“Somebody from a developing country said to me, ‘What we get from China is an airport. What we get from the United States is a lecture.’ ” — Larry Summers, former U.S. Secretary of the Treasury

Amid ongoing U.S.-China competition, Summers’ observation encapsulates one of the key reasons for China’s success across the Global South — particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean. China delivers when it comes to building infrastructure, whether it’s airports and sports stadiums or 5G networks courtesy of Huawei and ZTE.

Argentine President Alberto Fernandez and Chinese President Xi Jinping meet to discuss deepening their two countries’ partnership Beijing, China, Oct. 18, 2023. (Facebook/Casa Rosada)
Argentine President Alberto Fernandez and Chinese President Xi Jinping meet to discuss deepening their two countries’ partnership Beijing, China, Oct. 18, 2023. (Facebook/Casa Rosada)

Meanwhile, the United States too often is lecturing about human rights and the need for democratization. While the U.S. goals are laudable, a lack of accompanying concrete benefits means they are seen more as hectoring than as useful policy approaches.

Worse, when American and Western nations do provide tangible investments, they are accompanied by Western environmental, social and governance requirements. By contrast, there often are far fewer immediate strings attached to Chinese aid.

Not surprisingly, China has made major inroads into Latin America and the Caribbean. As the House Foreign Affairs Committee notes, in 2021 alone, “Chinese state-owned companies … funded $11.3 billion worth of projects in South American countries.”

Huawei is one of the main providers of 5G equipment for Brazil and Mexico and currently is bidding on 5G infrastructure projects across the rest of Central and South America. Huawei Marine Networks, meanwhile, plans to lay submarine cables (which can carry substantially more data than satellite systems) between Brazil and the African countries of Cape Verde and Cameroon.

China also has outsize positions in mining in South America — controlling 100% of Peruvian iron ore production, for example — and has positioned itself to control key resources associated with electric vehicles. China also has longstanding contracts with nations such as Bolivia for their lithium production, a key part of batteries.

For the United States, this is a radically different challenge than the one presented by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. U.S.-Soviet competition was largely one undertaken in the military arena. And while the Soviets sought to suborn and undermine various governments across Latin America, its appeal was inherently limited. Regimes like the Castros in Cuba and the Sandanistas in Nicaragua had little to offer their population beyond dialectics and ideological diatribes. Few populations were better off under Soviet-style communist regimes.

But the People’s Republic of China (PRC), through construction of airports and railways, as well as the provision of cheap advanced technology, has far broader appeal, not only to governments eager to modernize their nation but also to local populations that can see the benefits of access to cell phones and the Internet. Moreover, unlike Moscow, Beijing has shown little tendency to remake local governments in its own image. Whether democracies or dictatorships, Beijing has proven an equal-opportunity trading partner.

And a military role may not be far off. The PRC has already been negotiating the establishment of a joint training facility in Cuba, which would put Chinese troops barely 100 miles from American shores. Meanwhile, it has also been exploring the possibility of selling advanced fighter jets to Argentina.

For the United States, it is essential that it implement a comprehensive strategy to counter these major Chinese advances in the region. America’s southern flank already has proven porous, whether to illegal immigrants (including Chinese) or to fentanyl. South American states are major trading partners, but as Presidents Lula da Silva, Nicolas Maduro and the late Hugo Chavez have demonstrated, their leaders can also choose to align with Beijing. It is no accident that Argentina is one of the new BRICS states.

The American response, however, must go beyond periodic speeches and military exercises. American investment remains sought after, even preferred, because it is far more transparent and less likely to incur debt traps. American assistance in helping local states review contracts and deals with the Chinese, in this regard, would forestall some of the worst Chinese practices, whether it be usurious interest rates or crippling terms that mortgage national sovereignty.

American assistance in cyber security would help many states retain their intellectual property, while limiting the ability of China to exploit the open digital border.

Above all, it is essential that the United States mobilize its resources — financial, intellectual, political and cultural — to create a 21st century version of the Alliance for Progress, rooted in the belief that cooperation between North and South America will provide far greater benefits for all than anything an authoritarian, mercantilist China can offer.

This op-ed was originally published by the Miami Herald.


Related Publications

Myanmar Scam Hubs Revive Fast After China Eases Pressure on Junta

Myanmar Scam Hubs Revive Fast After China Eases Pressure on Junta

Thursday, September 26, 2024

Transnational crime groups in Southeast Asia, hit with intense scrutiny and law enforcement action earlier this year, are moving into new areas and adapting their operations as they revive and expand global scam operations. In Myanmar — a key center of this internet-based criminal activity — extreme political instability combined with the connivance of the country’s military and its militias continue to provide fertile ground for crime groups, albeit in new configurations. At the same time, a sudden shift in China’s posture toward Myanmar’s military regime has eased pressure on the scam industry, allowing criminal networks to further scale up their malign activities.

Type: Analysis

EconomicsGlobal PolicyHuman Rights

What Does the Emerging China-Africa Minerals Consensus Mean for U.S. Initiatives?

What Does the Emerging China-Africa Minerals Consensus Mean for U.S. Initiatives?

Thursday, September 12, 2024

The recently concluded Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) provided a revealing glimpse into the current state of the Africa-China relationship. On the one hand, the official imagery and language of the summit emphasized constancy — a vision of a stable South-South relationship stretching from the past into the future. On the other hand, the summit also projected a relationship that is being reshaped for a new decade.

Type: Analysis

EconomicsEnvironment

China’s Bid for a Bigger Security Role in Africa

China’s Bid for a Bigger Security Role in Africa

Thursday, September 12, 2024

Last week, China welcomed more than 50 African leaders to Beijing for the ninth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which has met every three years since 2000 to coordinate economic and political relations. FOCAC is China’s main platform for Belt and Road-affiliated projects and Chinese plans for infrastructure development have generally dominated the action plans that come out of the forum. In recent years, exchanges between Chinese and African political parties, legislatures and local governments have also been a focus of the forum. China has also found in FOCAC a source of support for international relations principles it prioritizes, including noninterference and its "one China" principle. While security cooperation has been an element of FOCAC for more than a decade, this year’s forum saw an unprecedented Chinese emphasis on its role in security on the continent.

Type: Analysis

Global Policy

How China Is Leveraging Security Cooperation in Central Asia

How China Is Leveraging Security Cooperation in Central Asia

Monday, September 9, 2024

The July 2024 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in in Astana, Kazakhstan provided China with another platform to highlight its vision for global governance and security. While the SCO has expanded to include states beyond Central Asia, the organization’s focus on fighting terrorism, separatism and extremism — the so-called “three evils” — is particularly relevant for China in Central Asia, where Beijing looks to test and advance its security cooperation strategies. The SCO, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Global Security Initiative (GSI) are key components of China’s ambition to offer an alternative to what it calls “Western hegemony” and to resist external interference in the domestic affairs of SCO states.

Type: Analysis

Global Policy

View All Publications