KEY TAKEAWAYS
KEY TAKEAWAYS
The ongoing war in Gaza was only one of several items on the agenda for last week’s summit of leading Western economies, known as the Group of 7 (G7). But, given the global attention on Gaza and coming on the heels of the Biden administration’s most recent push to achieve a cease-fire — including sponsorship of a U.N. Security Council resolution toward that end — questions around the prospects for a negotiated pause in fighting and hostage agreement dominated the discussions.
President Biden’s own words in response to the non-stop queries about the ongoing Gaza war — “I haven’t lost hope, but it’s going to be tough” — represent the extent to which the aspirations and commitments articulated in the Gaza-focused paragraphs of the G7 communique represent a tall order in the current climate.
In some ways, the Gaza portion of the G7 communique can be read as aligned world leaders’ cri de cœur on what should be done by the parties to turn the conflict toward a pause, relief and ultimately resolution. The statement called for parties to:
This is a list that underscored the daunting scope and scale of the roadblocks to a “credible pathway toward peace that leads to a two-state solution.”
The eight months of devastation that began on October 7 place in stark relief the imperative of pursuing a diplomatic endgame.
The G7’s goals represent the views of a significant swath of the international community, as the eight months of devastation that began on October 7 place in stark relief the imperative of pursuing a diplomatic endgame. But the parties themselves hold a different set of seemingly irreconcilable conceptions and calculations.
Israel and Hamas do not seem to be signaling imminent progress toward a cease-fire. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has insisted on “the destruction of Hamas’ military and governing capabilities,” before a permanent cease-fire can take place. Despite being significantly weakened, Hamas’ Gaza leadership seems to have estimated that the group can survive the war and retain control of the Strip. Hamas is relying on indicators of sympathy and support among Palestinians who back resistance to Israel alongside what it sees as a concomitant erosion of support for Israel in the international arena. It is also pursuing a strategy of bleeding Israeli forces and resolve through damage and sustained displacement, even if the result leads to massive Palestinian casualties.
Meanwhile, last week, former Israeli generals Benny Gantz and Gadi Eizenkot resigned from their roles in the government’s war cabinet in frustration over what they articulated as Netanyahu’s failure to have a plan to end the war. Their departure reflects what appears to be a growing rift between the Israeli military and the civilian government. Eizenkot went even further, denouncing Netanyahu for prioritizing politics over national interest. Their exit will not lead to the Israeli government’s collapse, but it leaves Netanyahu more beholden to the demands and influence of the far-right members of his coalition — most notably Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir — who have threatened to leave the government (a move that would collapse the coalition) if Netanyahu “surrenders” by pursuing a cease-fire agreement.
Smotrich, Israel’s minister of finance, is also a key player in affecting the third major actor on the ground: the Palestinian Authority (PA). In the face of U.S. objections, and in defiance of an agreement to which the U.S. is party, Smotrich is withholding $150 million in tax revenues that Israel collects for the PA under the terms of the Oslo Accords. Smotrich has championed this policy as a punitive response toward the PA’s campaign to pressure Israel in the international community, whether at the International Criminal Court or via moves by some countries to recognize Palestinian statehood.
In a related move, Smotrich also indicated this week intent to further expand settlement activity in the West Bank — reportedly despite objections by Israel’s security establishment. Undermining an already teetering PA and expanding settlements bode ill for West Bank stability and contradict international calls for the parties to “avoid unilateral actions that undermine the prospect of a two-state solution.”
In the West Bank, PA solvency and Palestinian human security — in addition to a longer-term vision for the Palestinian Authority to reunite the West Bank and Gaza in Palestinian self-determination and statehood — cannot be divorced from the critical need for reform, which the G7 expressed last week and the international community has been calling on for years. The PA has long been accused of corruption, lack of transparency, ineffectiveness and illegitimacy. The situation in the West Bank today is increasingly precarious, with growing fears over the PA’s potential collapse, an economic implosion and an explosion in violence.
A June 2024 poll of Palestinians found that 69% of those polled view the PA as a burden on the Palestinian people, and 94% of West Bankers and 83% of Gazans want President Mahmoud Abbas to resign. In February, under pressure from the U.S. and other international actors, the PA announced a cabinet reshuffle, which has been viewed as mostly cosmetic: The same poll found that 72% believe the new government will not succeed in achieving any goals toward reform set by the previous government. Thus, the confluence of PA weakness and unpopularity with Hamas’ resilience and resonance mean that fragility and division among leading Palestinian actors is likely to continue, if not become worse.
In halls of power around the world, there’s near-consensus on the need for a two-state solution … but in the hearts and minds of the parties themselves, the prevailing logic is different and more complicated.
All the above highlights the present glaring divide between the theory and practice of Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution. In halls of power around the world, there’s near-consensus that the eventual end of the conflict must take the form of a two-state solution as outlined by the Oslo Accords, Clinton Parameters and other breakthroughs from decades ago. The G7 statement is only the latest example of global powers seeking to catalyze solutions to the longstanding Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
But in the hearts and minds of the parties themselves, the prevailing logic is different and more complicated — fear, anger, ideology, and trauma elevating maximalism, distrust, and revenge over compromise. Most Israelis cannot see concessions toward a future Palestinian state as anything other than a reward for Hamas’ terrorism. Beyond that, Israeli public support for a two-state solution — which was already low before October 7 — has cratered. According to an Israel Democracy Institute poll, only 29 percent of Jewish Israelis support the establishment of a Palestinian state, even if offered normalization with Saudi Arabia as an incentive.
For many Palestinians, the perceived passivity and diplomatic engagement and cooperation approach Abbas has promoted over the course of his two-decade presidency has led nowhere, whereas Hamas’ violence, time and again, has extracted concessions and brought attention to the Palestinian cause.
As Israelis and Palestinians alike experience the current crisis as existential, leaders like those who gathered at the G7 will need to wrestle with these realities.