United States Institute of Peace

Under Hasina, Bangladesh progressed in ways the next government will want to continue. She oversaw strong economic growth, rapid infrastructure development, growing rates of women in the workforce and rising income levels. After the deadly Holy Artisan terrorist attack in 2016, her government put a lid on Islamic extremism and emphasized the country’s tradition of religious pluralism. In foreign policy, she often adeptly navigated Bangladesh’s difficult balancing act between regional competitors India and China.

Yet these successes hid a complicated and often dark reality. Corruption and inequality stunted Bangladesh’s economic potential. Labor protections were poor. The ruling Awami League often placated Islamist groups to ward off conservative political challenges. State institutions were co-opted and politicized. Bangladesh’s political space became increasingly undemocratic, marked by disputed elections and credible allegations of harassment, enforced disappearances, torture and extrajudicial killings against the ruling party’s opponents.

Nobel laureate and microcredit pioneer Muhammad Yunus will steer Bangladesh's revolution as head of the new interim government, tasked with sustaining the country’s positive development and social trends while also getting its democracy on the right track. Accountability is needed for abuses and corruption during the past 15 years. Bangladesh’s key political institutions require revamping. Its political culture, long defined by zero-sum politics, must be imbued with norms of compromise and consensus. Beyond political issues, its flailing economy also needs reform.

This path will not be easy. Rehabilitating political institutions and inculcating a new political culture are massive tasks, particularly as an unelected body. The protest movement that unseated Hasina’s government lacked a unifying motive beyond ousting the prime minister. The interim government will face competing pressures from students, opposition parties and embedded bureaucratic actors, who all have different agendas.

If deadlock and vested interests restrain reform, Bangladesh could face an unstable future. Elections are needed to reestablish legitimate governance but, if held prematurely, they could entrench an established political elite that likely has less interest in systemic change. If Bangladesh’s Gen-Z protesters sense a reversion to the status quo under a new political banner, they will turn their ire on the next government, reviving unrest. After Hasina’s fall, political violence and anti-minority attacks have resurfaced and could continue to rise during a period of prolonged political instability.

International players can shape how this situation develops. India saw the Awami League as a key ally, protecting Delhi’s security, trade and geopolitical interests along their long mutual border. In exchange, India stood by Hasina through controversial elections and human rights concerns, which ironically made her less responsive to domestic calls for political liberalization and consequently more vulnerable to the type of uprising that dislodged her. China also backed Hasina as a reliable partner for its economic interests. Neither country proactively seeks democracy in Bangladesh and both will now warily watch the rise of a political opposition that often criticized the Hasina government for its obeisance to regional powers.

The United States is well outside Bangladesh’s neighborhood but still has important interests at stake. The U.S. is Bangladesh’s largest destination for garment exports and a key source of the country’s foreign direct investment. It has invested heavily in assisting Rohingya refugees in southeastern Bangladesh. Despite souring relations over Bangladesh’s democracy and human rights record under Hasina, the U.S. maintained strong security and defense ties with the former government and saw Bangladesh as an emerging strategic partner in regional geopolitics.

The inevitable instability of Bangladesh’s transition imperils these interests in the short-term, but a more democratic Bangladesh is good for America. A stable, multi-party democracy with fair elections will promote accountability, putting guardrails on corruption and governmental abuse that will stabilize politics. Robust democratic institutions and civil society are also more resilient to China’s influence. Bangladesh’s erstwhile opposition often advocated liberal reforms and greater foreign policy ties to the West, indicating the potential for a strong relationship with the next government to complement already rich people-to-people ties.

Ultimately, Bangladeshis will determine their own political future, but the U.S. can help. It can encourage dialogue and compromise between political stakeholders, provide technical assistance on democratic reforms, invest in youth empowerment and support economic growth, all of which will help Bangladesh’s reformers succeed.

Bangladesh’s road forward is littered with hazards, but the forces of democracy — particularly its youth — are strong and committed. The greatest danger for Bangladesh is that its revolution remains unfinished. The citizens’ democratic aspirations have been unleashed after years of dormancy. If repressed, they are likely to burst forth again with greater ferocity. Channeling the public’s demands into a methodical restoration of political and civic institutions is more likely to set the country on a path toward stability and continued economic growth. The United States can support this effort.