believe that a more representative district council would help allay tensions in the district, a view largely rejected by the majority of Shabak respondents. Issues of local representation are key to understanding the grievances of the Christian community in Hamdaniya, considering the district’s growing Shabak population.
• Although a majority of respondents across all locations feel politically or socially marginalized, the Hamdaniya Christians and Yazidis from Sinjar district are distinguished in that both communities overwhelmingly rank the central government first in who they blame for their marginalization and neglect. This perception may strengthen the appeal of ethno-sectarian political representation and locally homogenous administrative (district and subdistrict) councils.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

• Majorities of Arabs and Yazidis in Sinjar district, as well as both Christians and Shabaks in Hamdaniya believe that members of other local ethno-religious communities mistrust them. In Hamdaniya, only in wave three, mistrust was probed further by asking whether respondents trust other communities: 83 percent of Shabak respondents noted that they trust others, whereas only 55 percent of Christians do. Perceptions of being mistrusted by others appear to be lower overall in Tal Keif, particularly with Christian residents.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

• Majorities of respondents from almost all communities persistently perceive their community’s grievances are misunderstood by other communities, and that they are more marginalized than others. Most respondents stated that their communities are “very” or “somewhat” marginalized and that other communities do not completely acknowledge their suffering. Conversely, the majority of respondents from all communities believe that other communities in their area are only “somewhat” or “not at all” marginalized—in other words, very few believe that other communities in their areas also face very serious marginalization and neglect.
• Respondents from across communities (between 30 and 60 percent in each with few exceptions) believe service provision and reconstruction efforts are not distributed evenly in their areas. This probably reinforces perceptions of marginalization and that government actors favor some communities over others.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

• Most respondents also display awareness of the potential for progress toward social cohesion. With only a few exceptions, majorities of each population in Ninewa acknowledge that other local components have legitimate political grievances. Most respondents agreed there are issues on which their community should compromise to achieve peaceful outcomes with other groups in their areas. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

• Notable exceptions included Yazidi residents of Sinjar Center and Sinuni, and Christian residents of Hamdaniya. Majorities from both communities expressed limited or no willingness to compromise with other identity groups and became less likely to want to compromise over time. For the Yazidis living in their home communities, unwillingness to compromise is likely a function of perceptions that compromise cannot happen in the absence of justice for genocide perpetrators. It may also coincide with the Yazidis’ growing dominance in local security provision, such that they have less incentive to compromise with Sunni Arab neighbors they perceive as somewhat complicit in ISIS atrocities. The opposite dynamic manifests in Hamdaniya, where Christians feel increasingly dominated by Shabaks, both politically and in terms of local security. Given the relative power imbalance, Christians eschew compromising from a weaker position and on issues—such as demographic change—they see as externally imposed against their will.
• Another notable contrast is that the majority of displaced Yazidis and Christians do favor compromise with other identity groups, although these majorities have dwindled over time. The reasons for this vary and are likely linked to displacement dynamics. Displaced communities might feel compromise could help facilitate their return, whereas returnees may be less likely to see compromise as desirable based on their local dynamics. It may also be that displaced Christians and Yazidis are living farther removed from the conflict environment, whereas those who have returned to locations where social tensions are aggravated by “the other”—as in those who may have supported or sympathized with ISIS genocidaires—next door

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

• Most respondents view the responses, decisions, and policies of both the central and provincial governments as insufficient in addressing their needs—particularly in disputed areas. Disillusionment with government performance is particularly acute in Sinjar district, where the Government of Iraq (GoI) and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) are still embroiled in a dispute over jurisdiction. As a result, respondents feel neither GoI nor KRG are providing basic services to the people of Sinjar.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

• Non-Christians (including Sunni Arabs and Shabaks) in Tal Keif are satisfied with the performance of both federal and provincial authorities in comparison to Christians—another indicator of how salient the GoI-KRG dispute over territories is for communities in Ninewa. The contrast may correlate with the division of Tal Keif between two distinct administrations, one federal and another under KRG authority. The Christians of Tal Keif live in areas in which GoI is not present, and thus perceive the central government as not responding to any of their needs.
• Across all locations, the vast majority of respondents feel the state either acknowledges the hardships impacting their community only ‘a little’ or ‘not at all.’  Percentages of respondents who feel the state acknowledges their communities’ suffering are not only extremely low, they decreased over time

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

• In Sinjar and Sinuni subdistricts, the vast majority of Sunni Arab respondents believe political leaders in the district stir up sectarian divisions to mobilize support—in contrast to Yazidi, Shia, and Kurdish respondents who feel political leaders work across the ethno-sectarian divide. The dynamics of Sinjar district gives some perspective on these views: Yazidi political and security factions dominate, the relationship between Yazidis and their Sunni neighbors is strained following ISIS’ crimes, and an ongoing political rapprochement is occurring internally in the Yazidi community.
• In Hamdaniya, the majority of both Christian and Shabak residents feel political leaders stoke sectarianism to mobilize support. Between waves two and three, the number of Shabak respondents who feel leaders foment sectarian divisions decreased (84 percent to 58 percent), whereas the number of Christians who see district leaders as being divisive increased (58 percent to 68 percent). One outlier is the Christian IDP community from Hamdaniya, whose perceptions of political leaders’ sectarian stoking first spiked in wave two (from 52 to 73 percent) and then decreased sharply in wave three (to 30 percent).
• The majority of Christian and non-Christian residents in Tal Keif also feel political leaders are spurring ethno-sectarian divisions to gain support—a view that has become more prominent across waves. The increase was consistent across both resident communities—rising from approximately 40 percent in the first wave to around 60 percent in the third wave.
• In Tal Afar, the views are mixed. In the subdistrict of Zummar, a slight majority of Kurdish residents feel that district leaders work across the ethno-sectarian divide, a view not shared by the majority of Sunni Arab residents. In the subdistrict of Ayadhiya, the majority of both Sunni Arabs and Turkmen residents feel that political leaders do not stir up sectarian sentiments but instead work across communities to gain support.

• By May 2019, a majority of residents in most communities felt comfortable moving around their areas (between 68 and 98 percent), compared to February 2018 (when the lowest was 12 percent, among Sinjar Center Yazidi residents, and highs were in the 70s and 80s among primarily Sunni Arab communities). In Hamdaniya, both Christian and Shabak residents demonstrated a sharp increase in comfort moving around their areas safely over time, with 92 percent of both Christian and Shabak respondents reporting comfort moving around by May 2019, up from 49 percent and 70 percent in February 2018, respectively. Responses from Yazidi residents of Sinjar district also showed a significant increase in perceptions of safe movement. Future data collection may reflect changes in perceptions based on developments in late 2019 and early 2020, including changes to power dynamics and positioning of prominent Popular Mobilization Forces in Hamdaniya and Tal Keif, and an increase in ISIS attacks and several Turkish airstrikes in Sinjar.
• The majority of communities in the areas surveyed feel that they can express their ethno-sectarian identity without fear of violence against them. This trend was consistent for all communities—with one exception—over the course of the three waves. This indicates that intimidation and physical actions by security actors are not focused on restricting religious practice or voices and are more political in nature. The one community for whom this sentiment did not prevail was Sunni Arabs in Sinuni.

Note that data collection did not distinguish between particular security actors or armed groups.

• In Sinjar district, both Yazidi residents and IDPs are unlikely to perceive that security actors treat them fairly. However, Yazidi IDPs from Sinuni feel intimidated by security actors in their areas of origin, whereas Yazidis living in their home communities do not. This difference could be explained by the Yazidis’ ties to KRG and the dramatic changes in Sinjar political and security actors since 2014. Prior to this, KRG’s Peshmerga units and local affiliates controlled the district. Following the defeat of ISIS and changing political dynamics after KRG’s independence referendum in 2017, Peshmerga units and local affiliates withdrew as federal forces entered, leaving federal forces and PMF-aligned local units in control of much of the district. Rather than a preference for the status ante, Yazidis living in Sinjar are now (a) concerned that security is divided such that escalation of violence could occur quickly, and (b) intimidated because the security forces present are connected to non-local centers of power such as Baghdad, Iran, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), or the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) versus Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)-aligned Peshmerga.
• For Shia and Sunni Arabs from Sinjar district, perceptions that security actors treat them fairly are higher than other communities—but still fairly low. A plurality of Shia respondents (Kurds and Arabs) from Sinjar subdistrict do feel security actors treat them fairly. For Sunni Arabs from Sinjar district, there is a significant difference between IDPs and residents: In wave three, only 7 percent of Sunni Arab IDPs from Sinjar Center perceive fair treatment by security actors or armed groups, whereas 57 percent of residents from Sinuni do perceive fair treatment.
• In Hamdaniya, there is no sharp discrepancy between Christians’ and Shabaks’ perceptions of equal treatment by security actors or armed groups. In fact, in wave three, Christian residents of Hamdaniya were 20 percent more likely to feel they are treated fairly by security actors (63 percent) by security actors/armed groups than both Christian IDPs and Shabaks (43 percent and 42 percent, respectively).
• In Tal Keif, Christians are generally more likely than their Arab and Shabak neighbors to perceive equal treatment by security actors—but both communities displayed a sharp drop in perceptions of being treated the same. Christians’ perception of equal treatment dropped from 82 to 41 percent, whereas Arab and Shabak perceptions of equal treatment dropped from low to lower (26 to 10 percent).

• The majority of Sunni Arab IDPs from Sinjar Center overwhelmingly blame their continued displacement on security actors purposefully blocking their returns and feel intimidated by security actors in their areas of origin. Averaged across waves, approximately 80 percent of Sunni IDPs felt intimidated. By contrast, Christian IDPs from Hamdaniya and Yazidi IDPs from Sinuni are less likely to feel intimidated by security actors in their home communities (averages of approximately 35 and 50 percent, respectively).
• Sunni Arab residents of Sinuni do not feel that they can express their ethno-sectarian identity without fear of violence against them. These feelings likely stem from the traumatic aftermath of ISIS and the damage it did to community relationships. Yazidis and other communities, as well as security actors, continue to harbor mistrust towards the Sunni Arab community. This has manifested in various ways, including IDPs being blocked from returning, collective punishment against whole families or tribes where one member was convicted of being an ISIS supporter, and, in some cases, acts of revenge violence.
• In May 2019, neither Yazidi IDP respondents from Sinuni nor Christian IDP respondents from Hamdaniya perceive security actors in their areas of origin to be deliberately blocking their return. Christian IDPs from Hamdaniya put lack of services, the absence of livelihood opportunities, and not wanting to return as the main reasons for not returning. Yazidi IDPs from Sinuni rank the lack of livelihood opportunities, lack of services, destruction of property, and lack of safety/poor security as the main factors keeping them displaced. For the Yazidi IDPs who do not perceive deliberate blockage as a barrier to return but do perceive poor security as a main impediment, this likely relates to a general fear of ISIS reconstituting and the multiplicity of politically aligned security actors in the district. The instability generated by strikes from Turkey against PKK-affiliates is also part of the IDPs’ overall concern.